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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on three distinct yet related problems that are motivated by
practices of electronics manufacturers, who satisfy stochastic demand from multiple markets
and multisource parts from several suppliers. The first problem investigates joint replenish-
ment and allocation decisions for a supplier who satisfies stochastic demand from a primary
market and a spot market. We formulate the problem as a multi-period stochastic dynamic
program and show that the optimal policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical
produce-up-to level and the critical retain-up-to level. We establish bounds for these two
quantities, discuss their economic interpretation, and use them to construct a new and effec-
tive heuristic policy. We identify two practical benchmark policies and establish thresholds
on the unit revenue earned from the spot market such that one of the two benchmark poli-
cies is optimal. Using a computational study, we quantify the benefits of the optimal policy
relative to the benchmark policies and examine the effects of demand correlation.
The second problem investigates an important extension where a supplier faces stochas-
tic demand from Class 1 along with price-sensitive stochastic demand from Class 2. We
investigate the supplier’s joint replenishment, allocation and pricing problem by formulating
it as a multi-period, two-stage stochastic dynamic program. We show that a dynamic pricing
policy is optimal at stage 2, and the stage 1 optimal policy is characterized by two quan-
tities: the critical produce-up-to level and the critical amount of inventory to be protected
from Class 1. In contrast to the optimal policy, myopic policies are less costly to evaluate,
and hence, are more practical. We establish two sufficient conditions under which a myopic
joint inventory and pricing policy is optimal. Using a computational study, we show that
the benefits of dynamic pricing to Class 2 are higher than the benefits of discretionary sales
to Class 1.
While the first two problems consider a supplier’s decision under stochastic demand from
multiple markets, the third problem considers decisions of a buyer who satisfies stochastic
ii
demand by multi-sourcing parts with percentage supply allocations (PSAs). We define PSA
as a pre-negotiated percentage of a multi-sourced part’s total demand that the buyer should
allocate to a supplier. During a recent industry collaboration, we observed that in such
settings the buyer’s demand allocation decisions are challenging due to operational changes
needed for (temporarily) switching suppliers, and lead to the bullwhip effect. Demand alloca-
tion policies that can meet PSAs and the resulting bullwhip effect have not been investigated
in the literature before. We contribute to the existing literature by introducing and analyzing
the concept of bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing. In addition, we propose and investigate
three demand allocation policies: (i) random allocation policy (RAP), which benchmarks
the current practice, (ii) time-based (CCP-T) and (iii) quantity-based cyclic consumption
(CCP-Q) policies. We show that while RAP and CCP-T always lead to bullwhip effect, the
bullwhip ratio under CCP-Q can be less than 1. We demonstrate that CCP-T and CCP-Q
can reduce the supplier’s bullwhip effect without increasing the buyer’s expected long-run
average number of supplier switches compared to RAP.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND SIGNIFICANCE
This dissertation is motivated by practices in the electronics industry. In particular, on
the outbound side, manufacturers satisfy stochastic demand from multiple markets. Sim-
ilarly, on the inbound side, manufacturers multisource parts from several suppliers. Ac-
cordingly, the objective of this dissertation is to develop quantitative models to investigate
optimal inventory and demand allocation decisions in the presence of multiple markets or
suppliers as illustrated in Figure 1. In particular, this dissertation focuses on three distinct
yet related problems. The first problem investigates joint replenishment and liquidation de-
cisions for a supplier who satisfies demand from a contractual and a spot market. The second
problem extends this to investigate a supplier’s joint replenishment, allocation and pricing
decisions under two markets. The third problem investigates a buyer’s demand allocation
decisions under multi-sourcing and their impact on the bullwhip effect.
Customer segmentation is the division of a supplier’s market into different groups of
customers such that customers in each group share similar characteristics and preferences.
Suppliers may differentiate their customers based on price, fulfillment priority, contractual
agreements, shortage costs and time of occurrence of demand. In particular, recently, several
online sales platforms have been developed for a variety of products ranging from consumer
(a) Supplier with multiple markets (b) Buyer with multiple suppliers
Figure 1: Graphical representation of different problem settings
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electronics to industrial equipment and jewelry. Various large scale suppliers frequently use
such platforms, along with discount stores and foreign distributors to sell excess inventory.
For example, computer hard drives are produced and sold by several suppliers (e.g., Samsung,
Seagate, and Western Digital) whose prominent customers include powerful manufacturers
(e.g., Apple, Dell, and HP). Each supplier may sign a long-term (typically 6 to 12 months)
contract with one or more customers (manufacturers) and may also sell their products in
online markets. It is estimated that, online trading accounts for upto one third of all pro-
curement in the electronic component industry benefiting more than 80% of the suppliers,
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and contract manufactures [2]. In fact, as noted
in the recent literature, suppliers with traditional contractual or retail customers attain
significant benefits from online markets [32]. More specifically, this provides the supplier
opportunities to save on holding costs, better utilize the production capacity, and practice
dynamic pricing. These opportunities translate into operational flexibility while improving
profits and the supplier’s ability to manage risk due to demand uncertainty.
Recognizing the potential benefits and increased relevance of such practices, the first
problem in this dissertation considers a capacitated supplier facing stochastic demand from
two markets: (i) a primary market with high priority contractual customers, and (ii) a
secondary spot market with non-contractual customers. To maximize the expected net
profit, the supplier has to make two decisions in each period: (i) how much to produce, and
(ii) if there are excess units left after satisfying the primary market demand, how many of
these to sell in the spot market (i.e., how much inventory to retain for the next period). We
build on and contribute to the literature that focuses on production and allocation decisions
under stochastic demand (e.g., [4, 31, 30, 26]). Duran et al. [31, 30] consider a similar setting
as ours and assume that customers from one [30] or both [31] markets are willing to wait.
As rightly noted by Duran et al. [31], customers’ willingness to wait or not changes the form
of the model, and results in [31] do not follow from the analysis in [30]. We extend these
models by considering that unmet demand from both markets is lost.
We model this problem as a finite horizon, multi-period stochastic dynamic program. We
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show that the optimal policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical produce-up-to
level and the critical retain-up-to level. We establish bounds for the two critical quantities,
discuss their economic interpretation, and use them to construct a new and effective heuristic
policy. We also identify two practical benchmark policies and establish thresholds on the
unit revenue earned from the spot market such that one of the two benchmark policies is
optimal. We provide closed form expressions to determine these thresholds for the infinite
horizon problem under specific conditions on the available production capacity. In general,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to theoretically determine these thresholds in closed form
for the finite horizon problem. Hence, we report results of a computational study to gain
insights regarding the behavior of the optimal policy with respect to the spot market revenue.
Our computational results also quantify the benefits of the optimal policy relative to the
benchmark policies and examine the effects of demand correlation.
The second problem in this dissertation investigates an important extension of the first
problem to further improve supplier’s operational flexibility and profits by dynamic pricing.
Specifically, we consider a supplier facing stochastic demand from two customer classes: (i)
Class 1 customers are charged an exogenously determined fixed price in each period, and (ii)
customers in Class 2 with stochastic price-sensitive demand can be charged a different price
in each period. To maximize the expected profit, the supplier has to make three decisions in
each period: (i) how much to produce, (ii) how many units to protect from Class 1 to be able
to satisfy a potentially higher profit demand from Class 2, and (iii) what price to charge to
Class 2 customers? Thus, we extend the literature that focuses on production and allocation
decisions under stochastic demand (e.g., [4, 31, 30, 26]) by considering the additional pricing
decision. In addition, we build and contribute to the literature that focuses on simultaneous
determination of optimal inventory and pricing decisions in a periodic review setting (e.g.,
[13, 24, 33, 46, 51, 59, 81]). We classify this literature as single demand Class models
[24, 33, 51, 59], and multiple demand Class models [13, 46, 81]. The multiple demand Class
models in [13, 46, 81] consider a single period problem without inventory allocation decisions.
For modeling purposes, we divide each period into two stages: Stage 1 starts at the
3
beginning of the period and ends (and stage 2 starts) after the supplier observes and satisfies
Class 1 demand. Stage 2 ends at the end of the period. We formulate the problem as a finite
horizon, multi-period, two-stage stochastic dynamic program. We show that the optimal
price charged to Class 2 customers is a function of the left-over inventory after satisfying
Class 1 demand, i.e., a dynamic pricing policy is optimal. Furthermore, the stage 1 optimal
policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical produce-up-to level and the critical
amount of inventory to be protected from Class 1. That is, a discretionary sales policy is
optimal for Class 1. Since there are three decisions for each period, and the optimal pricing
policy is state-dependent, computing the optimal policy is not straightforward. This may
make it less attractive from implementation perspective. In contrast, myopic policies are
less costly to evaluate, and hence, are readily accepted by practitioners. A myopic policy
makes decisions in each period by isolating it from the future periods. We establish two
sufficient conditions under which a myopic joint inventory and pricing policy is optimal. For
example, these conditions are satisfied when all cost and demand parameters are stationary
and any units remaining at the end of the planning horizon are salvaged at a value equal to
the unit production cost. Thus, we generalize the pure inventory models, which investigate
the optimality of myopic replenishment policies in presence of a single demand Class [5, 14,
43, 47, 53, 58, 67, 68, 77]. We conduct a computational study and quantify the benefits of
discretionary sales for Class 1 and dynamic pricing for Class 2.
Similar to the way suppliers benefit from selling to multiple markets, buyers can also
benefit from multi-sourcing and supplier diversification. In fact multi-sourcing with percent-
age supply allocations (PSAs) is common across all industries including electronics, health
care, supermarkets and retail supply chains [9, 48, 76]. We define PSA as a pre-negotiated
percentage of the multi-sourced part’s total demand that the buyer should allocate to a
supplier in order to get discounts (commonly called as market share discounts [8, 57]) or
avoid penalties, depending on the specific agreement. In the electronics industry a contract
with PSAs is usually implemented along with vendor managed inventory (VMI) programs
in the form of commitments, which are binding on the buyer and suppliers.
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Accordingly, the third problem in this dissertation considers a buyer (e.g., electronics
manufacturer), who faces stochastic demand for its end-product, which is an assembly of
several parts. We consider a specific part that is multi-sourced via a VMI program with
PSAs. An important decision that the buyer makes under multi-sourcing is how to allocate
demand (or orders) among various suppliers. We address the buyer’s demand allocation
decision for the multi-sourced part with the objective to meet the PSAs for each supplier.
The challenge is that demand is stochastic, and at any given time, inventory from only one
supplier can be used and switching from one supplier to another is expensive [48]. During
a recent industry collaboration with a major computer manufacturer, we observed that the
demand allocation policy used in current practice creates two main challenges: (i) it may
not be effective in meeting PSAs, (ii) it can significantly increase the variability of the
demand observed by the suppliers, leading to the bullwhip effect [48]. Bullwhip effect is the
amplification of demand variability as customer orders travel upstream of the supply chain
and leads to supply chain inefficiencies [10, 12, 52].
In multi-sourcing settings, buyer’s demand allocation policies that can meet PSAs and
the resulting bullwhip effect are not addressed in the existing literature. To fill these gaps,
we propose and investigate three practical policies: (i) random allocation policy (RAP),
which benchmarks the current practice, (ii) time-based cyclic consumption policy (CCP-T)
and (iii) quantity-based cyclic consumption policy (CCP-Q). We compare their performance
based on (i) long-run fraction of total demand allocated to each supplier, (ii) buyer’s expected
long-run average number of supplier switches, and (iii) supplier’s bullwhip effect under multi-
sourcing. We contribute to the current literature by demonstrating the existence of bullwhip
effect caused due to demand allocation policies under multi-sourcing. We term it as the
bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing and emphasize its absence in single-sourcing systems.
We show that while RAP and CCP-T always lead to bullwhip effect, the bullwhip ratio under
CCP-Q can be less than 1. Our results offer new insights that substantiate the exclusionary,
and hence, anti-competitive effects of a contract with PSAs under RAP. We demonstrate,
analytically where possible and numerically if not, that CCP-T and CCP-Q can reduce the
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supplier’s bullwhip effect without increasing the buyer’s expected long-run average number
of supplier switches compared to RAP. Furthermore, when negotiating a contract with the
buyer, suppliers will find our results valuable to carefully select the service levels that they
commit to provide based on the agreed upon PSA.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we introduce
the first problem, discuss the relevant literature and present our results and findings. In
Chapter III, we introduce the second problem, discuss the relevant literature and present
our results and findings. In Chapter IV, we introduce the third problem, discuss the relevant
literature and present our results and findings. We make concluding remarks and summarize
the contributions of this dissertation in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER II
JOINT REPLENISHMENT AND LIQUIDATION DECISIONS UNDER
CONTRACTUAL AND SPOT MARKETS
II.1 Introduction
Recently, several web-based spot markets have been developed for a variety of products
ranging from consumer electronics to industrial equipment and jewelry. Various large scale
suppliers frequently use such platforms, along with discount stores and foreign distribu-
tors, for inventory liquidation. A prominent spot-market example includes Broker Forum
(www.brokerforum.com), a Business-to-Business (B2B) spot market enabling online trans-
actions for the sale of consumer electronics components.
For example, computer hard drives are produced and sold by several suppliers (e.g.,
Samsung, Seagate, and Western Digital) whose prominent customers include powerful man-
ufacturers (e.g., Dell, HP, and Toshiba). Each supplier may sign a long-term (typically 6
to 12 months) contract with one or more customers (manufacturers) and also may trade in
online spot markets like Broker Forum. In fact, as noted in the recent literature, suppliers
with contractual customers attain significant benefits from a spot market [32]. Such a market
provides the supplier opportunities to (i) liquidate excess inventory to save on holding costs;
and (ii) utilize excess production capacity to earn higher profits, if available. These oppor-
tunities may translate into operational flexibility while improving profits and the supplier’s
ability to manage risk due to demand uncertainty.
In this chapter, we consider such a supplier (e.g., Samsung) that satisfies demands from
contractual and spot markets during a finite planning horizon. On the supply side, con-
tractual customers (e.g., make-to-order manufacturers like Dell) guarantee a market for the
supplier’s products. On the demand side, high volume buyers are guaranteed high priority
deliveries at an agreed upon price under the contractual agreement, long before the actual
demands are realized. Hence, we consider the case where demand from contractual cus-
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tomers is stochastic. There is additional stochastic demand from customers in a secondary
spot market. Here, we use the term spot market broadly to include all customers who do not
have a commitment from the supplier. Unsatisfied demand from the contractual customers
incurs a lost sales penalty. Based on the contract, supplier’s unit revenue from contractual
customers and the lost sales penalty are fixed and constant for the entire planning horizon.
In contrast, unit revenue from the spot market may vary from one period to another and
there is no penalty for unsatisfied demand. To maximize the expected net profit, the supplier
has to make two decisions in each period: (i) how much to produce, and (ii) if there are
excess units left after satisfying the primary market demand, how many of these to liquidate
in the spot market (i.e., how much inventory to retain for the next period).
Clearly, the supplier may manage such an inventory system by employing simple policies.
For example, if the unit revenue from the spot market is high enough, the supplier may prefer
to liquidate the entire left-over inventory, i.e., the excess stock after satisfying the demand
from the contractual customers . We term this approach the retain-none policy. However,
if the unit revenue from the spot market is too low, the supplier may choose to completely
ignore it. The supplier may then choose to follow a retain-all policy and carry the entire
left-over inventory to the next period. We refer to these two policies as benchmark policies.
The benchmark policies are simple and easy to implement, and, in our experience, they are
encountered in current practice. Clearly, the real question is not whether to liquidate or
retain the entire left-over inventory, but how much to produce and to retain?
We model the problem as a finite horizon, multi-period stochastic dynamic program. We
show that the optimal policy is a combination of a modified base-stock and a retain-up-to
policy. In other words, the optimal policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical
produce-up-to level and the critical retain-up-to level. We term the optimal inventory to be
carried to the next period as the optimal retain-up-to level. Thus, even if selling in the spot
market is profitable (i.e., unit revenue from the spot market is larger than the unit production
cost), it may not be optimal to liquidate the entire left-over inventory. Instead, if one reserves
an inventory equal to the optimal retain-up-to level, in anticipation of future high-priority
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or high-revenue demand, higher profits can be earned. In addition, the profit can further
be increased by considering the replenishment (i.e., production) and liquidation decisions
jointly. We establish bounds for the two critical levels of the optimal policy parameters
for the general problem and two of its special cases. Furthermore, we discuss the economic
interpretation of these bounds, and use them to construct a heuristic policy.
We study the impact of the unit revenue earned from the spot market on the optimal
policy. We show that there are (lower and upper) thresholds on the unit revenue earned from
the spot market such that one of the two benchmark policies is optimal. We provide closed
form expressions to determine these thresholds for the infinite horizon problem under specific
conditions on the available production capacity. In general, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to theoretically determine these thresholds in closed form for the finite horizon problem.
Hence, in this case, we rely on a detailed computational study to gain insights regarding the
behavior of the optimal policy with respect to the spot market revenue. We investigate the
performance of our heuristic policy and show that the optimality gap is less than 2% for more
than 98% of the problem instances. Based on our numerical results, we also quantify the
economic benefits of the optimal policy as opposed to the benchmark policies and examine
the effects of demand correlation. We show that economic benefits of the optimal policy over
each of the benchmark policies are significant, more than 5%, for some problem instances.
Finally, we discuss interesting insights of the problem from a managerial perspective. For
example, based on our computational study, we infer that if specific conditions on model
parameters are satisfied, then one of the benchmark policies (retain-none and retain-all) is
optimal. This leads to a better understanding of the benchmark policies, which are easier
to implement.
In summary, along with analytically addressing the operational questions regarding (i)
how much to produce and (ii) how much to retain, our numerical results also offer answers
to the following key practical questions:
(iii) Under what conditions are the benchmark policies optimal? The results here will
indicate when the simpler–yet, practical–benchmark policies that either completely
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ignore or focus on the spot market sales are optimal, and justify their practical value.
(iv) What is the value of the optimal policy relative to the benchmark policies? These
results will quantify benefits of the optimal policy and justify its implementation in
comparison to the benchmark policies.
(v) What is the effect of correlation between the primary and spot market demands in each
period on the benefits of the optimal policy? The primary and spot market demand
may be correlated, and hence, it is important to find how correlation affects the value
of the optimal policy.
Furthermore, we analytically investigate two relevant and key questions:
(vi) What is the structure of the optimal policy if demand from the primary market is
backlogged, rather than lost?
(vii) Is it always preferable to completely satisfy the primary market demand? This is
important to determine and compare the value of the contractual customers in the
primary market and the spot market.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section II.2, we provide a brief
summary of the related literature and the contribution of this study. We present the notation
and stochastic dynamic program formulation of the problem in Section II.3. In Section II.4,
we characterize the structure of the optimal policy for a finite planning horizon and establish
bounds associated with the optimal policy parameters. In Section II.4, we also study the
impact of the unit revenue earned from the spot market on the optimal policy. Section
II.5 examines the infinite horizon problem with stationary model parameters and demand
distributions. Section II.6 presents insightful results of our computational study. Section
II.7 studies the case where the primary market demand is backlogged. Section II.8 studies
the case where all cost and revenue parameters are non-stationary, i.e., the unit revenue
and lost sales penalty from the primary market are also non-stationary. This is followed by
concluding remarks in Section II.9.
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II.2 Related Literature
First and foremost, this research is related to the capacitated inventory models which
investigate production/inventory decisions only under stochastic demand from a single cus-
tomer class. The modeling approach followed by these papers is similar to the modeling
approach that we use. Notable works include [6, 34, 35]. We generalize the existing work in
this area by considering multiple markets, i.e., contractual and spot markets, with stochastic
demand while modeling capacitated replenishment and liquidation decisions, simultaneously.
This research is also related to two streams of literature on stochastic production and
inventory models under periodic review: The first stream places emphasis on the disposal
of excess stock, which, in a sense, is similar to selling in the spot market in our model. The
second stream focuses on production and/or inventory rationing decisions.
Majority of the first stream focuses on the determination of optimal disposal, or equiva-
lently, optimal retention quantity, and, unlike our model, production ordering decisions are
not considered explicitly. Hence, we refer to this stream of literature as pure disposal models
[15, 41, 63, 66]. Based on whether excess inventory can be disposed of once or several times
over a multi-period planning horizon, the pure disposal models can further be classified as
single-disposal [15] and multi-disposal [41, 63, 66] models, and all of them assume that one
can dispose of or order as many units as desired. In contrast, we consider a multi-disposal
model with stochastic demand in the spot market and also investigate the production deci-
sions under limited capacity. Fukuda also [39] considers a multi-period model such that the
decision to be made at the beginning of each period is one of the following: order, dispose,
or do nothing. However, unlike our model, one can dispose of or order as many units as
desired under Fukuda’s model, too.
The retain-up-to level in our model specifies how much demand to satisfy from the spot
market, i.e., how to ration inventory to the spot market. Thus, the second stream of related
literature investigates: (i) how much to produce, and/or (ii) how much demand to satisfy
from each customer class [4, 22, 26, 31, 30, 36, 38, 60, 65, 69, 75, 78, 82]. We refer to
these decisions as production and rationing decisions, respectively. We divide this stream of
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literature in three categories: (i) papers that study only production decisions [69, 78, 82],
(ii) papers that study only rationing decisions (see Kleijn and Dekker [50] for a review), and
(iii) papers that study production and rationing decisions jointly. The papers that study
production and rationing decisions jointly can be further classified as single [65] or multiple
demand class models [4, 22, 26, 30, 31, 36, 38, 60, 75]. The multiple demand class models
can be further divided as single procurement [60], multi-procurement models with unlimited
production capacity [22, 36, 38, 75] and multi-procurement models with limited production
capacity [4, 31, 30, 26].
We also consider a multi-procurement model with limited production capacity and discuss
such models, i.e., [4, 31, 30, 26], in detail. Araman and O¨zer [4] consider selling to a long-term
channel along with selling/buying in a spot market with unlimited demand/supply. They
consider that the production capacity for the entire planning horizon is limited and spot
market decisions are made before the long-term channel demand is observed. In contrast,
we consider only selling in the spot market with stochastic demand and limited production
capacity in each period. Furthermore, in our model, spot market decisions are made after
the long-term channel demand is satisfied. This change in the sequence of decisions and the
stochastic (rather than unlimited) demand in the spot market change the model significantly,
and results from [4] cannot be directly applied.
Duran et al. [30] consider two customer classes with independent demands and the classes
are differentiated by their willingness to pay a premium price in order to have higher priority
on resources (inventory and capacity). They assume that unless rejected, customers from
both classes are willing to wait and show that policies of the (S,R,B) form are optimal,
where S is the order up-to level, R is the reserve up-to amount to be protected from selling
to current customers, and B is the backlog up-to amount. Duran et al. [31] extend this result
to models where the high priority customers are willing to pay a premium price but are not
willing to wait. As rightly noted by Duran et al. [31], customers’ willingness to wait or not
changes the form of the model, and results in [31] do not follow from the analysis in [30].
Thus, a natural question that follows is: What is the structure of the optimal policy when
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customers from neither class are willing to wait? We address this question in this chapter.
Furthermore, differentiating customers as contractual (primary market) or non-contractual
(spot market) allows us to extend the analysis in [31, 30] to settings where customers from
the spot market may be willing to pay more than those from the primary market. We also
allow demands from the two customer classes to be correlated. Both [31, 30] allow some units
to be protected from the high priority customers and focus on the ability to differentiate
between different classes. Although in our main model we do not allow discretionary sales to
the primary market, we study it as an extension to our model. We also focus on the ability
to increase the expected profit by making the production and liquidation decisions jointly.
Vericourt et al. [26] develop a multiple demand class queuing-based model to decide
when to produce and whether the arriving demand should be satisfied or back-ordered.
They study a infinite horizon problem with stationary cost and demand parameters. In
contrast, we study a periodic review system with lost sales and non-stationary cost and
demand parameters.
Finally, we note a more recent line of research studying the buyer’s problem of procuring
inventory from multiple sources, e.g., contractual supplier and spot market [40, 55]. We
complement to this line of research by studying a supplier’s problem of selling in multiple
markets.
In summary, relative to the existing literature, we model stochastic demands in both
contractual and spot markets explicitly under limited production capacity. We show that
the optimal policy is a combination of a modified base-stock and a retain-up-to policy. Fur-
thermore, we establish bounds on the critical policy parameters. Our practical contribution
is that we identify alternate benchmark policies and show that there are (lower and upper)
thresholds on the unit revenue earned from the spot market such that one of the alternate
benchmark policies is optimal. Based on our computational study, we quantify the benefits
of using the optimal policy over the benchmark policies and show that the potential savings
are significant.
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II.3 Model Formulation
We consider a supplier that sells a single product in two markets as illustrated in Figure
2. The selling horizon consists of T periods and each period has a finite production capacity
of Ct units for t = 1, . . . , T . At the beginning of period t, the supplier decides the number of
units to be produced, qt, based on the current on-hand inventory, It. We denote the produce-
up-to level by yt = qt + It. Production cost is proportional to the quantity produced and ct
denotes the unit production cost in period t. We assume that the production is instantaneous.
After production is completed, the stochastic demand from the primary market, X1t, is
realized and one of the following cases arises: If demand from the primary market exceeds
the produce-up-to level, yt, then excess demand is lost and a unit penalty of b is incurred in
period t. On the other hand, if demand from the primary market in period t is less than yt,
then the remaining on-hand inventory can be liquidated by selling in the spot market. We
denote the stochastic demand from the spot market in period t by X2t. Hence, the second
decision that the supplier makes in each period is how much to sell in the spot market, or
equivalently, how much inventory to carry to the next period.
We term the maximum amount of inventory to be carried to the next period as the
retain-up-to level and denote it by zt in period t. That is, after sales to the primary market,
any inventory in excess of the retain-up-to level, zt, is available for sales in the spot market.
There is no penalty for unsatisfied demand from the spot market. Thus, in our model,
inventory is replenished immediately when needed, protected when scarce, and liquidated
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the problem setting with a supplier, a primary market
and a spot market
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of the sequence of events for period t.
when it is in excess.
We consider a holding cost of ht in period t for each unit carried to the next period. The
unit revenue from the primary market is denoted by r1. Note that both the unit revenue
(r1) and the unit lost sales penalty (b) associated with the primary market are constant
throughout the planning horizon. These parameter values are determined based on the
contractual agreement between the supplier and the primary market customers. On the
other hand, the unit revenue from the spot market in period t, denoted by r2t, may change
from period to period. Clearly, r1 > ct for t = 1, . . . , T , in order for the problem to make
economic sense. However, we do not restrict the value of r2t. If r2t ≥ ct, then selling in the
spot market is profitable. On the other hand, if r2t < ct, then selling in the spot market is
equivalent to salvaging. Furthermore, r2t may be greater than or less than r1. We consider
a one-period discount factor of 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the
sequence of events that take place in a period and Table 1 summarizes the notation that we
use in our model.
We index each period in terms of the number of periods remaining until the end of the
horizon and formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic program. Since, we define zt as
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Table 1: Notation for the joint replenishment and liquidation problem
T total number of periods
X1t demand random variable for the primary market in period t
X2t demand random variable for the spot market in period t
Fit(·) cumulative distribution function of Xit, i = 1, 2
fit(·) probability density function of Xit, i = 1, 2
F−1it (·) inverse of the cumulative distribution function of Xit, i = 1, 2
r1 unit revenue from the primary market in periods t = 1, . . . , T
r2t unit revenue from the spot market in period t
ct unit cost of production in period t
b unit lost sales penalty for unsatisfied demand in primary market in periods
t = 1, . . . , T
ht unit holding cost in period t
Ct production capacity in period t
It on-hand inventory at the beginning of period t
qt number of units produced in period t
yt produce-up-to level in period t
zt retain-up-to level in period t
β one period discount factor
the maximum, and not the actual, amount of inventory to be carried to the next period, the
optimal retain-up-to level in period t, denoted by z∗t , is independent of the realized value
of X1t. For mathematical simplicity, we formulate the problem such that z
∗
t is determined
before observing X1t. Vt(I) denotes the maximum expected discounted profit when there
are t periods to-go until the end of the planning horizon and the starting inventory is I. For
each period t = 1, . . . , T , with starting inventory I, the expected profit earned in period t
when the produce-up-to level is y and retain-up-to level is z units is given as
P0t(I, y, z) = E
[− ct(y − I) + [r1y − b(X1t − y)]1(X1t > y)
+ r1X1t1(X1t ≤ y)− ht(y −X1t)1(y − z ≤ X1t ≤ y)
+ [r2t(y −X1t − z)− htz]1(X1t ≤ y − z,X1t +X2t > y − z)
+ [r2tX2t − ht(y −X1t −X2t)]1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)
]
. (1)
The first term in the above equation represents the production cost. The second term is the
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total revenue earned and the lost sales penalty incurred when the primary market demand
exceeds the produce-up-to level, y. The third term is the revenue earned from the primary
market when y exceeds the demand from the primary market. The fourth term represents
the holding cost incurred if demand from the primary market is greater than y − z but less
than y. In this case, the inventory remaining after satisfying the primary market demand is
less than the retain-up-to level, and hence, all of it is carried to the next period. The fifth
term represents the revenue earned from the spot market and the holding cost incurred if
demand from primary market is less than y− z and the sum of demands from both markets
is greater than y−z. In this case, z units are carried to the next period, and part of the spot
market demand is satisfied. The final term gives the same when the sum of demands from
both markets is less than y− z. In this case, demands from both markets are fully satisfied.
For conciseness, we define the following functions:
Git(u) =
∫ ∞
u
(x− u)dFit(x), (2)
Ht(u) =
∫ ∞
u
(x− u)dFst(x) , where Fst(x) is cdf and fst(x) is the pdf of X1t +X2t, (3)
Pt(y, z) = (r1 + ht)E[X1t] + (r2t + ht)E[X2t]− (ct + ht)y − (r1 + b+ ht)G1t(y)
+ (r2t + ht)(G1t(y − z)−Ht(y − z)). (4)
Using equation (1), P0t(y, z) can be rewritten as follows:
P0t(y, z) = E
[− ct(y − I) + [(r1 + b)y − bX1t]1(X1t > y)
+ r1X1t(1− 1(X1t > y))− ht(y −X1t)(1(X1t > y − z)− 1(X1t > y))
+ [r2t(y −X1t − z)− htz](1(X1t +X2t > y − z)− 1(X1t > y − z))
+ [r2tX2t − ht(y −X1t −X2t)](1− 1(X1t +X2t > y − z))
]
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P0t(y, z) = E
[− ct(y − I)− (r1 + b+ ht)(X1t − y)1(X1t > y) + r1X1t
+ (r2t + ht)(X1t − y + z)1(X1t > y − z)
− (r2t + ht)(X1t +X2t − y + z)1(X1t +X2t > y − z)
+ r2tX2t − ht(y −X1t −X2t)
]
= ctI + (r1 + ht)E[X1t] + (r2t + ht)E[X2t]− (ct + ht)y
+ E
[− (r1 + b+ ht)(X1t − y)1(X1t > y)
+ (r2t + ht)
(
(X1t − y + z)1(X1t > y − z)
− (X1t +X2t − y + z)1(X1t +X2t > y − z)
)]
. (5)
Using definitions (2), (3) and (4) on the right-hand side of (5), we have P0t(y, z) = ctI +
Pt(y, z). The maximum expected profit when there are t periods-to-go and the starting
inventory is I can be written as
Vt(I) = ctI + max{Jt(y, z) : I ≤ y ≤ Ct + I, z ≥ 0}, where (6)
Jt(y, z) = Pt(y, z) + β
[
E[Vt−1(0)1(X1t > y)]
+ E[Vt−1(z)1(X1t ≤ y − z,X1t +X2t > y − z)]
+ E[Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)]
+ E[Vt−1(y −X1t)1(y − z < X1t ≤ y)]
]
, (7)
for t = 1, . . . , T . The first term in equation (7) represents the expected profit in period
t. The remaining terms represent the discounted expected profit-to-go for the next t − 1
periods conditioned on the demand realization in period t. More specifically, the second
term represents the discounted expected profit-to-go if the primary market demand is greater
than y, and hence, the on-hand inventory available at the beginning of next period is zero.
The third term represents the discounted expected profit-to-go if demand from the primary
market is less than y − z and the sum of demands from both markets is greater than y − z.
In this case, z units are carried to the next period. The fourth term gives the discounted
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expected profit-to-go if the sum of demands from both markets is less than y−z, and hence,
demands from both markets are fully satisfied and the remaining units are carried to the
next period. The last term gives the discounted expected profit-to-go if demand from the
primary market is greater than y − z but less than y. In this case, the inventory remaining
after satisfying the primary market demand is less than the retain-up-to level, and hence, all
of it is carried to the next period. There is no salvaging at the end of the planning horizon,
and hence, V0(I) = 0 for I ≥ 0. The objective is to compute VT (I) and to determine the
optimal y∗t and z∗t that achieve this maximum expected profit for each period t, t = 1, . . . , T .
We observe that r2t is the immediate revenue that can be obtained by selling a left-over
unit in the spot market in period t. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of carrying
a unit to the next period is β(r1 + b) − ht. If the cost and revenue parameters are such
that β(r1 + b) ≤ r2t + ht for t = 1, . . . , T , then carrying inventory to the next period is not
profitable and the liquidation decisions are trivial. In order to avoid such cases, we assume
that β(r1 + b) > r2t+ht for t = 1, . . . , T . Furthermore, for 0 < β < 1 and ht ≥ 0 this implies
that (r1 + b) > r2t, i.e., losing sales from the primary market is more expensive than losing
sales from the spot market. This provides economic motivation to our problem setting where
primary market customers are given higher priority. In the next section, we characterize the
structure of the optimal policy.
II.4 Characterization of the Structure of the Optimal Policy
In this section, we first present a theorem which completely characterizes the structure of
the optimal policy. Next, in Section II.4.1, we establish upper bounds on the critical policy
parameters for the general problem studied in Section II.3 and two of its special cases, and
discuss their value. In Section II.4.2, we study how the optimal policy parameters change
with respect to the unit revenue earned from the spot market. We show that there exist
lower and upper thresholds on the unit revenue earned from the spot market such that one
of the two benchmark policies is optimal.
Theorem 1 presents how to determine the optimal policy parameters (y∗t , z∗t ) by studying
the functions Vt(I) and Jt(y, z), given by equations (6) and (7), respectively. In particular,
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it shows that the optimal policy parameters are characterized by two quantities: St and Rt.
St denotes the critical produce-up-to level and Rt is the critical retain-up-to level in period
t. We term it as the (St, Rt) policy.
Theorem 1. Jt(y, z) and Vt(I) satisfy the following properties for t = 1, . . . , T :
(a) Jt(y, z) has a finite maximizer denoted by (y
∗
t , z
∗
t ) such that
z∗t =

0 if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
,
Rt if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
>
r2t + ht
β
,
(8)
where Rt satisfies
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
=
r2t + ht
β
and
y∗t =

I if St < I,
St if I ≤ St ≤ Ct + I,
Ct + I if St > Ct + I,
(9)
where St is determined by Jt(St, z
∗
t ) = max{Jt(y, z∗t ) : y ∈ <+}.
(b) Vt(I) is a concave function of I.
(c)
dVt(I)
dI
≤ r1 + b and lim
I→∞
dVt(I)
dI
< 0.
Proof. Before we proceed with a proof, using Leibniz’s rule of differentiation of an integral,
we present the first order derivatives of Jt(y, z) with respect to y and z as follows:
∂Jt(y, z)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y − z)− Fst(y − z)]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y − z ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
, (10)
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∂Jt(y, z)
∂z
=
[
β
dVt−1(z)
dz
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y − z)− Fst(y − z)]. (11)
The proof follows by induction. We will first show that the properties (a)-(c) are true for
the one-period problem. Since V0(·) = 0, we have that dV0(z)/dz = 0. Substituting this in
equation (11) for t = 1, it can be easily shown that ∂J1(y, z)/∂z ≤ 0, and hence, J1(y, z) is
decreasing in z. Therefore, z∗1 = 0, which satisfies the first part of equation (8). Next, we
note that the assumption β(r1 + b) ≥ r2t + ht and 0 < β < 1 implies that r1 + b > r2t for
t = 1, . . . , T . Then, taking the derivative of equation (10) with respect to y for t = 1 and
evaluating the result at z = 0, we obtain:
∂2J1(y, 0)
∂y2
= −(r1 + b− r2)f11(y)− (r21 + h1)fs1(y) < 0.
This shows that J1(y, 0) is concave in y. Defining S1 such that
∂J1(y, 0)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=S1
= 0,
we have the optimal produce-up-to level in period 1 expressed as
y∗1 =

I if S1 < I,
S1 if I ≤ S1 ≤ C1 + I,
C1 + I if S1 > C1 + I.
Consequently, it follows from equation (6) that V1(I) = c1I + J1(y
∗
1(I), 0). The first order
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derivative of V1(I) is
dV1(I)
dI
=

r1 + b− (r1 + b− r21)F11(I)− (r21 + h1)Fs1(I) if S1 < I,
c1 if I ≤ S1 ≤ C1 + I,
r1 + b− (r1 + b− r21)F11(C1 + I)
−(r21 + h1)Fs1(C1 + I) if S1 > C1 + I.
(12)
From equation (12), we observe that dV1(I)/dI ≤ r1 + b. Moreover, taking the derivative of
equation (12) with respect to I, it can be easily shown that d2V1(I)/dI
2 ≤ 0. Thus, V1(I)
is concave in I. For S1 < I, evaluating the limit of equation (12) as I goes to infinity, we
obtain:
lim
I→∞
dV1(I)
dI
= r1 + b− (r1 + b− r21)− (r21 + h1) < 0.
As a result, properties (a)-(c) are true for the one-period problem.
Suppose that properties (a)-(c) are true for periods t− 1, t− 2, . . . , 2. We will show that
they are true for period t. By the induction hypothesis based on part (b), dVt−1(z)/dz is a
decreasing function of z. Suppose that dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 ≤ (r2t+ht)/β. Then, dVt−1(z)/dz ≤
(r2t + ht)/β for z > 0. Using this inequality and equation (11), we observe that Jt(y, z) is
a decreasing function of z for y ∈ [I, Ct + I]. Therefore, z∗t = 0. On the other hand,
if dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 > (r2t + ht)/β, then by the induction hypothesis based on part (c)
(limI→∞ dVt−1(I)/dI < 0) and the intermediate value theorem there exists a Rt ∈ <+
such that
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
=
r2t + ht
β
. (13)
Using equations (11) and (13), we observe that Jt(y, z) is increasing in z for z < Rt, and
decreasing in z for z > Rt. Therefore, Jt(y, z) attains its maximum at z = Rt for y ∈
[I, Ct + I].
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From the above discussion, we see that for y ∈ [I, Ct + I], if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
, (14)
then z∗t = 0; otherwise, z∗t = Rt.
Next, we show that Jt(y, z
∗
t ) is concave in y. Evaluating expression (10) at z = 0 and
taking the derivative of the result with respect to y, we obtain:
∂Jt(y, 0)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y)− Fst(y)]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y)
]
and
∂2Jt(y, 0)
∂y2
= −(r1 + b− r2t)f1t(y) +
[
β
dVt−1(y − x1t − x2t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t+x2t=y
− (r2t + ht)
]
fst(y)
+ βE
[
d2Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y)
]
< 0. (15)
The negativity of (15) follows from the induction hypothesis that Vt−1(·) is concave and
inequality (14). On the other hand, if z∗t = Rt, then Rt satisfies equality (13) by definition.
Evaluating expression (10) at z = Rt and taking the derivative of the resulting expression
with respect to y, we obtain:
∂Jt(y,Rt)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y −Rt)− Fst(y −Rt)]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y −Rt)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y −Rt ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
and
∂2Jt(y,Rt)
∂y2
=
[
β
dVt−1(y − x1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t=y
− (r1 + b+ ht)
]
f1t(y)
−
[
β
dVt−1(y − x1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t=y−Rt
− (r2t + ht)
]
[f1t(y −Rt)− fst(y −Rt)]
+ βE
[
d2Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y −Rt)
]
+ βE
[
dV 2t−1(y −X1t)
dy2
1(y −Rt ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
< 0. (16)
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In equation (16), the negativity of the first term follows from the fact that dVt−1(I)/dI ≤
r1 + b. From equation (13) it can be seen that the second term is equal to zero. The last two
terms are negative based on the induction hypothesis that Vt−1(·) is concave. Thus, from
inequalities in (15) and (16), it follows that Jt(y, z
∗
t ) is concave in y. Defining St ∈ < such
that
∂Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=St
= 0, (17)
we have the optimal produce-up-to level in period t, y∗t , expressed as in equation (9). As a
result, property (a) holds. Then, it follows from equation (6) that Vt(I) = cI+Jt(y
∗
t (I), z
∗
t ).
The first-order derivative of Vt(I) with respect to I evaluated at y
∗
t (I) from equation (9) is
given by:
dVt(I)
dI
= ct +
dJt(y
∗
t (I), z
∗
t )
dI
, (18)
dVt(I)
dI
= ct +

∂Jt(y,z∗t )
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=I
if St < I,
0 if I ≤ St ≤ Ct + I,
∂Jt(y,z∗t )
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=Ct+I
if St > Ct + I.
(19)
Taking the first-order derivative of equation (19) with respect to I and using the fact that
Jt(y, z
∗
t ) is concave in y in the resulting expression, it is easy to verify that d
2Vt(I)/dI
2 ≤ 0.
Hence, Vt(I) is concave in I.
To prove property (c), we first note from part (a) that dVt−1(z)/dz|z=z∗t ≤ (r2t + ht)/β.
Using this inequality and the fact that Vt−1(·) is concave, we have
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z≥z∗t
<
r2t + ht
β
. (20)
For St < I, evaluating expression (10) at y = I and substituting this on right-hand side of
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equation (19), we have
dVt(I)
dI
= −ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(I)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(I − z∗t )− Fst(I − z∗t )]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(I −X1t −X2t)
dI
1(X1t +X2t ≤ I − z∗t )
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(I −X1t)
dI
1(I − z∗t ≤ X1t ≤ I)
]
. (21)
Using inequality (20) and the fact that dVt−1(I)/dI ≤ r1 + b on the right-hand side of
equation (21), after some algebraic manipulations, for St < I we have
dVt(I)
dI
≤ r1 + b− [(1− β)(r1 + b) + ht]F1t(I)− [β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht]F1t(I − z∗t ) ≤ r1 + b.
(22)
The last in inequality in (22) follows from the assumption that β(r1 +b) > r2t+ht. Following
a similar argument, we can show that for St > Ct + I, dVt(I)/dI < r1 + b. For I ≤ St ≤
Ct + I, dVt(I)/dI = ct < r1 + b. Next, we recall that equation (21) gives the expression
for dVt−1(I)/dI for St < I. Hence, taking limit of the right-hand side of equation (21) and
using the induction hypothesis that limI→∞ dVt−1(I)/dI < 0 in the resulting expression, we
obtain:
lim
I→∞
dVt(I)
dI
= −ht + lim
I→∞
βE
[
dVt−1(I −X1t −X2t)
dI
1(X1t +X2t ≤ I − z∗t )
]
< 0.
As a result, properties (a)-(c) are true for period t.
Thus, Theorem 1 shows that the optimal policy is a combination of a modified base-stock
and a retain-up-to policy. We use the term modified base-stock policy because the optimal
produce-up-to level depends on the starting on-hand inventory and the production capacity.
The retain-up-to policy indicates that after sales to the primary market, it is optimal to sell
only the units in excess of the optimal retain-up-to level in the spot market. From part (a) of
Theorem 1, we observe that the optimal retain-up-to level depends on the unit revenue from
25
the spot market, the unit holding cost, the one-period discount factor and the derivative
of the profit-to-go function with respect to the retain-up-to level. For period t, Rt denotes
the retain-up-to level at which the discounted marginal value of retaining one more unit of
inventory for the next t − 1 periods is equal to the potential revenue and savings in the
holding cost that can be realized by selling a unit in the spot market in period t. We show
that if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
, (23)
then Jt(y, z) is a decreasing function of z for y ≥ 0. Note that throughout the text, we use
decreasing (increasing) to mean non-increasing (non-decreasing) for brevity. From equation
(6), it follows that z∗t = 0. On the other hand, if the inequality in (23) is violated, then
Jt(y, z) is unimodal in z for y ≥ 0, and z∗t = Rt. Hence, as the unit revenue from the spot
market increases, it is optimal to liquidate more inventory. We would like to note that z∗t may
be higher than the optimal produce-up-to level y∗t for some problem instances. This means
that the optimal policy is equivalent to the retain-all policy (i.e., the left-over inventory after
satisfying the primary market demand is carried to the next period), and hence, the spot
market should be ignored.
Part (b) of Theorem 1 shows that the maximum expected profit-to-go is a concave
function of the initial inventory. Further, part (c) shows that for every unit of on-hand
inventory available at the beginning of a period, the increase in the optimal expected profit
is bounded by the sum of the unit revenue from the primary market and unit lost sales
penalty, i.e., r1 + b. Part (c) also shows that if the on-hand inventory available at the
beginning of a period goes to infinity, then the increase in the optimal expected profit is
negative.
II.4.1 Bounds for the optimal policy parameters
In this section, we develop upper bounds for Rt and St for the general problem studied in
Section II.3 and two of its special cases. Furthermore, we discuss the economic interpretation
of these bounds, which can be useful from a managerial perspective.
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Proposition 1. (a) The critical retain-up-to level Rt is bounded above as follows for t =
2, . . . , T :
If ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, then Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
− Ct−1 + z∗t−1.
If ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β, then Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
+ z∗t−1.
(b) The critical produce-up-to level St is bounded above as follows for t = 1, . . . , T :
St ≤ F−11t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b− r2t
)
+ z∗t .
This upper bound is finite if ct > r2t, and infinite if ct ≤ r2t.
Proof. Since Vt(·) is concave, dVt(I)/dI is a decreasing function of I. Therefore, from equa-
tion (19), we observe that
dVt(I)
dI

< ct if St < I,
= ct if I ≤ St ≤ Ct + I,
> ct if St > Ct + I,
(24)
for t = 1, . . . , T . In addition, we know from Theorem 1 that Rt satisfies equation (13).
(a) If ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, then applying equation (24) for period t − 1, we observe
that for all I ≥ St−1 − Ct−1, dVt−1(I)/dI ≤ ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β. Since Rt should satisfy
equation (13), we have Rt < St−1 − Ct−1. Next, we evaluate dVt−1(I)/dI for I = Rt when
Rt < St−1 − Ct−1. Using the last part of equation (19), we have
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=Rt
= ct−1 +
∂Jt−1(y, z∗t−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=Ct−1+Rt
. (25)
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Using equations (10) and (13), we can write equation (25) as
r2t + ht
β
= −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)]
+ (r2,t−1 + ht−1)[F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)− Fs,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)]
+ βE
[
dVt−2(Ct−1 + z −X1,t−1 −X2,t−1)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
1(X1,t−1 +X2,t−1 ≤ Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−2(Ct−1 + z −X1,t−1)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1 ≤ X1,t−1 ≤ Ct−1 +Rt)
]
, (26)
for t = 2, . . . , T . Using inequality (20) and part (c) of Theorem 1 on the right-hand side of
equation (26), we have
r2t + ht
β
≤ −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)]
+ (r2,t−1 + ht−1)[F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)− Fs,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)]
+ β
(
r2,t−1 + ht−1
β
)
E
[
1(X1,t−1 +X2,t−1 ≤ Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)
]
+ β(r1 + b)E
[
1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1 ≤ X1,t−1 ≤ Ct−1 +Rt)
]
= r1 + b− (r1 + b+ ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)
+ (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)
+ β(r1 + b)[F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)]. (27)
Using the fact that β(r1 + b) ≤ r1 + b ≤ r1 + b + ht−1 on the right-hand side of equation
(27), we have
r2t + ht
β
≤ r1 + b− (r1 + b+ ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt) + (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)
+ (r1 + b+ ht−1)[F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)].
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After some algebra, the above inequality can be written as
Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
− Ct−1 + z∗t−1.
If ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β, then applying equation (24) for period t− 1, we observe that for
all I ≤ St−1, dVt−1(I)/dI ≥ ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β. Since Rt should satisfy equation (13), we
have Rt > St−1. Next, we evaluate dVt−1(I)/dI for I = Rt when Rt > St−1. Using the first
part of equation (19), we have
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=Rt
= ct−1 +
∂Jt−1(y, z∗t−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=Rt
. (28)
Using equations (10) and (13), we can write equation (28) as
r2t + ht
β
= −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Rt)]
+ (r2,t−1 + ht−1)[F1,t−1(Rt − z∗t−1)− Fs,t−1(Rt − z∗t−1)]
+ βE
[
dVt−2(z −X1,t−1 −X2,t−1)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
1(X1,t−1 +X2,t−1 ≤ Rt − z∗t−1)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−2(z −X1,t−1)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
1(Rt − z∗t−1 ≤ X1,t−1 ≤ Rt)
]
, (29)
for t = 2, . . . , T . Then, following a similar argument as for the ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, it can be
shown that
Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
+ z∗t−1.
(b) Recall that St ∈ < satisfies equation (17) by definition. Then, simultaneous use of
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equations (10) and (17) implies
∂Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=St
= 0 = −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(St)]
+ (r2t + ht)[F1t(St − z∗t )− Fst(St − z∗t )]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=St
1(X1t +X2t ≤ St − z∗t )
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=St
1(St − z∗t ≤ X1t ≤ St)
]
, (30)
for t = 1, . . . , T . Using equation (20) and part (c) of Theorem 1 on right-hand side of
equation (30), we have
0 ≤ −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(St)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(St − z∗t )− Fst(St − z∗t )]
+ β
(
r2t + ht
β
)
E
[
1(X1t +X2t ≤ St − z∗t )
]
+ β(r1 + b)E
[
1(St − z∗t ≤ X1t ≤ St)
]
= r1 + b− ct − (r1 + b+ ht)F1t(St) + (r2t + ht)F1t(St − z∗t )
+ β(r1 + b)
[
F1t(St)− F1t(St − z∗t )
]
. (31)
Using the fact that β(r1 + b) ≤ r1 + b+ht on the right-hand side of equation (31), we obtain
0 ≤ r1 + b− ct − (r1 + b+ ht)F1t(St) + (r2t + ht)F1t(St − z∗t )
+ (r1 + b+ ht)
[
F1t(St)− F1t(St − z∗t )
]
.
After some algebra, the above inequality can be written as
St ≤ F−11t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b− r2t
)
+ z∗t .
Note that (r1 + b − ct)/(r1 + b − r2t) < 1 if p > r2t, and hence, this upper bound on St is
finite. On the other hand, if p ≤ r2t, this upper bound on St is infinite.
Let us define Kut as the cost of selling a unit in the spot market in period t, which will
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be needed in the primary market in period t − 1 and Kot as the cost of retaining a unit in
period t, which will not be needed in the primary market in period t − 1, t = 1, . . . , T . If
we assume that there is ample demand in the spot market, then it is easy to verify that
Kut = β(r1 + b) − r2t − ht and Kot = r2t + ht − βr2,t−1. We term Kut/(Kut + Kot) as the
critical ratio. Suppose ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β. Then, Proposition 1 shows that Rt is bounded
above as
Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
Kut
Kut +Kot
)
− Ct−1 + z∗t−1 for t = 2, . . . , T .
The inequality ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β implies that it is more profitable to produce for the
primary market in period t− 1 rather than carrying a unit from period t. Hence, if Rt units
are carried to period t− 1 and we produce up to Ct−1, then the probability of satisfying all
demand from the primary market and retaining z∗t−1 units in period t − 1 is at most equal
to the critical ratio. Thus, Rt and its upper bound are positive only if
Ct−1 < F−11,t−1
(
Kut
Kut +Kot
)
+ z∗t−1.
It is important to note that the upper bound on Rt, and hence, z
∗
t depends on the pri-
mary market demand distribution and the available production capacity in the next period.
However, the upper bound is independent of the spot market demand distribution.
On the other hand, if ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β, then it is profitable to satisfy the primary
market demand in period t− 1 by carrying units from period t. Thus, independent of Ct−1,
Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
Kut
Kut +Kot
)
+ z∗t−1 for t = 1, . . . , T .
That is, if Rt units are carried to period t− 1 and we do not produce in period t− 1, then
the probability of satisfying all demand from the primary market and retaining z∗t−1 units in
period t−1 is at most equal to the critical ratio. Thus, in this case, Rt has a strictly positive
upper bound. We also note that the upper bound for Rt is tighter when ct−1 ≤ r2t + ht.
Next, define K ′ut as the cost of producing one unit less and K ′ot as the cost of producing
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one unit more than the primary market demand in period t. Again, if we assume that there
is ample demand in the spot market, then K ′ut = r1 + b− ct, K ′ot = ct − r2t, and the critical
ratio is equal to K ′ut/(K ′ut + K ′ot). It follows that, in terms of K ′ut and K ′ot, St is bounded
above as
St ≤ F−11t
(
K ′ut
K ′ut +K ′ot
)
+ z∗t .
If we produce up to St in period t, then the probability of satisfying all demand from the
primary market and retaining z∗t−1 units in period t is at most equal to the critical ratio.
The above economic interpretation of bounds is interesting from a managerial perspec-
tive. Furthermore, these bounds allow us to narrow the search region while computing the
optimal policy parameters. One drawback of these bounds is their additive nature, i.e.,
bounds in period t depend on the optimal retain-up-to decision in period t − 1, z∗t−1. Con-
sequently, when z∗t−1 is large, bounds in periods t, . . . , T can be loose. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to establish bounds on St and Rt based purely on problem parameters.
We complement Proposition 1 by establishing bounds on St and Rt based purely on
problem parameters for two special cases: First, in Proposition 2, we provide lower bounds
on St and Rt for the case with ample demand in the spot market such that, if desired, all
the remaining inventory after satisfying the primary market demand can be sold in the spot
market. Second, in Proposition 3, we provide upper bounds on St and Rt for the case with
ample production capacity and stationary cost parameters.
Proposition 2. When there is ample demand in the spot market (i.e. X2t = ∞, for t =
1, . . . , T )
(a) The critical retain-up-to level Rt is bounded as follows for t = 2, . . . , T :
If ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, then
F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
−Ct−1 ≤ Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
−Ct−1+z∗t−1.
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If ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β, then
F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
≤ Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
+ z∗t−1.
(b) The critical produce-up-to level St is bounded as follows for t = 2, . . . , T :
If r2t ≥ ct, y∗t = Ct + I.
If r2t < ct, then F
−1
1t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b− r2t
)
≤ St ≤ F−11t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b− r2t
)
+ z∗t .
Proof. Since, this is a special case of the problem considered in Section II.3, Theorem 1 and
Proposition 1 still hold. Therefore, the upper bounds on Rt and St as given in Proposition
2 follow directly from Proposition 1.
Below, we provide derivations for the lower bounds on Rt and St. We note that ample
demand in the spot market implies
E[1(X1t +X2t ≤ x)] = Fst(x) = 0 (32)
for x ≥ 0 and for t = 1, . . . , T . In addition, based on the definition of Rt from Theorem 1,
we note that dVt−1(z)/dz|z=Rt = (r2t+ht)/β. Using this inequality and the fact that Vt−1(·)
is concave, we have
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z≤Rt
≥ r2t + ht
β
. (33)
(a) If ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, using equation (32) on the right-hand side of equation (26),
we obtain
r2t + ht
β
= −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)]
+ (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1)
+ βE
[
dVt−2(Ct−1 + z −X1,t−1)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
1(Ct−1 +Rt − z∗t−1 ≤ X1,t−1 ≤ Ct−1 +Rt)
]
,
(34)
for t = 2, . . . , T . Using part (a) of Theorem 1 for period t − 1, we note that z∗t−1 = 0 or
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z∗t−1 = Rt−1. If z∗t−1 = 0, then from equation (34), we have
r2t + ht
β
= −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)] + (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)
= r1 + b− (r1 + b− r2,t−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt).
After some algebra, the above equation can be written as
Rt = F
−1
1,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
− Ct−1. (35)
On the other hand, if z∗t−1 = Rt−1, then using inequality (33) on right-hand side of equation
(34), we have
r2t + ht
β
≥ −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)]
+ (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt −Rt−1)
+ β
(
r2,t−1 + ht−1
β
)
E[1(Ct−1 +Rt −Rt−1 ≤ X1,t−1 ≤ Ct−1 +Rt)]
r2t + ht
β
= r1 + b− (r1 + b+ ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt)] + (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Ct−1 +Rt).
After some algebra, the above inequality can be written as
Rt ≥ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
− Ct−1. (36)
The lower bound for Rt follows from equations (35) and (36).
If ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β, using equation (32) on the right-hand side of equation (29), we
have
r2t + ht
β
= −ht−1 + (r1 + b+ ht−1)[1− F1,t−1(Rt)] + (r2,t−1 + ht−1)F1,t−1(Rt − z∗t−1)
+ βE
[
dVt−2(z −X1,t−1)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
1(Rt − z∗t−1 ≤ X1,t−1 ≤ Rt)
]
, (37)
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for t = 2, . . . , T . Then, following a similar argument as for the ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, it can be
shown that
Rt ≥ F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
. (38)
(b) If r2t ≥ ct, using equation (32) on the right-hand side of equation (10) for z = z∗t , we get
∂Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(y − z∗t )
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y − z∗t ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
. (39)
If z∗t = 0, then from equation (39), we have
∂Jt(y, 0)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(y)
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)]− (r2t + ht)[1− F1t(y)] + r2t + ht
= r2t − ct + (r1 + b− r2t)[1− F1t(y)] > 0. (40)
On the other hand, if z∗t = Rt then from equation (39), we have
∂Jt(y,Rt)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(y −Rt)
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y −Rt ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
. (41)
Using inequality (33) on right-hand side of equation (41), we observe that
∂Jt(y,Rt)
∂y
≥ −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(y −Rt)
+ β
(
r2t + ht
β
)
E[1(y −Rt ≤ X1t ≤ y)]
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2 + h)F1t(y) > 0. (42)
Thus, from equations (40) and (42) it follows that Jt(y, z
∗
t ) is increasing in y, and hence,
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y∗t = Ct + I.
On the other hand, if r2t < ct using equation (32) on the right-hand side of equation
(30), we obtain
0 = −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(St)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(St − z∗t )
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=St
1(St − z∗t ≤ X1t ≤ St)
]
, (43)
for t = 1, . . . , T . If z∗t = 0, then from equation (43), it follows that
0 = −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(St)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(St).
After some algebra, the above equation can be written as
St = F
−1
1t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b− r2t
)
. (44)
If z∗t = Rt, then from equation (43), we have
0 = −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(St)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(St −Rt)
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=St
1(St −Rt ≤ X1t ≤ St)
]
. (45)
Using inequality (33) on right-hand side of equation (45), it follows that
0 ≥ −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(St)] + (r2t + ht)F1t(St −Rt)
+ β
(
r2t + ht
β
)
E[1(St −Rt ≤ X1t ≤ St)],
0 ≥ r1 + b− p− (r1 + b+ ht)F1t(St) + (r2t + ht)F1t(St).
After some algebra, the above inequality can be written as
St ≥ F−11t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b− r2t
)
. (46)
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The lower bound for St follows from equations (44) and (46).
We recall that for ample demand in the spot market, Kut = β(r1 + b) − r2t − ht and
Kot = r2t + ht − βr2,t−1. Suppose ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β. Then, we have
F−11,t−1
(
Kut
Kut +Kot
)
− Ct−1 ≤ Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
Kut
Kut +Kot
)
− Ct−1 + z∗t−1.
That is, the bounds for Rt are such that, if Rt units are carried to period t−1 and we produce
up to Ct−1, then (a) the probability of satisfying all demand from the primary market in
period t − 1 is at least equal to the critical ratio, and (b) the probability of satisfying all
demand from the primary market and retaining z∗t−1 units in period t − 1 is at most equal
to the critical ratio. On the other hand, if ct−1 > (r2t+ht)/β, Rt units are carried to period
t−1 and we do not produce in period t−1, then (a) the probability of satisfying all demand
from the primary market in period t − 1 is at least equal to the critical ratio, and (b) the
probability of satisfying all demand from the primary market and retaining z∗t−1 units in
period t − 1 is a at most equal to the critical ratio. As before, if ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, the
bounds are independent of Ct−1.
Part (b) of Proposition 2 indicates that if r2t ≥ ct, then selling in the spot market is
profitable, and, hence, it is optimal to produce up to the capacity in each period. However,
if r2t < ct, then it may not be optimal to produce up to the capacity. In this case, we again
have K ′ut = r1 +b−ct and K ′ot = ct−r2t. Then, in terms of K ′ut and K ′ot, St is bounded such
that, if we produce up to St in period t, the (a) the probability of satisfying all demand from
the primary market in period t is at least equal to the critical ratio, and (b) the probability
of satisfying all demand from the primary market and retaining z∗t−1 units in period t is at
most equal to the critical ratio, which is now equal to K ′ut/(K ′ut +K ′ot).
Next, Proposition 3 provides bounds for Rt and St based purely on the problem param-
eters for the case with ample production capacity and stationary cost parameters.
Proposition 3. When the production capacity in each period is ample and the cost param-
eters are stationary (i.e., Ct =∞, r2t = r2, ct = c and ht = h for t = 1, . . . , T ),
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(a) If c ≤ (r2 + h)/β, then z∗t = 0.
If c > (r2 + h)/β, then the critical retain-up-to level Rt is bounded above as follows
t = 2, . . . , T :
Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
r1 + b− (r2 + h)/β
r1 + b+ h− βc
)
.
This upper bound is finite if (r2 + h)/β < c ≤ (r2 + h(1 + β))/β2 and infinite if c >
(r2 + h(1 + β))/β
2.
(b) The critical produce-up-to level St is bounded as follows for t = 1, . . . , T ,
St ≤ F−11,t
(
r1 + b− c
r1 + b+ min{−r2, h− βc}
)
.
This upper bound is finite if p > r2 and infinite if c ≤ r2.
Proof. Suppose that ample production capacity is available in each period and cost param-
eters are stationary (i.e., Ct = ∞, r2t = r2, ct = c and ht = h for t = 1, . . . , T ). Then,
substituting Ct−1 =∞ in equation (24) for t = 1, . . . , T , we have
dVt(I)
dI

= c if I ≤ St,
< c if I > St.
(47)
(a) If c ≤ (r2 + h)/β, then from the first part of (47), we have dVt(I)/dI|I=0 = c ≤
(r2 + h)/β. Then, from part (a) of Theorem 1, it follows that z
∗
t = 0. Next, suppose that
c > (r2 +h)/β. Since this is a special case of the problem considered in Section II.3, equation
(29) holds with r2t = r2, ct = c and ht = h for t = 1, . . . , T . Using inequalities (20) and (47)
on the right-hand side of (29) and after some algebra, we have
r2 + h
β
≤ r1 + b− (r1 + b+ h− βc)F1,t−1(Rt)− (βc− r − h)F1,t−1(Rt − z∗t−1)
≤ r1 + b− (r1 + b+ h− βc)F1,t−1(Rt).
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Rearranging the above inequality, we have
Rt ≤ F−11,t−1
(
r1 + b− (r2 + h)/β
r1 + b+ h− βc
)
.
Note that (r1 + b− (r2 + h)/β)/(r1 + b+ h− βc) ≤ 1 if p ≤ (r2 + h(1 + β))/β2, and hence,
this upper bound on Rt is finite. If c > (r2 + h(1 + β))/β
2, then this upper bound on Rt is
infinite.
(b) If c ≤ (r2 + h)/β, then from part (a) z∗t = 0. Substituting z∗t = 0 in part (b) of
Proposition 1, we have
St ≤ F−11,t
(
r1 + b− c
r1 + b− r2
)
. (48)
Next, suppose that c > (r2 + h)/β. Then, using the same argument as in part (a) above,
we know that equation (30) holds with r2t = r2, ct = c and ht = h for t = 1, . . . , T . Using
inequalities (20) and (47) on the right-hand side of (29), and following a similar argument
as used above for establishing the upper bound for Rt, it can be shown that
St ≤ F−11,t
(
r1 + b− c
r1 + b+ h− βc
)
. (49)
We note that when c ≤ (r2+h)/β, we have −r2 ≤ h−βc, and hence, min{−r2, h−βc} = −r2.
On the other hand, if c > (r2 + h)/β, then min{−r2, h − βc} = h − βc. Then, combining
the inequalities in (48) and (49), the upper bound on St can be expressed as in part (b) of
Proposition 3. Furthermore, similar to part (b) of Proposition 1 we see that if c ≤ r2t then
the upper bound on St as presented in part (b) of Proposition 3 is infinite.
In Figure 4, we summarize the collective results of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 to show the
regions where we can find finite upper bounds for St and Rt. To this end, we let Stu and
Rtu denote the upper bounds on St and Rt, respectively, given by Proposition 1. Let R
a
tl
denote the lower bound on Rt for the case with ample demand as given by Proposition 2,
and Rctu denote the upper bound on Rt for the case with ample capacity and stationary cost
parameters as given by Proposition 3. We use the results from Propositions 1, 2 and 3 to
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of conditions when bounds on St and Rt are finite
develop a heuristic policy in Section II.6.2 and demonstrate its effectiveness.
II.4.2 Impact of the spot market revenue on the optimal policy
From Section II.1, recall that the two practical benchmark policies, retain-none and
retain-all, may be employed to manage the inventory system under consideration. These
policies are actually special cases of the optimal policy. Under the retain-none policy, the
entire left-over inventory is liquidated in the spot market after the demand from the primary
market is satisfied. Hence, the retain-none policy is obtained by setting zt = 0, for t =
1, . . . , T and using a modified base-stock policy for the production decision. Let Vt,none(I)
be the expected profit under the retain-none policy. Then, substituting z = 0 in equations
(6) and (7) we obtain the following dynamic program
Vt,none(I) = ctI + Jt,none(yt,none, 0), where (50)
Jt,none(y, 0) = (r1 + ht)E[X1t]− (r2t + ht)(E[X2t]−Ht(y))− (ct + ht)y
− (r1 + b− r2t)G1t(y) + β
[
E[Vt−1,none(0)1(X1t +X2t > y)]
+ E[Vt−1,none(y −X1t −X2t)1(X1t +X2t ≤ y)]
]
,
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yt,none =

I if St,none < I,
St,none if I ≤ St,none ≤ Ct + I,
Ct + I if St,none > Ct + I,
(51)
and the base-stock or produce-up-to level, St,none, is determined by solving the first order
condition for Jt,none(y, 0).
On the other hand, under the retain-all policy, the entire left-over inventory is carried
to the next period and the spot market is ignored, i.e., zt = yt for t = 1, . . . , T . Hence, to
compute the optimal production decision under the retain-all policy we substitute z = y in
equations (6) and (7), which gives the following dynamic program:
Vt,all(I) = ctI + max{Jt,all(y, y) : I ≤ y ≤ C + I}, where (52)
Jt,all(y, y) = (r1 + ht)E[X1t]− (ct + ht)y − (r1 + b+ ht)G1t(y)
+ β
[
E[Vt−1,all(0)1(X1t > y)] + E[Vt−1,all(y −X1t)1(X1t ≤ y)]
]
, (53)
for t = 1, . . . , T . We observe that (52) and (53) represents a multi-period inventory problem
with limited capacity and non-stationary parameters, and hence, a modified base-stock policy
is optimal for the production decision under the retain-all policy [6]. We observe that these
alternate benchmark policies are easy to compute. Thus, one immediate question of interest
is, “under what conditions are the benchmark policies optimal?” We address this question
by studying the impact of the unit revenue from the spot market on the optimal policy.
Proposition 4. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(a) There exist thresholds rl2t and r
u
2t, r
l
2t ≤ ru2t, given by rl2t = max{r2t ≥ 0 : z∗t ≥ y∗t }, and
ru2t = min{r2t ≥ 0 : z∗t = 0}.
(i) If r2t ≤ rl2t, then a retain-all policy is optimal in period t.
(ii) If r2t ≥ ru2t, then a retain-none policy is optimal in period t.
(b) rl2t decreases in Ct.
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(c) ru2t decreases in Ct−1.
Proof. We first show that the following results are true: (1) z∗t is a decreasing function of
r2t, and (2) y
∗
t is an increasing function of r2t. Then, we use these results to provide a proof
for Proposition 4.
From Theorem 1, we know that
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=Rt
=
r2t + ht
β
.
We note that dVt−1(z)/dz is independent of r2t. In addition, from concavity of V (·), it
follows that dVt−1(z)/dz is a decreasing function of z. Therefore, Rt is a decreasing function
of r2t. Consequently, from equation (8) it follows that z
∗
t is a decreasing function of r2t.
We first show that St is an increasing function of r2t. Evaluating expression (10) at
z = z∗t , we have
∂Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1 + b+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y − z∗t )− Fst(y − z∗t )]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z∗t )
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y − z∗t ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
. (54)
Let us denote the expression on the right-hand side of equation (54) with G(y, z∗t , r2t). Then,
from equation (30), we have G(St, z
∗
t , r2t) = 0. By implicit differentiation, we have
∂G
∂St
∂St +
∂G
∂z∗t
∂z∗t +
∂G
∂r2t
∂r2t = 0. (55)
From equation (55), we write
∂St
∂r2t
=
− ∂G∂z∗t
∂z∗t
∂r2t
− ∂G∂r2t
∂G
∂St
(56)
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We can express each term in (56) as follows:
∂G
∂z∗t
=
∂2Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y∂z∗t
∣∣∣∣
y=St
=
[
β
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=z∗t
− (r2t + ht)
]
[f1t(St − z∗t )− fst(St − z∗t )]. (57)
∂z∗t
∂r2t

= 0 if z∗t = 0,
< 0 if z∗t = Rt.
(58)
∂G
∂r2t
=
∂2Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y∂r2t
∣∣∣∣
y=St
= F1t(St − z∗t )− Fst(St − z∗t ) > 0 (59)
∂G
∂St
=
∂2Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y2
∣∣∣∣
y=St
< 0. (60)
The negativity in expression (60) follows from the fact that Jt(y, z
∗
t ) is concave in y. Observe
that if z∗t = 0, then ∂z∗t /∂r2t = 0. On the other hand, if z∗t = Rt, then ∂G/∂z∗t = 0. From
equation (57), it follows that for z∗t ≥ 0 we can write equation (56), as
∂St
∂r2t
=
− ∂G∂r2t
∂G
∂St
> 0, (61)
where the last inequality follows from expressions (59) and (60). Thus, St is an increasing
function of r2t. Consequently, from equation (9), we observe that y
∗
t is an increasing function
of r2t.
(a) Part (i) follows from the expression of rl2t and the fact that z
∗
t is decreasing and y
∗
t
is increasing in r2t. Part (ii) follows directly from the expression of r
u
2t and the fact that z
∗
t
is a decreasing function of r2t.
(b) From equation (9), we observe that y∗t is increasing in Ct. We also note that z∗t is
independent of Ct. Therefore, r
l
2t is decreasing in Ct.
(c) Similarly, from part (a) of Proposition 1, we observe that Rt is decreasing in Ct−1.
Therefore, if follows that z∗t , and hence, ru2t is decreasing in Ct−1.
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It is intuitive and easy to see that as r2t increases it is optimal to retain less and produce
more. We use this fact to provide insightful results. Part (a) of Proposition 4 shows that
for all values of r2t less than r
l
2t, it is optimal to ignore the spot market in period t. Thus,
rl2t represents the maximum value of r2t for which it is optimal to ignore the spot market in
period t. On the other hand, for all r2t greater than r
u
2t, it is optimal to liquidate the entire
left-over inventory in the spot market in period t. Thus, ru2t represents the minimum value
of r2t for which it is optimal to liquidate the entire left-over inventory in the spot market
in period t. Parts (b) and (c) show the impact of the production capacities in the current
period and in the next period on rl2t and r
u
2t. Note that for r
l
2t < r2t < r
u
2t the optimal policy
does not simplify to any of the benchmark policies.
Computing the thresholds rl2t and r
u
2t for given model parameters will considerably sim-
plify the implementation of the optimal policy. In general, it is difficult, if not impossible,
determine these thresholds in closed form. However, under certain conditions, these thresh-
olds can be determined easily, as we discuss next.
First, we conjecture that βct−1− ht ≤ ru2t ≤ β(r1 + b)− ht. For an intuitive explanation,
observe that if r2 < βct−1 − ht, then it is profitable to satisfy the primary market demand
in period t − 1 by carrying units from period t. Therefore, z∗t > 0. On the other hand,
if r2t > β(r1 + b) − ht, then it is more profitable to sell in the spot market in period
t than to sell in the primary market in period t − 1. Hence, z∗t = 0. Thus, we have
βct−1 − ht ≤ ru2t ≤ β(r1 + b)− ht. Next, we compute ru2t under specific conditions on Ct−1.
Suppose St−1 ≤ Ct−1 and r2t ≥ βct−1 − ht. It is easy to verify that
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=0
= ct−1 ≤ r2t + ht
β
.
Then, from Theorem 1, it follows that z∗t = 0. Therefore, if St−1 ≤ Ct−1, i.e., there is enough
production capacity available in the next period, then ru2t = βct−1 − ht.
In the next section, we provide closed form results to determine these thresholds for
the infinite horizon problem. Furthermore, for the finite horizon problem, we examine the
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behavior of these thresholds computationally in Section II.6.
II.5 Infinite Planning Horizon
In this section, we show that for the infinite-horizon problem, a stationary (S, R) policy is
optimal. Moreover, for the infinite horizon case, we provide analytical formulae to determine
the thresholds on the unit revenue earned from the spot market such that the optimal policy
reduces to one of the benchmark policies.
Let us consider an infinite planning horizon with stationary model parameters and de-
mand distributions such that β(r1 + b) > r2 + h. Let V (I) be the maximum expected total
discounted profit with starting inventory I and a discount factor 0 < β < 1 over an infinite
planning horizon. Then V (I) satisfies the following optimality equation:
V (I) = pI + max{J(y, z) : I ≤ y ≤ C + I, z ≥ 0}, where (62)
J(y, z) = P (y, z) + β
[
E[V (0)1(X1 > y)] + βE[V (z)1(X1 ≤ y − z,X1 +X2 > y − z)]
+ E[V (y −X1 −X2)1(X1 +X2 ≤ y − z)]
+ E[V (y −X1)1(y − z ≤ X1 ≤ y)]
]
(63)
and P (y, z) is as defined in equation (4) without the subscript t. The objective is to compute
V (I) and to determine y∗ and z∗ that achieve this maximum expected discounted profit over
an infinite planning horizon. Proposition 5 presents how to determine the optimal policy
parameters y∗ and z∗ and shows that a stationary (S, R) policy is optimal.
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Proposition 5. J(y, z) and V (I) satisfy the following properties:
(a) J(y, z) has a finite maximizer denoted by (y∗, z∗) such that
z∗ =

0 if
dV (z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2 + h
β
,
R if
dV (z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
>
r2 + h
β
,
where R satisfies
dV (z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R
=
r2 + h
β
and
y∗ =

I if S < I
S if I ≤ S ≤ C + I,
C + I if S > C + I,
where S is determined by J(S, z∗) = max{J(y, z∗) : y ∈ <+}.
(b) V (I) is a concave function of I.
(c)
dV (I)
dI
≤ r1 + b.
Proof. The proof follows from the value iteration algorithm and induction. Let V k(I) and
Jk(y, z) be the values of V (I) and J(y, z) at the k-th iteration of the value-iteration algo-
rithm, respectively. Let us set V 0(I) = 0 for I ≥ 0 and define
V k(I) = cI + max{Jk(y, z) : I ≤ y ≤ C + I, , z ≥ 0}, (64)
Jk(y, z) = P (y, z) + β
[
E[V k−1(0)1(X1 > y)] + E[V k−1(z)1(X1 ≤ y − z,X1 +X2 > y − z)]
+ E[V k−1(y −X1 −X2)1(X1 +X2 ≤ y − z)]
+ E[V k−1(y −X1)1(y − z ≤ X1 ≤ y)]
]
. (65)
Evaluating expressions (64) and (65) for k = 1, it is easy to observe that V 1(I) = V1(I)
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and J1(y, z) = J1(y, z) as given by equations (6) and (7) for t = 1 and stationary model
parameters. In Theorem 1, we show that properties (a)-(c) are true for V1(I) and J1(y, z).
Hence, properties (a)-(c) are true for V 1(I) and J1(y, z).
Suppose that properties (a)-(c) are true at iterations k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 2. We will show
that they are true at iteration k. For iteration k, it is also straight forward to observe
that equations (64) and (65) are the same as equations (6) and (7) with t = k. That is,
V k(I) = Vk(I) and J
k(y, z) = Jk(y, z). Thus, from Theorem 1 it follows that properties
(a)-(c) are true at iteration k.
Then, from the convergence results of the value-iteration algorithm (see e.g., [61]), we
have lim
k→∞
V k(I) = V (I), lim
k→∞
Jk(y, z) = J(y, z) and the optimal policy is stationary. Thus,
V (I) and J(y, z) satisfy properties (a)-(c).
Proposition 6 partially presents how to compute the stationary thresholds, rl2 and r
u
2 , on
the unit revenue earned from the spot market such that the optimal policy reduces to one of
the benchmark policies. Furthermore, it provides bounds on the critical produce-up-to level
and conditions under which these bounds are tight.
Proposition 6. For the infinite horizon case,
(a) rl2 = βc−h. Therefore, if r2 ≤ βc−h, then z∗ =∞ > y∗, and hence, the retain-all policy
is optimal. Furthermore, the critical produce-up-to level is bounded below as follows:
S ≥ F−11
(
r1 + b− c
r1 + b+ h− βc
)
. (66)
The bound is tight when C ≥ F−11
(
r1 + b− c
r1 + b+ h− βc
)
.
(b) Define C¯1 as
C¯1 = F
−1
1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2 − h
β(r1 + b− r2)
)
. (67)
(i) If C ≥ C¯1, then ru2 = βc − h. Therefore, if C ≥ C¯1 and r2 ≥ βc − h, then
z∗ = 0, and hence, the retain-none policy is optimal. Furthermore, the critical
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produce-up-to level satisfies the following inequality
(r1 + b− r2)F1(S) + (r2 + h− βc)Fs(S) ≥ r1 + b− c.
The above inequality is tight when C ≥ max{C¯1, C¯2}, where C¯2 is such that
0 = r1 + b− c− (r1 + b− r2)F1(C¯2)− (r2 + h− βc)Fs(C¯2). (68)
(ii) If C < C¯1, then r
u
2 ≥ βc − h. Therefore, if C < C¯1 and r2 ≥ βc − h, then
0 < z∗ = R. Furthermore, the critical produce-up-to level is bounded below as in
equation (66).
Proof. Recall that lim
t→∞ Jt(y, z) = J(y, z). Then, substituting r2t = r2, ct = c, ht = h,
Ct = C, F1t(·) = F1(·) and F2t(·) = F2(·) for t = 1, 2, . . ., on the right-hand side of equations
(10) and (11), we have
∂J(y, z)
∂y
= −c− h+ (r1 + b+ h)[1− F1(y)] + (r2 + h)[F1(y − z)− Fs(y − z)]
+ βE
[
dV (y −X1 −X2)
dy
1(X1 +X2 ≤ y − z)
]
+ βE
[
dV (y −X1)
dy
1(y − z ≤ X1 ≤ y)
]
, (69)
∂J(y, z)
∂z
=
[
β
dV (z)
dz
− (r2 + h)
]
[F1(y − z)− Fs(y − z)]. (70)
Next, we note that the critical produce-up-to level, S, is the same for each period. Hence,
even if I > S at the beginning of the planning horizon, this initial inventory will deplete in
time. Therefore, after a transient phase, we will have I ≤ S for each period. Then, using
part (a) of Proposition 5, the optimal produce-up-to level can be expressed as
y∗ =

S if S ≤ C + I,
C + I if S > C + I.
(71)
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Furthermore, using the fact that lim
t→∞Vt(I) = V (I) and equation (24), we have
dV (I)
dI

= c if S ≤ C + I,
≥ c if S > C + I.
(72)
(a) Suppose that r2 < βc − h. Then, from equation (72), we note that dV (I)dI ≥ c >
(r2+h)/β. Substituting this in equation (70), it can be easily shown that J(y, z) is increasing
for z < y, and constant for z ≥ y. Therefore, z∗ = y. Thus, rl2 = βc − h. Next, using the
definition of S (i.e., ∂J(y, z∗)/∂y|y=S = 0), z∗ = y and equation (69), we have
∂J(y, y)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=S
= 0 = −c− h+ (r1 + b+ h)[1− F1(S)] + βE
[
dV (y −X1)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=S
1(0 ≤ X1 ≤ S)
]
.
Using equation (72) on the right-hand side of the above expression and simplifying the
resulting expression, we have
S ≥ F−11
(
r1 + b− c
r1 + b− βc+ h
)
. (73)
Furthermore, the inequality in (73) is tight when the inequality in (72) is tight. That is,
when there is sufficient capacity so that S ≤ C, then S = F−11 ((r1 +b−c)/(r1 +b−βc+h)).
In other words, the inequality in (73) is tight when C ≥ F−11
(
(r1 + b− c)(r1 + b− βc+ h)
)
.
(b) Next, suppose that r2 ≥ βc − h. From the proof for Theorem 1, we recall that
V k(I) = Vk(I). Let z
k∗ be the optimal retain-up-to level at iteration k of the value iteration
algorithm and Rk be such that dV k−1(z)/dz|z=Rk = (r2 + h)/β. Then, Rk = Rk, and the
upper bound for Rk as given by Proposition 1 also holds for R
k. More specifically, we have
Rk = Rk ≤ F−11
(
β(r1 + b)− r2 − h
β(r1 + b− r2)
)
− C + z∗k−1 = C¯1 − C + z∗k−1. (74)
(b)(i) Define C¯1 as in equation (67). If C ≥ C¯1, we have Rk = Rk ≤ z∗k−1. From
Theorem 1 and Proposition 5, we know that z1∗ = z∗1 = 0. Hence, for k = 2, R2 = R2 ≤ 0.
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This implies that z2∗ = z∗2 = 0. Continuing in this manner, we see that zk∗ = 0 for all
k. Therefore, z∗ = lim
k→∞
zk∗ = 0. Thus, ru2 = βc − h. Next, using the definition of S (i.e.,
∂J(y, z∗)/∂y|y=S = 0), z∗ = 0, and equation (69), we have
∂J(y, 0)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=S
= 0 = −c− h+ (r1 + b+ h)[1− F1(S)] + (r2 + h)[F1(S)− Fs(S)]
+ βE
[
dV (y −X1 −X2)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=S
1(X1 +X2 ≤ S)
]
.
Using equation (72) on the right-hand side of the above expression and simplifying the
resulting expression, it follows that S is such that
0 ≥ r1 + b− c− (r1 + b− r2)F1(S)− (r2 + h− βc)Fs(S). (75)
Again, from equation (72), we see that the inequality in (75) is tight when S ≤ C¯2, i.e., and
C ≥ max{C¯1, C¯2}, where C¯2 is such that
0 = r1 + b− c− (r1 + b− r2)F1(C¯2)− (r2 + h− βc)Fs(C¯2). (76)
(b)(ii) Next, suppose that C < C¯1. From proof of part (c) of Proposition 4, we have z
∗
k
is decreasing in C and from part (b)(i) above, we know that if C ≥ C¯1 then z∗k = 0. Hence,
if C < C¯1 then z
∗
k ≥ 0. Then, using zk∗ = z∗k for all k, we have z∗ = lim
k→∞
zk∗ ≥ 0. Hence,
ru2 ≥ βc − h. Again, using the definition of S (i.e., ∂J(y, z∗)/∂y|y=S = 0), z∗ = R and
following a similar argument as in part (a) above, it can be shown that S is bounded below
as in equation (66).
Part (a) of Proposition 6 shows that for the infinite horizon problem rl2 = βc − h,
and hence, if r2 ≤ βc − h then the retain-all policy is optimal. Part (b) of Proposition
6 show that if there is enough production capacity available, as given by expression (67),
then rl2 = r
u
2 = βc − h. In other words, if there is enough production capacity available,
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then the optimal policy reduces to one of the benchmark policies depending on whether
r2 ≤ βc − h or r2 ≥ βc − h. Thus, the quantity βc − h represents an important threshold.
As we discuss in the next section, these results prove to be insightful for the finite horizon
model as well. On the other hand, if enough production capacity is not available, then from
parts (a) and (b)(ii) of Proposition 6 we have rl2 = βc − h ≤ ru2 . Hence, when r2 is such
that rl2 < r2 < r
u
2 the optimal policy does not reduce to either of the benchmark policies.
Furthermore, Proposition 6 provides an lower bound on S, and shows that the bound is tight
when production capacity is above a certain threshold.
II.6 Computational Results
In this section, we present the results of our computational study, which has a four
objective. First, we develop a heuristic policy based on the bounds in Section II.4.1 and
examine its performance. Second, we numerically examine the thresholds on the unit revenue
from the spot market such that the optimal policy reduces to one of the benchmark policies.
Third, we quantify the benefits of the optimal policy over the benchmark policies. Finally,
we study the effect of demand correlation on the benefits of the optimal policy.
II.6.1 Experimental setup
In the interest of a more focused discussion of the key insights of our model, the com-
putational results reported in this section assume that all model parameters are stationary,
i.e., r2t = r2, ct = c, ht = h, and Ct = C for t = 1, . . . , T . We set T = 9, β = 1, and use
the truncated Normal distribution for the primary and spot market demands. We analyze
two experimental settings: In Setting 1, demand parameters E[X1t] ∼ Unif[100, 150] and
E[X2t] ∼ Unif[40, 80] for t = 1, . . . , 9. In setting 2, E[X1t] ∼ Unif[40, 80] and E[X2t] ∼
Unif[100, 150] for t = 1, . . . , 9. Thus, under Setting 1 (Setting 2) the primary market size is
larger (smaller) than the spot market size. We consider two different values for the standard
deviation to examine the effect of demand uncertainty (σit = αE[Xit], α = 0.1 or 0.3). Also,
to study the effect of demand correlation we consider three values for correlation coefficient,
ρ = −0.9, 0, 0.9. Based on parameter values presented in Table 2, we construct an experi-
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Setting α ct ht r1 r2t b Ct ρ
1,2 0.1 50 1.25 75 30 1.1(r1-ct) 150 -0.9
0.3 2.5 150
... 300 0.0
5.0 300 80 0.9
Table 2: Experimental setup for the joint replenishment and liquidation problem
mental design corresponding to 1296 parameter settings. For each of these 1296 parameter
settings, we generate five different sets of values for demand parameters E[X1t] and E[X2t]
(see Tables 3 and 4). Hence, we consider a total of 6480 problem instances.
As observed in Section II.4 and Section II.5, βct−1−ht represents an important threshold
for r2t. Hence, in our numerical study, although ct is fixed, we consider three and six
different values for ht and r2t, respectively. Thus, we consider both cases: r2t ≤ βct−1 − ht
(r2t = 30, 40) and r2t > βct−1 − ht (r2t = 50, . . . , 80). In order to investigate the impact of
production capacity constraints, we consider two different values for the available production
capacity (Ct = 150, 300). We note that for each of the 1296 parameter settings the inequality
r1 + b > r2t + ht is satisfied, as assumed for our theoretical results.
Set t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 E[X1t] 111 141 129 126 131 113 111 101 130
E[X2t] 70 77 56 79 45 42 56 63 55
2 E[X1t] 132 113 142 144 144 104 146 104 121
E[X2t] 40 52 69 74 61 72 68 53 48
3 E[X1t] 149 114 107 103 117 123 127 113 146
E[X2t] 43 69 69 62 58 60 40 50 77
4 E[X1t] 103 141 126 138 137 128 137 101 107
E[X2t] 54 73 46 43 77 51 74 53 43
5 E[X1t] 113 145 132 133 141 132 136 120 102
E[X2t] 56 60 74 49 52 67 72 60 76
Table 3: Demand parameters for Setting 1
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Set t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 E[X1t] 80 68 73 63 49 51 55 68 68
E[X2t] 114 114 119 120 145 101 132 129 131
2 E[X1t] 70 47 57 71 58 56 58 55 71
E[X2t] 131 139 140 116 148 104 115 126 117
3 E[X1t] 51 43 68 68 80 80 75 55 41
E[X2t] 108 113 128 106 115 145 114 105 116
4 E[X1t] 48 65 61 47 41 40 66 44 78
E[X2t] 150 135 144 113 105 124 125 105 116
5 E[X1t] 59 50 69 72 69 45 79 64 65
E[X2t] 122 144 105 134 122 118 147 105 126
Table 4: Demand parameters for Setting 2
II.6.2 Heuristic policy
In this section, we propose a heuristic policy to compute St and Rt values. This heuristic
policy is based on Propositions 1 and 2, and a myopic newsvendor solution. We denote
the produce-up-to and retain-up-to levels computed by the heuristic policy by Sth and Rth,
respectively. Below, we present the heuristic, discuss each step of the heuristic and demon-
strate its effectiveness. The heuristic is as follows:
1. Compute S¯1 as the critical produce-up-to level when r21 = c1, i.e.,
∂J1(y, 0|r21 = c1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=S¯1
= (r1 + b− c1)(1− F11(S¯1))− (c1 + h1)Fs1(S¯1) = 0. (77)
2. For t = 1, set R1h = z
∗
1 = 0 and compute S1h as follows:
If c1 ≥ r21, then S1h = min
{
F−111
(
r1 + b− c1
r1 + b− r21
)
, S¯1
}
, (78)
else S1h = max
{
F−111
(
r1 + b− c1
r1 + b+ h1
)
+ F−121
(
r21 − c1
r21 + h1
)
, S¯1
}
. (79)
3. For t > 1 define C¯1,t−1 = F−11,t−1
(
β(r1 + b)− r2t − ht
β(r1 + b− r2,t−1)
)
, and set zt = Rth and compute
Rth as follows:
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(a) If ct−1 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β, then set Rth = max{C¯t−1 − Ct−1, 0}.
(b) If ct−1 > (r2t + ht)/β, then set Rth = C¯t−1.
Furthermore, compute Sth as follows: Sth = F
−1
1t
(
r1 + b− ct
r1 + b+ ht
)
+ F−12t
(
r2t − ct
r2t + ht
)
.
Step 1 of the heuristic computes S¯1 as the critical produce-up-to level for t = 1 by
setting r21 = c1. For t = 1, in Step 2 of the heuristic, we set R1h = z
∗
1 = 0. Furthermore,
we compute S1h using the upper bound on S1 as given by Proposition 1. We note that if
c1 > r21 and c1−r21 ≈ 0, or if c1 ≤ r21, then the upper bound on S1 as given by Proposition
1 goes to infinity, and hence, will be loose (see Figure 4). To address this, we note that S1 is
an increasing function of r21 (see proof of Proposition 4). Then, if c1 ≥ r21, we bound S1h
from above by S¯1. On the other hand, when c1 < r21, we set S1h as the maximum of S¯1 and
the sum of single-period newsvendor solutions computed individually for the primary and
the spot markets. For t > 1, Step 3 of the heuristic sets Rth to its upper bound as given by
Proposition 1 when z∗t−1 = 0. Furthermore, the heuristic policy simplifies the computation
of zt by setting zt = Rth. Based on extensive numerical studies, we observe that the upper
bound on S1 as given by Proposition 1 when z
∗
t = 0 may not perform well for some parameter
settings. Hence, for t > 1, we compute S1h myopically as sum of single period newsvendor
solutions computed individually for the primary and the spot markets.
Tables 5 and 6 presents performance of the heuristic policy, measured in terms of the
percent optimality gap defined as
e = 100
(
Expected profit under optimal policy− Expected profit under heuristic policy
Expected profit under optimal policy
)
%.
We list our observations as below:
O1 The heuristic policy is equivalent to the optimal policy, i.e., e = 0, for 10.2% and 23.9%
instances for settings 1 and 2. We note that Rth is equal to the lower bound on Rt for the
case with ample demand in the spot market. Hence, as E[X2t] increases in comparison
to E[X1t], the percentage of instances with e = 0 increases.
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e = % opti. Setting 1, T = 9
gap % instances Common features, if any
e = 0 10.2%
0 < e ≤ 1 86.6%
1 < e ≤ 2 2.7% r2 > 50, α > 0.1
2 < e ≤ 3 0.4% r2 > 60, α > 0.1, r1 < 150, C < 300, h < 5
3 < e ≤ 5 0.1% r2 > 70, α > 0.1, r1 < 150, C < 300, h < 2.5
Table 5: Performance of the heuristic policy for Setting 1
O2 We observe that e ≤ 2% for 99.5% and 96.1% of problem instances for settings 1 and
2, respectively. The maximum optimality gap over all instances is less than 10%. This
indicates that the heuristic performs well compared to the optimal policy.
O3 Next, we investigate the problem parameters which may lead to poor performance of the
heuristic policy. To this end, we determine if all the problem instances with optimality
gap belonging to a particular range of e have any common features. Tables 5 and 6
enlist these common problem features, if any, for each range of e. We observe that e
is higher when the difference between r1 and r2 is less (e.g., r2 > 50 and r1 < 150),
demand variability, i.e., α, is high, and the production capacity is tight. To understand
this, we recall that the heuristic sets Rth to its upper bound as given by Proposition 1
when z∗t−1 = 0. When the capacity is tight, z∗t−1 may not be zero, and hence, Rt > Rth.
In addition, if the difference between r1 and r2 is less, then Step 3 of the heuristic shows
e = % opti. Setting 2, T = 9
gap % instances Common features, if any
e = 0 23.9%
0 < e ≤ 1 67.3%
1 < e ≤ 2 4.9% r2 > 40, r1 < 300
2 < e ≤ 3 2.2% r2 > 40, α > 0.1, r1 < 150
3 < e ≤ 5 1.6% r2 > 50, α > 0.1, r1 < 150, C < 300, ρ > −0.9
5 < e ≤ 10 0.1% r2 > 50, α > 0.1, r1 < 150, C < 300, ρ > −0.9, h < 2.5
Table 6: Performance of the heuristic policy for Setting 2
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t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
E[X1t] 111 141 129 126 131 113 111 101 130
E[X2t] 70 77 56 79 45 42 56 63 55
Table 7: Demand parameters for Setting 1 and value set 1
that Rth is reduced further. As a result, a smaller retain-up-to level is chosen, which may
result in lost sales from the primary market in the next period leading to a low profit.
On the other hand, when the capacity is high, the effect of a smaller retain-up-level can
be addressed by producing more in the next period.
II.6.3 Behavior of the optimal policy with respect to the spot market revenue
From Section II.4.2, we know that there exist thresholds rl2t and r
u
2t such that (a) if
r2t ≤ rl2t, then z∗t ≥ y∗t and retain-all policy is optimal, and (b) if r2t ≥ ru2t, then z∗t = 0
and retain-none policy is optimal. Further, when rl2t ≤ r2t ≤ ru2t the optimal policy does not
reduce to any of the benchmark policies. Thus, we say that the optimal policy has one of
the following three forms: retain-all, retain-none and (St, Rt).
In Table 8, we illustrate this result for demand parameter values presented in Table 7.
Note that, in Table 8, bold typeface indicates that enough production capacity is available
for that period, i.e., St ≤ Ct. We summarize our main observations as follows:
t, r2t 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 none none none none none none none none
2 (St,Rt) (St,Rt) none none none none none none
3 all all (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) none
4 all all (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) none none
5 all all (St,Rt) none none none none none
6 all all (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) (St,Rt) none none
7 all all none none none none none none
8 all all none none none none none none
9 all all none none none none none none
Table 8: Form of the optimal policy: Setting 1, α = 0.1, ht = 1.25, r1 = 75, Ct = 150.
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O1 If there is only one period-to-go then the retain-none policy is optimal. This is intuitive
because in the last period there is a single opportunity to earn revenue, and all inventory
should be sold to make more profits.
O2 Under both settings 1 and 2, for t ≥ 3 and r2t = 30, 40 (i.e., r2t < βct−1 − ht), the
retain-all policy is optimal.
O3 Under Setting 1, for t ≥ 2, r2t = 50, . . . , 80 (i.e., r2t ≥ βct−1 − ht) and St−1 ≤ Ct−1, the
retain-none policy is optimal. Under Setting 2, we observe that St < Ct for t = 1, . . . , 9
for each experiment and for r2t = 50, . . . , 80, retain-none policy is optimal. Hence, for
all 6480 problem instances, we verify that if St−1 ≤ Ct−1 then ru2t = βct−1 − ht.
O4 On the other hand, for t ≥ 2, if r2t = 50, . . . , 80 (i.e., r2t ≥ βct−1 − ht) and St−1 > Ct−1
then the magnitudes of the two critical quantities, St and Rt, and hence, the form of
the optimal policy depends on several model parameters.
O5 In particular, as r2t increases St increases while Rt decreases. Therefore, as seen from
Table 8, the retain-none policy is optimal for higher values of r2t.
O6 In contrast, both St and Rt increase as r1 or the demand uncertainty, represented by
α, increases. Similarly, both St and Rt decrease as ht and Ct−1 increase. These results
are intuitive, for example, if unit revenue from the primary market is higher, profits can
be increased by producing more and selling less in the spot market with a lower unit
revenue. Therefore, an increase in r1 or α widens the (St, Rt) region while an increase
in ht or Ct−1 shrinks the (St, Rt) region.
O7 In addition, from an extended numerical study we observe that under stationary demand
settings z∗t decreases as the number of periods-to-go decreases. This is intuitive since
the opportunities for sale decrease as we approach the end of the planning horizon, and
hence, it is optimal to carry less inventory. Therefore, if r2t is constant for the entire
planning horizon, then it may be optimal to ignore the spot market for a few periods
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at the beginning of the planning horizon but liquidate more and more units as we move
closer to the end of the planning horizon.
O8 In general, even under non-stationary demand settings z∗t decreases as the number of
periods-to-go decrease. For example, in Table 8 for r2t = 30, 40, the retain-all policy is
optimal for t ≥ 3, the (St, Rt) policy is optimal for t = 2, and the retain-none policy is
optimal for t = 1. However, under non-stationary demand settings, z∗t may increase due
to change in demand parameters (mean and standard deviation) in the next period. The
combined effect of t and demand parameters in the next period may lead to an increase
in z∗t . For example, in Table 8 for r2t = 60, even though the retain-none policy is optimal
for t = 7 (i.e., z∗7 = 0), the (St, Rt) policy is optimal for t = 6 (i.e., z∗6 = R6 > 0 ). This
is because the mean demand increases from 113 for t = 6 to 131 for t = 5.
In summary, we note that when there are two or more periods-to-go, the two most
important factors that determine z∗t , and hence, the form of the optimal policy are: (1)
relative values of r2t and βct−1 − ht and (2) relative values of St−1 and Ct−1. Together,
these factors define the boundary on which the optimal policy changes from one form to
another. For example, when St−1 ≤ Ct−1 the optimal policy reduces to either one of the
benchmark policies. In other words, when there is enough production capacity available in
the next period rl2t = r
u
2t. On the other hand, when the production capacity available in
the next period is not enough to meet the critical produce-up-to level (in the next period),
we have rl2t < r
u
2t. Furthermore, we numerically verify the conjecture stated in SectionII.4.2
that βct−1 − ht ≤ ru2t ≤ β(r1 + b) − ht. The above observations are true for all of the 6480
problem instances.
II.6.4 Benefits of the optimal policy over the benchmark policies
We quantify the benefits of the optimal policy by computing the percentage increase in
the maximum expected profit that can be achieved by employing the optimal policy rather
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than one of the benchmark policies, as follows
100
(
Expected profit under optimal policy− Expected profit under benchmark policy
Expected profit under optimal policy
)
%.
We find that when there is only one period-to-go, the average (over all 6480 problem
instances) profit improvement under the optimal policy compared to the retain-all policy
is 15.9%, where the minimum improvement is 0.6% and maximum is 70.4%. That is when
there is only one period-to-go ignoring the spot market under the retain-all policy results
in a significant loss. However, in this case, we know that the retain-none policy is optimal.
Furthermore, under Setting 1 for Ct = 300 and under Setting 2 for Ct = 150, 300, the
production capacity constraint is never tight. Therefore, the optimal policy again reduces to
one of the benchmark policies. However, under Setting 1 for Ct = 150 the capacity constraint
is tight and the optimal policy may not reduce to either of the benchmark policies. Figure 5
shows that when the capacity constraint is tight (Ct = 150), the demand uncertainty is high
Figure 5: Average % improvement of the optimal policy over the benchmark policies: Setting
1, Ct = 150
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(α = 0.3) and there are more than six periods-to-go, the profit improvement of the optimal
policy over both the benchmark policies is significant, more than 5%.
We summarize our additional observations as follows:
O1 For t ≥ 2, the optimal policy results in an average profit improvement of 7.1% over the
retain-all policy, where the minimum benefit is 0.2% and the maximum benefit is 60.7%.
On the other hand, for t ≥ 2 the average profit improvement over the retain-none policy
is 2.33%, where the minimum benefit is 0% and the maximum benefit is 25.3%.
O2 Profit improvement under the optimal policy is higher when the demand uncertainty is
higher, i.e., α = 0.3.
O3 Figure 5 illustrates that profit improvement under the optimal policy compared to the
retain-all policy is high when the number of periods-to-go is less (8-12%) and decreases
convexly with the increase in the number of periods-to-go.
O4 In contrast, profit improvement under the optimal policy compared to the retain-none
policy is low when the number of periods-to-go is less (1-3%). When the demand uncer-
tainty is low (α = 0.1) and t ≥ 2, the optimal policy leads to an average improvement
of 1%. However, when the demand uncertainty is high (α = 0.3), the benefits of the
optimal policy increase concavely, more than 5%, with the increase in the number of
periods-to-go.
II.6.5 Effect of demand correlation
Finally, we study the effect of correlation between the primary and spot market demands
in each period t, denoted by ρ, on the benefits of the optimal policy. Our main observations
as follow:
O1 For each of the 6480 problem instances, we find that the optimal retain-up-to level, z∗t
decreases as ρ increases. To understand this intuitively, we note that the distribution of
the sum of the primary and spot market demands is important in computing the optimal
policy parameters. As ρ increases, the variance of the the sum of the primary and spot
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Retain-none policy Retain-all policy
C = 150 C = 300 C = 150 C = 300
ρ, α 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
-0.9 1.3 5.9 0.8 2.2 4.1 8.2 8.9 11.2
0 1.2 4.0 0.8 2.0 4.1 7.2 8.0 10.2
0.9 1.2 4.4 0.8 1.8 4.0 6.3 7.8 9.3
Table 9: Effect of demand correlation on average % improvement of the optimal policy over
the benchmark policies: Setting 1, t ≥ 2
market demands increases. Therefore, as ρ increases the risk due to demand uncertainty
increases, and hence, any opportunity to sell in the spot market should be well utilized.
This in turn reduces the maximum optimal inventory to be carried to the next period,
i.e., z∗t .
O2 Table 9 shows that the average profit improvement of the optimal policy over the bench-
mark policies decreases as ρ increases. Furthermore, the effect of demand correlation is
higher when demand uncertainty is higher, i.e., α = 0.3.
Based on our observations so far, we conjecture that the optimal retain-up-to level in
period t, z∗t , is proportional to the difference between the mean primary market demand
Figure 6: E[X1t], E[X2t] and z
∗
t with respect to t: Setting 1, α = 0.1, ht = 1.25, r1 = 75,
Ct = 150
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and the available production capacity in the next period, i.e., E[X1,t−1] − Ct−1. We verify
this conjecture numerically under constant production capacity. Figure 6 shows variation
of E[X1t], E[X2t] and z
∗
t with respect to the number of period-to-go for demand parameter
values presented in Table 7. We observe that for periods t = 2, . . . , 9, highlighted in bold,
z∗t follows a similar trend as E[X1t] but with a lag of one period. In other words, z∗t is
proportional to E[X1,t−1]. This is intuitive because at the end of each period we retain in
anticipation of future high-priority (primary market) demand. Therefore, if the primary
market demand in the next period is high (low), it is optimal to retain more (less) at the
end of the current period. (Though Figure 6 shows results for a particular problem instance,
they are qualitatively true for other instances as well.) We also note that z∗t does not seem to
be affected by change in E[X2t]. This is consistent with our observation that one of the most
important factors that determines z∗t is the relative value of Ct−1 and St−1, which further
depends on E[X1,t−1] (See Section II.6.3). In fact, this observation leads to an interesting
question for future work: What happens if demand in different markets are correlated in
time? In particular, what is the effect of correlation between the spot market demand in
a given period and the primary market demand in the next period on the optimal policy
parameters and benefits of the optimal policy?
Next, we consider the case where the primary market demand is backlogged.
II.7 Backlog Model
In this section, we consider that any unmet demand from the primary market in periods
t = 2, . . . , T is backlogged and incurs a unit backlog penalty of b¯. Furthermore, we consider
that any unmet demand from the primary market in the last period, i.e., t = 1 is lost and
incurs a unit penalty of b. We observe that the total cost of backlogging a unit from the
primary market in period t is b¯+βct−1. If the cost parameters are such that b¯+βct−1 < r2t
for t = 2, . . . , T , then it is more profitable to sell the current on-hand inventory in the spot
market and backlog the primary market demand, and the retain-up-to decisions are trivial.
In order to avoid such trivial cases, we assume that b¯ + βct−1 > r2t for t = 2, . . . , T , and
thus, ensure that giving priority to the primary market customers is profitable.
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Let V¯t(I) be the maximum expected discounted profit when there are t periods to-go until
the end of the planning horizon and the starting inventory is I. For each period t = 2, . . . , T ,
with starting inventory I, the expected profit earned in period t when the produce-up-to
level is y and retain-up-to level is z units is given as
P¯0t(I, y, z) = E
[− ct(y − I) + r1X1t − b¯(X1t − y)1(X1t > y)− ht(y −X1t)1(y − z ≤ X1t ≤ y)
+ [r2t(y −X1t − z)− htz]1(X1t ≤ y − z,X1t +X2t > y − z)
+ [r2tX2t − ht(y −X1t −X2t)]1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)
]
, (80)
and P¯01(I, y, z) = P01(I, y, z). For t = 2, . . . , T , define P¯t(y, z) as follows
P¯t(y, z) = (r1 + ht)E[X1t] + (r2t + ht)E[X2t]− (ct + ht)y − (b¯+ ht)G1t(y)
+ (r2t + ht)(G1t(y − z)−Ht(y − z)), (81)
where G1t(·) and Ht(·) are as defined previously by equations (2) and (3). Then, for t =
2, . . . , T it can be shown that P¯0t(I, y, z) = ctI + P¯t(y, z). The maximum expected profit
when there are t periods-to-go and the starting inventory is I can be written as
V¯t(I) = ctI + max{J¯t(y, z) : I ≤ y ≤ Ct + I, z ≥ 0}, where (82)
J¯t(y, z) = P¯t(y, z) + β
[
E[V¯t−1(y −X1t)1(X1t > y − z)]
+ E[V¯t−1(z)1(X1t ≤ y − z,X1t +X2t > y − z)]
+ E[V¯t−1(y −X1t −X2t)1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)], (83)
for t = 2, . . . , T , and V¯1(I) = V1(I) as defined by equations (6) and (7) for t = 1. Similar to
the lost sales model, we have V¯0(I) = 0 for I ≥ 0. The objective is to compute V¯T (I) and to
determine the optimal y¯∗t and z¯∗t that achieve this maximum expected profit for each period
t, t = 1, . . . , T .
Theorem 2 shows that when the primary market demand is backlogged, similar to the lost
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sales case, the optimal policy for the backlog case is also characterized by the produce-up-to
and the retain-up-to levels.
Theorem 2. J¯t(y, z) and V¯t(I) satisfy the following properties for t = 1, . . . , T :
(a) J¯t(y, z) has a finite maximizer denoted by (y¯
∗
t , z¯
∗
t ) such that
z¯∗t =

0 if
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
,
R¯t if
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
>
r2t + ht
β
,
(84)
where R¯t satisfies
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R¯t
=
r2t + ht
β
and
y¯∗t =

I if S¯t < I,
S¯t if I ≤ S¯t ≤ Ct + I,
Ct + I if S¯t > Ct + I,
(85)
where S¯t is determined by J¯t(S¯t, z
∗
t ) = max{J¯t(y, z¯∗t ) : y ∈ <+}.
(b) V¯t(I) is a concave function of I.
(c) lim
I→∞
dV¯t(I)
dI
< 0.
Proof. We present the first order derivatives of J¯t(y, z) with respect to y and z for t =
2, . . . , T , as follows:
∂J¯t(y, z)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (b¯+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y − z)− Fst(y − z)]
+ βE
[
dV¯t−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)
]
+ βE
[
dV¯t−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(X1t > y − z)
]
, (86)
∂J¯t(y, z)
∂z
=
[
β
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y − z)− Fst(y − z)]. (87)
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The proof follows by induction. Since V¯1(I) = V (I), from Theorem 1 we know that
properties (a)-(c) are true for the one-period problem. Suppose that properties (a)-(c) are
true for periods t−1, t−2, . . . , 2. From equations (87) and (24), we observe that ∂J¯t(y, z)/∂z
has the same structure as ∂Jt(y, z)/∂z. Then, following the exact same steps as in the proof
of Theorem 1, we can show that the optimal retain-up-to level in period t, z¯∗t is as expressed
in equation (84). In addition, for y ∈ [I, Ct + I], if
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
, (88)
then z¯∗t = 0; otherwise, z¯∗t = R¯t. Furthermore, using properties (a) and (b) for period t, we
have
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≥ ct−1. (89)
Next, we show that J¯t(y, z¯
∗
t ) is concave in y. Evaluating expression (86) at z = 0 and
taking the derivative of the result with respect to y, we obtain:
∂J¯t(y, 0)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (b¯+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y)− Fst(y)]
+ βE
[
dV¯t−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y)
]
+ βE
[
dV¯t−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(X1t > y)
]
,
∂2J¯t(y, 0)
∂y2
=
[
β
dV¯t−1(y − x1t − x2t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t+x2t=y
− (r2t + ht)
]
fst(y)
−
[
b¯− r2t + βdV¯t−1(y − x1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t=y
]
f1t(y)
+ βE
[
d2V¯t−1(y −X1t)
dy2
1(X1t > y − z)
]
+ βE
[
d2V¯t−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z)
]
< 0. (90)
The negativity of (90) follows from the induction hypothesis that Vt−1(·) is concave and
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inequalities (88) and (89). On the other hand, if z¯∗t = R¯t, then R¯t satisfies
dV¯t−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R¯t
=
r2t + ht
β
(91)
by definition. Evaluating expression (86) at z = R¯t and taking the derivative of the resulting
expression with respect to y, we obtain:
∂J¯t(y, R¯t)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (b¯+ ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y − R¯t)− Fst(y − R¯t)]
+ βE
[
dV¯t−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − R¯t)
]
+ βE
[
dV¯t−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(X1t > y − R¯t)
]
, and
∂2J¯t(y, R¯t)
∂y2
=
[
r2t + ht − βdV¯t−1(y − x1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t=y−R¯t
]
[f1t(y − R¯t)− fst(y − R¯t)]
− (b¯+ ht)f1t(y) + βE
[
d2V¯t−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − R¯t)
]
+ βE
[
d2V¯t−1(y −X1t)
dy2
1(X1t > y − R¯t)
]
< 0. (92)
From equation (91), it can be seen that the second term on the right-hand side of (92) is
equal to zero, and the last two terms are negative based on the induction hypothesis that
Vt−1(·) is concave. Thus, from inequalities in (90) and (92), it follows that J¯t(y, z¯∗t ) is concave
in y. Defining S¯t ∈ < such that
∂J¯t(y, z¯
∗
t )
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=S¯t
= 0, (93)
we have the optimal produce-up-to level in period t, y∗t , expressed as in equation (85). As a
result, property (a) holds. Then, following a similar argument as in the proof of parts (b)
and (c) of Theorem 1, we can show that properties (b) and (c) are true for period t.
Next, we consider the case where all cost and revenue parameters are non-stationary, i.e.,
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the unit revenue and lost sales penalty from the primary market are also non-stationary.
II.8 Non-Stationary Revenue and Cost Parameters for the Primary Market
We now consider a generalization of our model where all cost and revenue parameters
are non-stationary. Let r1t and bt denote the unit revenue and unit lost sales penalty for
unsatisfied demand from the primary market in period t, respectively. Under this setting,
there may be instances where it is optimal to ration inventory to both markets. That is, it
may be profitable not to satisfy part or all of the demand from the primary market in order
to retain some inventory to satisfy future high-revenue demand. As a result, in this setting,
we have two decision variables that determine how much inventory to retain. In particular,
z1t denotes the inventory to be saved from sales to both primary and spot markets and z2t
denotes the additional inventory to be saved from the spot market in period t. Thus, z1t
and z1t + z2t, respectively, represent the minimum and the maximum amount of inventory
to be retained in period t. As before, we assume that r1t + bt > r2t + ht for t = 1, . . . , T .
For each period t = 1, . . . , T , with starting inventory I, the expected profit earned in period
t is given as
P0t(y, z1, z2)
= E[−ct(y − I) + [r1t(y − z1)− htz1 − bt(X1t − y + z1)]1(X1t > y − z1)
+ r1tX1t1(X1t ≤ y − z1)− ht(y −X1t)1(y − z1 − z2 ≤ X1t ≤ y − z1)
+ [r2t(y − z1 −X1t − z2)− ht(z1 + z2)]1(X1t ≤ y − z1 − z2, X1t +X2t > y − z1 − z2)
+ [r2tX2t − ht(y −X1t −X2t)]1(X1t ≤ y − z1 − z2, X1t +X2t ≤ y − z1 − z2)].
Let us define
Pt(y, z1, z2) = (r1t + ht)E[X1t] + (r2t + ht)E[X2t]− (ct + ht)y − (r1t + bt + ht)G1t(y − z1)
+ (r2t + ht)G1t(y − z1 − z2)− (r2t + ht)Ht(y − z1 − z2), (94)
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where Git(u) and Ht(u) are as defined in equations (2) and (3). After some algebra, we can
write the expected profit earned in period t as
P0t(y, z1, z2) = cI + Pt(y, z1, z2).
The maximum expected profit when there are t periods-to-go and the starting inventory is
I can be written as
Vt(I) = ctI + max{Jt(y, z1, z2) : I ≤ y ≤ Ct + I, z1, z2 ≥ 0}, where (95)
Jt(y, z1, z2) = Pt(y, z1, z2) + β
[
E[Vt−1(z1)1(X1t > y − z1)]
+ E[Vt−1(z1 + z2)1(X1t ≤ y − z1 − z2, X1t +X2t > y − z1 − z2)]
+ E[Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)1(X1t ≤ y − z1 − z2, X1t +X2t ≤ y − z1 − z2)]
+ E[Vt−1(y −X1t)1(y − z1 − z2 ≤ X1t ≤ y − z1)]
]
.
As before, V0(I) = 0 for I ≥ 0. Proposition 7 shows that the optimal policy parameters
are characterized by three quantities: St, R1t and R2t. As before, St denotes the critical
produce-up-to level, R1t denotes the critical level of inventory to be saved from sales in
either market and R2t is the total critical level of inventory to be saved from sales in the
spot market. R2t is equivalent to Rt considered in Section II.4 and hence, it is the critical
retain-up-to level for period t.
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Proposition 7. Jt(y, z1, z2) and Vt(I) satisfy the following properties for t = 1, . . . , T :
(a) Jt(y, z1, z2) has a finite maximizer denoted by (y
∗
t , z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t) such that
(z∗1t, z
∗
2t) =

(0, 0) if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
,
(0, R2t) if
r2t + ht
β
<
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r1t + bt + ht,
(R1t, R2t −R1t) if dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
> r1t + bt + ht,
(96)
where R2t satisfies
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R2t
=
r2t + ht
β
, R1t satisfies
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R1t
= r1t+bt+ht
and
y∗t =

I if St < I,
St if I ≤ St ≤ Ct + I,
Ct + I if St > Ct + I,
(97)
where St is determined by Jt(St, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t) = max{Jt(y, z∗1t, z∗2t) : y ∈ <+}.
(b) Vt(I) is a concave function of I.
Proof. The first order derivatives of Jt(y, z1, z2) with respect to y, z1 and z2 are given as
follows:
∂Jt(y, z1, z2)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1t + bt + ht)[1− F1t(y − z1)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y − z1 − z2)
− Fst(y − z1 − z2)] + βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y − z1 − z2)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y − z1 − z2 ≤ X1t ≤ y − z1)
]
, (98)
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∂Jt(y, z1, z2)
∂z1
=
[
β
dVt−1(z1)
dz1
− (r1t + bt + ht)
]
[1− F1t(y − z1)]
+
[
β
dVt−1(z1 + z2)
dz1
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y − z1 − z2)− Fst(y − z1 − z2)], (99)
∂Jt(y, z1, z2)
∂z2
=
[
β
dVt−1(z1 + z2)
dz2
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y − z1 − z2)− Fst(y − z1 − z2)]. (100)
The proof follows by induction. We will first show that the properties (a)-(c) are true for the
one period problem. Since V0(·) = 0, dV0(z)/dz = 0. Substituting this in equations (99) and
(100) for t = 1, it can be easily shown that ∂J1(y, z1, z2)/∂z1 ≤ 0 and ∂Jt(y, z1, 0)/∂z2 ≤ 0.
Hence, J1(y, z1, z2) is decreasing in both z1 and z2. Therefore, z
∗
11 = 0 and z
∗
21 = 0, which
satisfies the first part of equation (96). In addition, taking the derivative of equation (98)
with respect to y for t = 1 and evaluating the result at z1 = z2 = 0, we see that J1(y, 0, 0)
is concave in y. Defining S1 such that
∂J1(y, 0, 0)
∂y
∣∣
y=S1
= 0,
we have the optimal produce-up-to level in period 1 expressed as in equation (97).
Consequently, if follows from equation (95) that V1(I) = c1I + J1(y
∗
1(I), 0, 0). The first
order derivative of V1(I) is
dV1(I)
dI
=

r11 + b1 − (r11 + b1 − r21)F11(I)− (r21 + h1)Fs1(I) if S1 < I,
c1 if I ≤ S1 ≤ C1 + I,
r11 + b1 − (r11 + b1 − r21)F11(C1 + I) if S1 > C1 + I.
−(r21 + h1)Fs1(C1 + I)
(101)
From equation (101), we observe that dV1(I)/dI ≤ r11 + b1. Moreover, taking the derivative
of equation (101) with respect to I, it can be easily shown that d2V1(I)/dI
2 ≤ 0. Thus,
V1(I) is concave in I. As a result, properties (a)-(c) are true for the one-period problem.
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Suppose that properties (a)-(b) are true for periods t− 1, t− 2, . . . , 2. We will show that
they are true for period t. By the induction hypothesis based on part (b), dVt−1(z)/dz is a
decreasing function of z. Suppose that dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 ≤ (r2t + ht)/β. Then,
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z>0
≤ r2t + ht
β
. (102)
Using this inequality and equation (100), we observe that Jt(y, z1, z2) is a decreasing function
of z2 for z1 ≥ 0 and y ∈ [I, Ct + I]. Therefore, z∗2t = 0. Evaluating expression (99) at z2 = 0,
we have
∂Jt(y, z1, 0)
∂z1
=
[
β
dVt−1(z1)
dz1
− (r1t + bt + ht)
]
[1− F1t(y − z1)]
+
[
β
dVt−1(z1)
dz1
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y − z1)− Fst(y − z1)].
Using inequality (102) on right-hand side of the above equation, we have
∂Jt(y, z1, 0)
∂z1
=
[
β
(
r2t + ht
β
)
− (r1t + bt + ht)
]
[1− F1t(y − z1)]
+
[
β
(
r2t + ht
β
)
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y − z1)− Fst(y − z1)] < 0. (103)
The negativity of (103) follows from the assumption that β(r1t+bt) > r2t+ht and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Therefore, Jt(y, z1, 0) is a decreasing function of z1 for y ∈ [I, Ct + I], and hence, z∗1t = 0.
On the other hand, if dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 > (r2t + ht)/β, then for some R2t ∈ <+,
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R2t
=
r2t + ht
β
. (104)
Using equations (100) and (104), we observe that Jt(y, z1, z2) is increasing in z2 for z2 <
R2t− z1, and decreasing in z2 for z2 > R2t− z1. Therefore, Jt(y, z1, z2) attains its maximum
at z∗2t = R2t − z1 for z1 ≥ 0 and y ∈ [I, Ct + I]. Evaluating expression (99) at z2 = R2t − z1,
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we have
∂Jt(y, z1, R2t − z1)
∂z1
=
[
β
dVt−1(z1)
dz1
− (r1t + bt + ht)
]
[1− F1t(y − z1)]
+
[
β
dVt−1(z1 + z2)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z2=R2t−z1
− (r2t + ht)
]
[F1t(y −R2t)− Fst(y −R2t)]. (105)
Next, suppose that (r2t + ht)/β < dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 ≤ (r1t + bt + ht)/β. Then,
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z>0
≤ r1t + bt + ht
β
. (106)
Using inequality (106) and equation (104) on the right-hand side of expression (105), it is
easy to see that ∂Jt(y, z1, R2t−z1)/∂z1 < 0. Thus, Jt(y, z1, R2t−z1) is a decreasing function
of z1. Therefore, z
∗
1t = 0 and z
∗
2t = R2t − z∗1t = R2t.
On the other hand, if dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 > (r1t + bt + ht)/β, then for some R1t ∈ <+,
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=R1t
= r1t + bt + ht. (107)
Since dVt−1(z)/dz|z=R1t = r1t + bt +ht > (r2t +ht)/β and Vt−1(·) is concave, 0 < R1t < R2t.
Then, using equations (104) and (107) on the right-hand side of expression (105), we observe
that Jt(y, z1, R2t − z1) is increasing in z1 for z1 < R1t and decreasing in z1 for z1 > R1t.
Therefore, Jt(y, z1, R2t−z1) attains its maximum at z∗1t = R1t for y ∈ [I, Ct+I]. Furthermore,
z∗2t = R2t−z∗1t = R2t−R1t. Thus, for y ∈ [I, Ct+I], (z∗1t, z∗2t) can be expressed as in equation
(96).
Next, we show that Jt(y, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t) is concave in y. From the above discussion, we note
that for y ∈ [I, Ct + I], if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r2t + ht
β
, (108)
then z∗1t = z∗2t = 0. Evaluating expression (98) at z∗1 = z∗2 = 0 and taking the derivative of
the resulting expression with respect to y, we obtain:
72
∂Jt(y, 0, 0)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1t + bt + ht)[1− F1t(y)] + (r2t + ht)[F1t(y)− Fst(y)]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t ≤ y,X1t +X2t ≤ y)
]
,
∂2Jt(y, 0, 0)
∂y2
= −(r1t + bt − r2t)f1t(y) +
[
β
dVt−1(y − x1t − x2t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t+x2t=y
− (r2t + ht)
]
fst(y)
+ βE
[
d2Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y)
]
< 0. (109)
The negativity of (109) follows from the induction hypothesis that Vt−1(·) is concave and
inequality (108). On the other hand, if
r2t + ht
β
<
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r1t + bt + ht
β
, (110)
then z∗1t = 0 and z∗2t = R2t. Evaluating expression (98) at z∗1 = 0 and z∗2 = R2t and taking
the derivative of the resulting expression with respect to y, we obtain:
∂Jt(y, 0, R2t)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1t + bt + ht)[1− F1t(y)]
+ (r2t + ht)[F1t(y −R2t)− Fst(y −R2t)]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y −R2t)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y −R2t ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
,
∂2Jt(y, 0, Rt)
∂y2
=
[
β
dVt−1(y − x1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t=y
− (r1t + bt + ht)
]
f1t(y)
−
[
β
dVt−1(y − x)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x=R2t
− (r2t + ht)
]
[f1t(y −R2t)− fst(y −R2t)]
+ βE
[
d2Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y −R2t)
]
+ βE
[
dV 2t−1(y −X1t)
dy2
1(y −R2t ≤ X1t ≤ y)
]
< 0. (111)
In equation (111), the negativity of the first term follows from equation (110). The negativity
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of the second term follows from equation (104). The last two terms are negative based on the
induction hypotheses that Vt−1(·) is concave. Finally, if dVt−1(z)/dz|z=0 > (r1t + bt +ht)/β,
then z∗1t = R1t and z2t∗ = R2t − R1t. Evaluating expression (98) at z∗1 = R1t and z∗2 =
R2t −R1t and taking the derivative of resulting expression with respect to y, we obtain:
∂Jt(y,R1t, R2t −R1t)
∂y
= −ct − ht + (r1t + bt + ht)[1− F1t(y −R1t)]
+ (r2t + ht)[F1t(y −R2t)− Fst(y −R2t)]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y −R2t)
]
+ βE
[
dVt−1(y −X1t)
dy
1(y −R2t ≤ X1t ≤ y −R1t)
]
,
∂2Jt(y,R1t, R2t −R1t)
∂y2
=
[
β
dVt−1(y − x1t)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x1t=y−R1t
− (r1t + bt + ht)
]
f1t(y −R1t)
−
[
β
dVt−1(y − x)
dy
∣∣∣∣
x=R2t
− (r2t + ht)
]
[f1t(y −R2t)− fst(y −R2t)]
+ βE
[
d2Vt−1(y −X1t −X2t)
dy2
1(X1t +X2t ≤ y −R2t)
]
+ βE
[
dV 2t−1(y −X1t)
dy2
1(y −R2t ≤ X1t ≤ y −R1t)
]
< 0. (112)
In equation (112), the negativity of first term follows from the equation (107). The negativity
of second term follows from the equation (104). The last two terms are negative based on
the induction hypothesis that Vt−1(·) is concave. Thus, from inequalities in (109), (111) and
(112) it follows that Jt(y, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t) is concave in y. Defining St ∈ <, such that
∂Jt(y, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=St
= 0,
we have the optimal produce-up-to level in period t, y∗t expressed as in equation (97).
As a result property (a) holds. Then, it follows from equation (95) that Vt(I) = ctI +
Jt(y
∗
t (I), z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t). The first-order derivative of Vt(I) with respect to I evaluated at y
∗
t from
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equation (97) is given by:
dVt(I)
dI
= ct +
dJt(y
∗
t (I), z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t)
dI
dVt(I)
dI
= ct +

∂Jt(y, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=I
if St < I,
0 if I ≤ St ≤ Ct + I,
∂Jt(y, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=Ct+I
if St > Ct + I.
(113)
Taking the first-order derivative of equation (113) with respect to I and using the fact that
Jt(y, z
∗
1t, z
∗
2t) is concave in y in the resulting expression, it is easy to verify that d
2Vt(I)/dI
2 ≤
0. Hence, Vt(I) is concave in I. As a result, properties (a)-(b) are true for period t.
In addition to the results in Theorem 1, Proposition 7 indicates that if
dVt−1(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=0
≤ r1t + bt + ht, (114)
then Jt(y, z1, R2t − z1) is a decreasing function of z1 for y ≥ 0, and hence, from equation
(95), z∗1t = 0. On the other hand, if inequality (114) is violated, then Jt(y, z1, R2t − z1) is
unimodal in z1 for y ≥ 0 and z∗1t = R1t whereas z∗2t = R2t−R1t. We observe that if the unit
revenue from the primary market is constant for the entire planning horizon, then there is
no economic motivation to save inventory from sales in the primary market. Thus, for the
problem setting considered in Section II.3 z1t = R1t = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T . However, if the
unit revenue and unit lost sales penalty for unsatisfied demand from the primary market are
non-stationary then it may be optimal to save some units from sales in the primary market
as well. This is especially true in periods with low values of r1t and bt compared to those in
the very next period.
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II.9 Summary of Contributions and Key Insights
This chapter considers a multi-period, integrated replenishment and liquidation problem
for a capacitated supplier facing stochastic demand from two markets. This problem is
particularly relevant to suppliers facing demand from a spot market along with its primary
market (with higher priority contractual customers). In such settings, if one reserves the
optimal amount of inventory for future high-priority or high-revenue demand, higher profits
can be earned. If the unit revenue and the lost sales penalty for the primary market are
stationary, we show that the optimal policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical
produce-up-to and the critical retain-up-to levels.
We establish (lower and upper) thresholds on the unit revenue from the spot market
such that a simple benchmark policy is optimal. However, if the unit revenue from the
spot market is within these thresholds, then the optimal policy does not reduce to any of
the benchmark policies and leads to significant profit improvement. Our numerical results
indicate that the benefits of the optimal policy over both the benchmark policies are higher,
more than 5%, when the production capacity is low, demand uncertainty is high and/or
demands in the primary and spot market are negatively correlated.
Our computational study provides interesting managerial insights, which can be used
to develop rules of thumb for better understanding of the alternative and more practical
policies. For example, we observe that the two most important factors that determine the
optimal retain-up-to level are: (i) comparison of the current value of the product in the spot
market and savings in future production cost, and (ii) relative values of optimal produce-up-
to level and production capacity available in the next period. We observe that when there is
enough production capacity available in the next period the optimal policy reduces to either
one of the benchmark policies. On the other hand, when the production capacity available
is not enough to meet the produce-up-to level in the next period, the optimal policy may
not reduce to either of the benchmark policies.
The theoretical and numerical results presented in this chapter suggest that even if selling
in the spot market is profitable, it may be suboptimal to satisfy the spot market demand
76
completely even if we have sufficient inventory. On the other hand, by assumption, demand
from the primary market customers must be completely satisfied if there is enough inventory
available. This result is based on the assumption that the unit revenue and the unit lost
sales penalty for unsatisfied demand from the primary market customers are stationary. One
immediate question of interest is what happens if this assumption is violated, i.e., if the unit
revenue and unit lost sales penalty for unsatisfied demand from the primary market are
non-stationary and customers in primary market are non-contractual, is it still preferable
to completely satisfy the primary market demand in each period? The answer requires a
proof of the structure of the optimal policy under non-stationary parameters. In this case,
the optimal policy is characterized by three parameters, rather than just two, where the
third parameter specifies conditions under which one may choose to retain inventory at the
expense of losing primary market sales.
As we noted earlier, a future research direction relates to examining the effect of corre-
lation between the spot market demand in a given period and the primary market demand
in the next period. This extension explicitly considers that the demands can be correlated
over time as well. Other important extensions include the cases where (i) the spot market
price is unknown at the time of decision making and (ii) the demands are price-dependent.
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CHAPTER III
JOINT REPLENISHMENT, ALLOCATION AND PRICING DECISIONS UNDER TWO
MARKETS
III.1 Introduction
Revenue management (RM) focuses on demand-management decisions, and has emerged
as one of the most effective approaches to improve revenue, and hence, profits [72]. A funda-
mental strategy used in RM is customer segmentation, which is the division of a supplier’s
market into different groups, such that customers in each group share similar characteristics
and preferences. Suppliers may differentiate its customers based on price, fulfillment priority,
contractual agreements, shortage costs and time of occurrence of demand. Depending on the
basis of customer segmentation, existing models in the literature utilize either quantity-based
RM or price-based RM as a tactical tool to improve profits. Quantity-based RM focuses
on capacity/inventory allocation decisions to different customer segments and is used when
suppliers have to commit to certain prices. Price-based RM focuses on pricing decisions and
is used when prices can be changed over time. However, several real life business settings
may require the supplier to use quantity-based RM for one demand class and price-based
RM for another demand class.
For example, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) (e.g., Dell, HP) may sell their
products to high volume customers, which includes retailers like Best Buy, Walmart or
directly to individual customers through web-based channels. The retailers may negotiate
delivery at fixed prices and may place orders at the beginning of each month. In contrast,
direct customers order throughout the month and the OEM can easily change prices on its
website targeting these direct customers. In such settings, it is profitable for the supplier to
use a quantity-based RM strategy for the retail customers, whose demand is satisfied at the
beginning of each month at a fixed price. For example, the supplier can use discretionary
sales for the retail customers and satisfy their demand only partially while saving inventory
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for potentially higher-revenue demand from individual customers. Similarly, the supplier
can use a price-based RM strategy for the direct customers who can be charged a different
price in each month.
In this chapter, we consider such a supplier (e.g., OEMs) who satisfies demands from two
customer classes over a finite planning horizon. Class 1 customers consists of high-volume
buyers who negotiate delivery at fixed price. In contrast, customers with price-sensitive
demand in Class 2 may be charged a different price in each period. We consider the case
where the supplier observes and satisfies the stochastic demand from Class 1 before observing
the Class 2 demand in each period. Unsatisfied demand from Class 1 is lost and incurs a
lost sales penalty. In contrast, there is no penalty for unsatisfied demand from Class 2. To
maximize the expected profit, the supplier has to make three decisions in each period. Before
observing the Class 1 demand, the supplier decides (i) how much to produce, and (ii) how
much inventory to protect from Class 1 customers (i.e., how much inventory to allocate to
Class 1 demand). After observing and satisfying the Class 1 demand, the supplier decides
(iii) the price to be charged to Class 2 customers.
For modeling purposes, we divide each period into two stages as follows: Stage 1 starts
at the beginning of the period and ends (and stage 2 starts) after the supplier observes and
satisfies Class 1 demand. Stage 2 ends at the end of the period. We consider an additive
demand function for the price-sensitive demand in Class 2. We formulate the problem as
a finite horizon, multi-period, two-stage stochastic dynamic program. We show that the
optimal price charged to Class 2 customers is a function of the left-over inventory after
satisfying Class 1 demand. Furthermore, the stage 1 optimal policy is a combination of the
produce-up-to policy with potential discretionary sales to Class 1. In other words, stage
1 optimal policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical produce-up-to level and
the critical amount of inventory to be protected from Class 1. Specifically, we show that
a discretionary sales policy for Class 1 is optimal if the supplier anticipates higher-revenue
demand from Class 2.
In general, the supplier’s optimal policy can be computed using the backward induction
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algorithm, which may take considerable time to solve (e.g., see [54, 68]). This may make the
optimal policy less attractive from implementation perspective. In contrast, myopic policies
are less costly to evaluate, and hence, are readily accepted by practitioners. A myopic
policy makes decisions in each period by isolating it from the future periods. As a result, a
myopic solution to a T -period problem can be obtained by solving T single period problems.
Considering the practical relevance of our problem, we establish a set of sufficient conditions
under which a myopic policy is optimal. The first sufficiency condition requires the on-hand
inventory at the beginning of the planning horizon to be less than the myopic produce-up-
to level. The second sufficiency condition is satisfied if the critical myopic produce-up-to
level is non-decreasing. For example, this is true when all cost and demand parameters are
stationary and any units remaining at the end of the planning horizon are salvaged at a
value equal to the unit production cost.
We conduct a computational study to: (i) investigate the sensitivity of the optimal policy
parameters to key model parameters, and (ii) quantify the benefits of discretionary sales for
Class 1 and dynamic pricing for Class 2, and examine the effect of key model parameters on
these benefits. Our results show that the benefits of dynamic pricing for Class 2 (average
11.7%) are significantly higher than the benefits of discretionary sales for Class 1 (average
0.9%). Benefits of discretionary sales for Class 1 increase with increase in Class 1 or Class
2 demand variances, and decrease in the slope of the Class 2 demand curve. Furthermore,
benefits of dynamic pricing for Class 2: (i) increase with the increase in Class 1 or Class
2 demand variances, (ii) increase (decrease) with the increase in the slope of the Class 2
demand curve such that the resulting maximum price that can be charged to Class 2 is
higher (lower) than the sum of the price charged to Class 1 and the unit loss sales penalty.
In summary, this research seeks answers to the following key practical questions:
(i) What is the structure of the supplier’s joint optimal replenishment, allocation and
pricing policy?
(ii) What myopic policy can the supplier use and under what conditions is it optimal?
(iii) What is the value of discretionary sales to Class 1?
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(iv) What is the value of dynamic pricing to Class 2?
Implementing discretionary sales and/or dynamic pricing may be costly and may also result
in loss of good will [72]. Our results will quantify the benefits of these strategies and justify
their implementation in comparison to simpler policies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section III.2, we provide a
brief summary of the related literature and the contributions of our study. In Section
III.3, we present two-stage stochastic dynamic program formulation of the problem and
characterize the structure of the optimal policy. In Section III.4, we present an alternate
Markov Decision Processes (MDP) formulation of the problem and the corresponding myopic
policy. We establish the conditions under which this myopic policy is optimal, and discuss
the restrictions that these conditions impose of the model parameters in Section III.5. In
Section III.6, we present results of our computational study, followed by concluding remarks
in Section III.7.
III.2 Literature Review
First and foremost, this research is related to pure inventory models which investigate
optimality of myopic replenishment policies under stochastic demand from a single demand
Class. The methodological approach followed by these papers is similar to ours. Notable
works include [14, 43, 53, 67, 68, 77, 79]. We generalize the existing work in this area by
investigating the optimality of joint myopic replenishment, allocation and pricing policy in
presence of two demand classes.
This research builds on and generalizes two relevant streams of operations and marketing
literature: the first stream investigates inventory replenishment and allocation decisions in
the presence of multiple demand classes. The second stream focuses on joint replenishment
and pricing decisions in the presence of one or more demand classes.
The decision regarding the amount of inventory to be protected from Class 1 specifies the
maximum inventory that should be used to satisfy Class 1 demand. Thus, the first stream
of related literature investigates: (i) how much to produce, and (ii) how much demand to
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satisfy from each customer Class. We refer to these decisions as inventory replenishment and
allocation decisions, respectively. We divide this stream of literature into three categories:
(1) papers that study only production decisions [69, 78, 82], (2) papers that study only
allocation decisions (see Kleijn and Dekker [50] for a review), and (3) papers that study joint
production and allocation decisions. The papers that study joint production and allocation
decisions can be further Classified as single [65] or multiple demand Class models [4, 22,
26, 30, 31, 36, 38, 60, 75]. The multiple demand Class models can be further divided
as single procurement [60], multi-procurement models with unlimited production capacity
[22, 36, 38, 75] and multi-procurement models with limited production capacity [4, 26, 30, 31].
In this research, we assume that unlimited production capacity is available, and we extend the
second stream of literature by investigating pricing decisions in addition to the replenishment
and allocation decisions.
The second stream focuses on simultaneous determination of optimal inventory and pric-
ing decisions in the face of price-sensitive stochastic demand in a periodic review setting.
Based on how uncertainty of price-sensitive demand is modeled, we Classify this literature
as: (i) models that consider additive demand function [24, 46, 59, 74, 80, 81] , (ii) models
that consider multiplicative demand functions [13, 59, 70, 80], and (3) models that consider
a general demand function that admits both additive and multiplicative demand functions
[7, 17, 23, 33, 51]. We refer the reader to Chan et. al. [17] for a detailed review of this
stream of literature. With the exception of [13, 46, 81], this stream of literature assumes
that there is a single demand Class. We consider multiple demand classes and discuss such
models in detail. Cachon and Kok [13] investigate a single-period problem with two demand
classes: (i) there is stochastic demand from Class 1, which is charged a exogenously fixed
price, and (ii) Class 2 demand is a deterministic function of the realized demand in Class
1 and the price charged to it, which is a decision variable. Karakul [46] considers a single-
period problem with stochastic price-sensitive demand from a primary Class, and stochastic
demand from a clearance Class with exogenously fixed discounted price. Zhang and Bell [81]
consider a single-period problem with stochastic price-sensitive demand from two or more
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demand classes. They consider that demand from all classes is realized simultaneously, and
is satisfied without priority. In contrast, we consider a multi-period model with two demand
classes such that: (i) stochastic demand from Class 1 is satisfied at an exogenously fixed
price before Class 2 demand is observed, and (ii) stochastic price-sensitive demand from
Class 2 is independent of the Class 1 demand. Furthermore, we allow inventory rationing
and discretionary sales to Class 1, and the decide the price to be charged to Class 2 after
observing Class 1 demand.
In summary, we contribute to the existing literature by investigating joint replenishment,
allocation and pricing decisions under stochastic demand from two customer classes. We
investigate optimality of joint myopic replenishment, allocation and pricing policy in presence
of two demand classes. Based on our computational study, we show that the benefits of
discretionary sales for Class 1 and dynamic pricing for Class 2 are significant.
III.3 Model Formulation
We consider a supplier who faces stochastic demand from two customer classes, Class
1 and Class 2, as illustrated in Figure 7. The selling horizon consists of T periods. At
the beginning of period t, the supplier observes the on-hand inventory It and makes two
decisions: (i) the number of units to be produced, qt, and (ii) the minimum number of units
to be protected from Class 1 customers, zt. That is, the supplier may choose to satisfy Class
1 demand only partially even if sufficient inventory is available. We denote the produce-up-
to level by yt = qt + It. We assume that the production occurs instantaneously and ct is the
unit cost of production. After production is completed, the stochastic demand from Class 1
customers, D1t, is realized. The supplier satisfies Class 1 demand while protecting atleast zt
units of inventory. If Class 1 demand exceeds yt − zt, then excess demand is lost and incurs
a unit penalty of b. On the other hand, if Class 1 demand is less than yt−zt, then the entire
Class 1 demand is satisfied and the left-over inventory is available for sales to the Class 2
customers.
While the supplier charges a fixed unit price of r1 to Class 1 customers over the entire
planning horizon, Class 2 customers may be charged a different price in each period. In
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particular, after satisfying Class 1 demand, the supplier decides the price to be charged
to Class 2 customers, denoted by pt in period t. Following this, stochastic demand from
Class 2 customers is realized and satisfied at the determined price. More specifically, the
price-sensitive demand from Class 2 customers can be written as
D2t(p, ξt) = dt(p) + ξt,
where dt(p) is a decreasing and deterministic function of the Class 2 price p in period t.
Furthermore, ξt is a non-negative, continuous random variable defined in the range (0, At)
and E[ξt] = µt. There is no penalty for unsatisfied demand from Class 2. Any inventory
remaining after sales to Class 2 is carried to the next period at a unit holding cost of ht.
To summarize, in each period t, the supplier makes three decisions. Before observing
the Class 1 demand, the supplier decides yt and zt. After observing and satisfying the Class
1 demand, the supplier decides pt. That is, inventory can be replenished at the start of
the period and is first used to satisfy Class 1 demand. Both the price charged to Class 1
(r1) and the unit lost sales penalty (b) for unsatisfied demand from Class 1 are constant for
the entire planning horizon. Protecting zt units of inventory from Class 1 customers allows
the supplier to satisfy Class 1 demand only partially, and save inventory for potentially
higher-profit customers from Class 2. Furthermore, since Class 2 customers may be charged
a different price in each period, it allows the supplier to practice dynamic pricing. Any
inventory remaining at the end of the planning horizon is salvaged at a unit value of c0. We
Figure 7: Graphical representation of the problem setting
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Figure 8: Graphical representation of the sequence of events for period t.
consider a one-period discount factor of 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Figure 8 gives a graphical representation
of the sequence of events that take place in a period and Table 10 summarizes the notation
that we use in our model.
We index each period in terms of the number of periods remaining until the end of the
planning horizon. For modeling purposes, we divide each period into two stages as follows:
Stage 1 starts at the beginning of the period and ends (and stage 2 starts) after the supplier
observes and satisfies Class 1 demand. Stage 2 ends at the end of the period. We formulate
the problem as a two-stage stochastic dynamic program. Since we define zt as the minimum,
and not the actual, amount of inventory to be protected from Class 1, the optimal value of
z in period t, denoted by z∗t , is independent of the realized value of D1t. For mathematical
simplicity, we formulate the problem such that z∗t is determined before observing D1t. Vt(I)
denotes the maximum expected discounted profit when there are t periods to go until the
end of the planning horizon and the starting inventory is I. V2t(I2) denotes the maximum
expected discounted profit from stage 2 of period t until the end of the planning horizon when
the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand is I2. For each period t = 1, . . . , T ,
the expected profit earned in stage 2 of period t when the left-over inventory is I2 and Class
2 customers are charged a unit price of p is:
g02t(p, I2) = E
[
pmin{D2t(p, ξt), I2} − ht(I2 −D2t(p, ξt))+
]
, (115)
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Table 10: Notation
T total number of periods
D1t demand random variable for Class 1 in period t
ξt random element of Class 2 demand in period t
dt(p) deterministic element of Class 2 demand when unit price in period t is p
f1t(·), F1t(·) probability density and cumulative distribution functions of D1t
f2t(·), F2t(·) probability density and cumulative distribution functions of ξt
ct unit cost of production in period t
r1 fixed unit price charged to Class 1 in periods t = 1, ..., T
b unit lost sales penalty for unsatisfied demand from Class 1
ht unit holding cost in period t
It on-hand inventory at the beginning of period t
I2t left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand period t
qt number of units produced in period t
yt produce-up-to level in period t
zt minimum inventory to be protected from Class 1 in period t
pt unit price to be charged to Class 2 in period t
put maximum price that can be charged to Class 2 customers in period t
β one-period discount factor
where x+ = max{x, 0}. For conciseness, we define the following functions:
Git(u) =
∫ ∞
u
(x− u)dFit(x), (116)
g2t(p, I2) = (p+ ht)
[
dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p))
]
. (117)
Reorganizing the terms in (115) and after some algebraic manipulations, it can be shown
that g02t(p, I2) = −htI2 + g2t(p, I2). Let put be the maximum price that can be charged to
Class 2 customers in period t. The maximum expected discounted profit-to-go from stage 2
of period t when the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand is I2 can be written
as
V2t(I2) = −htI2 + max{J2t(p, I2) : 0 ≤ p ≤ put }, where (118)
J2t(p, I2) = g2t(p, I2) + βE[Vt−1(I2 −D2t(p, ξt))1(D2t(p, ξt) ≤ I2)]
+ βE[Vt−1(0)1(D2t(p, ξt) > I2)] (119)
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for t = 1, . . . , T . The first term in equation (119) represents the expected profit in stage 2
of period t plus the holding cost for I2 units. The remaining terms represent the expected
discounted profit-to-go for the next t− 1 periods conditioned on Class 2 demand realization
in period t. Similarly, for each period t = 1, . . . , T , the expected profit earned in stage 1 of
period t when the starting inventory is I, produce-up-to level is y, and z units are protected
from Class 1 is given as
g0t (y, z, I) = E
[
r1 min{D1t, y − z} − ct(yt − I)− b(D1t − y + z)+
]
= cI + gt(y, z),
where gt(y, z) = rE[D1t]− (r1 + b)G1t(y − z)− cty.
The maximum expected discounted profit when there are t periods-to-go and the starting
inventory is I can be written as
Vt(I) = ctI + max{Jt(y, z) : y ≥ I, z ≥ 0}, (120)
where Jt(y, z) = gt(y, z) + E[V2t(y −D1t)1(D1t ≤ y − z)] + E[V2t(z)1(D1t > y − z)] (121)
for t = 1, . . . , T . The first term in equation (121) represents the expected profit in stage 1
of period t less the production cost for I units. The remaining terms represent the expected
discounted profit-to-go from stage 2 of period t conditioned on Class 1 demand realization
in period t. We assume that end-of-horizon salvage value, c0, is such that 0 ≤ c0 ≤ c1,
and hence, V0(I) = c0I. The objective is to compute VT (I) and to determine the optimal
values of the decision variables denoted by y∗t , z∗t and p∗t that achieve this maximum expected
discounted profit.
We assume that r1 > ct for the problem to make economic sense. Furthermore, for each
period t, we make the following assumptions:
(A1) dt(p) is a decreasing and concave function of p for 0 ≤ p ≤ put . That is, d′t(p) ≤ 0,
d′′t (p) ≤ 0.
(A2) ξt has increasing failure rate, i.e., r(u) = f2t(u)/(1− F2t(u)) is increasing.
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(A3) D1t and ξt for t = 1, . . . , T are independent random variables.
Assumption A1 about dt(p) is mild and common in the economics and inventory management
literatures (e.g., [24, 33, 59]). It encompasses power functions of the form dt(p) = α − θpγ
(γ > 1, α, θ > 0), ln(α − θpγ) (γ > 0), and a − expγp (γ > 0). Assumption A2 is also
common in the literature (e.g., [24, 51, 59] ). Examples of distributions with increasing
failure rate include exponential, uniform, normal, truncated normal, lognormal, gamma
with shape parameters greater than 1, beta with both shape and scale parameters greater
than 1 (e.g., see Lariviere 2006 for more details). Assumption A3 means that demands in
different classes and in consecutive periods are independent.
The maximum price that can be charged to Class 2 customers, put , is the smallest price
such that dt(p) = 0 (e.g., see [24]). We do not restrict the value of p
∗
t to be greater than ct,
t = 1, . . . , T . If p∗t ≥ ct, then selling to Class 2 is profitable. On the other hand, if p∗t < ct,
then selling to Class 2 is equivalent to salvaging. Furthermore, we consider that the inverse
function of dt(·), denoted by d−1t (·), is continuous and is defined as d−1t (I) = p such that
dt(p) = I for 0 ≤ I ≤ dt(0). Furthermore, from assumption A1, we have (d−1t )′(dt(p)) =
1/d′t(p) ≤ 0 and (d−1t )′′(dt(p)) = −d′′t (p)/(d′t(p))3 ≤ 0. That is, d−1t (·) is decreasing and
concave.
III.3.1 Characterization of the structure of the optimal policy
In this section, we first present an assumption that simplifies the analysis presented in
rest of the chapter. Then, we present a theorem which completely characterizes the structure
of the optimal policy. For a special case of our problem, we establish a lower bound on the
optimal price and discuss the insights provided by this special case.
Similar to [80] and for the ease of exposition, we assume that for all I2 > 0
∂J2t(p, I2)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=put
= µt −G2t(I2) + d′t(put )(put + ht − βct−1)F2t(I2) < 0. (122)
This assumption ensures that Class 2 is never charged the maximum price put and implies
that µt is not too large. For example, when dt(p) = a1 − a2p and ξt follows Uniform(0, At)
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distribution, condition (122) implies that µt = 0.5At ≤ 0.5(a1 − a2(βct−1 − ht)). Results
in Theorem 3 can be generalized to consider settings where condition (122) is not satisfied,
albeit at the expense of a more tedious argument. In particular, when condition (122) is
not satisfied for some left-over inventory I¯2 in period t, it can be shown that J2t(p, I¯2) is
increasing for 0 < p ≤ put . Therefore, when the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1
demand does not satisfy condition (122) the optimal price to be charged to Class 2 customers
is put .
Before we characterize the structure of the optimal policy, we present a useful identity.
Lemma 1. For any I2 > 0 and 0 < p < p
u
t ,
[
dt(p)+µt−G2t(I2−dt(p))
]
> 0 for t = 1, . . . , T .
Proof. We recall that ξt ∼ (0, At), and hence, for x ≤ 0 we have dF2t(x) = 0. Then, using
equation (116) for 0 < I2 ≤ dt(p), we have
dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p)) =
∫ At
0
(dt(p) + x)dF2t(x)−
∫ At
0
(x− I2 + dt(p))dF2t(x)
= I2 > 0.
On the other hand, if I2 ≥ dt(p), then
dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p)) =
∫ At
0
(dt(p) + x)dF2t(x)−
∫ At
I2−dt(p)
(x− I2 + dt(p))dF2t(x)
=
∫ I2−dt(p))
0
(dt(p) + x)dF2t(x) + I2
[
1− F2t
(
I2 − dt(p)
)]
> 0.
Theorem 3 shows that the optimal price charged to Class 2 in period t is a function
of the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand in period t. It also presents how
to determine the optimal Class 2 price for a given I2, denoted by p
∗
t (I2), by studying the
functions V2t(I2) and J2t(p, I2), given by equations (118) and (119). Theorem 3 also presents
how to determine the stage 1 optimal policy parameters (y∗t , z∗t ) by studying the functions
Vt(I) and Jt(y, z) given by equations (120) and (121). In particular, it shows that the stage
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1 optimal policy is characterized by two critical quantities: St is the critical produce-up-to
level and Rt is the critical amount of inventory to be protected from Class 1 in period t.
Theorem 3. J2t(p, I2), V2t(I2), Jt(y, z) and Vt(I) satisfy the following properties for t =
1, . . . , T :
(a) For a given I2 ≥ 0, J2t(p, I2) has a finite maximizer p∗t (I2) such that p∗t (I2) < put and
∂J2t(p, I2)
∂I2
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗t (I2)
= 0.
(b) p∗t (I2) is continuous and decreasing in I2, and
(
I2 − dt(p∗t (I2))
)
is increasing in I2.
(c) V2t(I2) is concave in I2.
(d)
dV2t(I2)
dI2
≤ put .
(e) Jt(y, z) has a finite maximizer denoted by (y
∗
t , z
∗
t ) such that
z∗t =

0 if pu ≤ r1 + b
Rt if p
u > r1 + b,
(123)
where Rt > 0 satisfies
dV2t(I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=Rt
= r1 + b, and y
∗
t = max{St, I} where St satisfies
∂Jt(y, z
∗
t )
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=St
= 0.
(f) Vt(I) is concave in I.
(g)
dVt(I)
dI
≤ ct.
Proof. Before proceeding with a proof, we present the following first and second order deriva-
tives of J2t(p, I2) with respect to p as follows:
∂J2t(p, I2)
∂p
= dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p)) + d′t(p)(p+ ht)F2t(I2 − dt(p))
− d′t(p)βE
[
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)−ξt
1(ξt ≤ I2 − dt(p))
]
, (124)
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∂J22t(p, I2)
∂p2
= [2d′t(p) + (p+ ht)d
′′
t (p)]F2t(I2 − dt(p))
− (d′t(p))2
(
p+ ht − βdVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=0
)
f2t(I2 − dt(p))
+ (d′t(p))
2βE
[
d2Vt−1(I)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)−ξt
1(ξt ≤ I2 − dt(p))
]
− d′′t (p)βE
[
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)−ξt
1(ξt ≤ I2 − dt(p))
]
. (125)
The proof follows by induction. We will first show that the properties (a)-(g) are true for
the one-period problem. Since V0(I) = c0I, we have dV0(I)/dI = c0 and d
2V0(I)/dI
2 = 0.
Substituting this in equation (124) for t = 1 and using Lemma 1 in the resulting expression,
we observe that ∂J2t(p, I2)/∂p > 0 for p ≤ βc0 − h1. Therefore, the optimal price to be
charged to Class 2 in period t = 1 is greater than βc0 − h1. Substituting dV0(I)/dI = c0 in
equation (125) for t = 1, p ≥ βc0−h1, and using assumption A1 we have ∂J221(p, I2)/∂p2 ≤ 0.
Hence, J221(p, I2) is a concave function of p for a given I2. Define Ht(p, I2) = ∂J2t(p, I2)/∂p
for t = 1, . . . , T , and p∗1(I2) such that H1(p∗1(I2), I2) = 0. Then, from the first order condition
we know that p∗1(I2) maximizes J21(p, I2). Furthermore, evaluating H1(p, I2) at p = pu1 and
using the inequality (122), it follows that H1(p
u
1 , I2) < 0, and hence, p
∗
1(I2) < p
u
1 for all
I2 > 0. For simpler notation we write p
∗
t (I2) simply as p
∗
t , for t = 1, . . . , T .
To prove property (b), for t = 1, . . . , T define H0t (p, I2) as follows:
H0t (p, I2) = dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p)) + d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)F2t(I2 − dt(p)). (126)
Substituting dV0(I)/dI = c0 in equation (124) and evaluating equation (126) for t = 1, we
observe that
H1(p, I2) =
∂J21(p, I2)
∂p
= H01 (p, I2). (127)
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Using equation (116) and integration by parts, we rewrite H0t (p, I2) as follows:
H0t (p, I2) = dt(p) + µt −
∫ ∞
I2−dt(p)
(x− I2 + dt(p))dF2t(x)
+ d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)F2t(I2 − dt(p))
= I2 +
∫ I2−dt(p)
0
(x− I2 + dt(p))dF2t(x) + d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)F2t(I2 − dt(p))
= I2 −
∫ I2−dt(p)
0
F2t(x)dx+ d
′
t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)F2t(I2 − dt(p))
=
∫ I2−dt(p)
0
(
1− F2t(x) + d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(x)
)
dx+ dt(p)
=
∫ I2
dt(p)
(
1− F2t(x− dt(p)) + d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(x− dt(p))
)
dx+ dt(p)
=
∫ I2
dt(p)
(1− F2t(x− dt(p)))
[
1 +
d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(x− dt(p))
1− F2t(x− dt(p))
]
dx+ dt(p).
Using the fact that for x < 0, f2t(x) = F2t(x) = 0, we have
H0t (p, I2) =
∫ I2
0
(1− F2t(x− d1(p)))
[
1 +
d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(x− dt(p))
1− F2t(x− dt(p))
]
dx.
For conciseness, define the the following functions for t = 1, . . . , T
et(p, I2) =
−d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(I2 − dt(p))
1− F2t(I2 − dt(p)) , (128)
and Qt(p, I2) = [1− F2t(I2 − dt(p))](1− et(p, I2)). (129)
Then, it follows that
H0t (p, I2) =
∫ I2
0
Qt(p, x)dx. (130)
Evaluating H1(p1, I2) at p = p
∗
1 and using equations (127) and (130) for t = 1, we have
H1(p
∗
1, I2) =
∫ I2
0 Q1(p
∗
1, x)dx = 0. Using implicit differentiation, we have
dp∗1(I2)
dI2
=
−∂H1/∂I2
∂H1/∂p∗1
. (131)
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We can express each term in (131) as follows:
∂H1
∂p∗1
=
∂J221(p, I2)
∂p2
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗1
≤ 0, (132)
∂H1
∂I2
= 1− F21(I2 − d1(p∗1)) + d′1(p∗1)(p∗1 + h1 − βcs)f21(I2 − d1(p∗1)) = Q1(p∗1, I2).
From assumptions A1 and A2, it follows that et(p, I2) is increasing in I2 for t = 1, . . . , T .
Then, for a fixed p, Qt(p, I2) is decreasing in I2 for t = 1, . . . , T . If Q1(p
∗
1, I2) > 0, then for
all x ≤ I2, Q1(p∗1, x) > 0, and hence, H1(p∗1, I2) =
∫ I2
0 Q1(p
∗
1, x)dx > 0. This contradicts
the definition of p∗1, i.e., H1(p∗1, I2) = 0. Therefore, we have Q1(p∗1, I2) ≤ 0, and hence,
∂H1/∂I2 ≤ 0. Using this and the inequality (132) on the right-hand side of (131), we have
dp∗1(I2)/dI2 ≤ 0, and hence, p∗1(I2) is a decreasing function of I2.
Next, evaluating H1(p, I2) = ∂J2t(p, I2)/∂p at p = p
l
t = βc0 − h1, we see that H1(p =
βc0 − h1, I2) = d1(βc0 − h1) + µt − G2t(I2 − d1(βc0 − h1)) > 0. Then, from concavity of
J2t(p, I2) it follows that p
∗
1(I2) ≥ βc0 − h1 for I2 ≥ 0. Furthermore, we note that when
I2 = 0, H1(p, 0) = dt(p) > 0 for p < p
u
1 and H1(p
u, 0) = 0. Hence, we have p∗1(0) = pu1 . Since
p∗1(I2) is a decreasing function of I2, we have p∗t (I2) ≤ pu1 . Thus, p∗1(I2) always satisfies the
constraint pl1 < p
∗
1(I2) ≤ pu1 for I2 ≥ 0.
Next, lets us define wt(I2) = I2 − dt(p∗t (I2)), then
dwt
dI2
= 1− d′1(p∗1)
dp∗1(I2)
dI2
=
∂H1/∂p
∗
1 + d
′
1(p
∗
1)∂H1/∂I2
∂H1/∂p∗1
=
d′1(p∗1) + [d′1(p∗1) + d′′1(p∗1)(p∗1 + h1 − βc0)]F21(I2 − d1(p∗1))
∂H1/∂p∗1
> 0. (133)
Using equation (118) for t = 1, we have V21(I2) = −h1I2 + J21(p∗1(I2), I2), and
dV21(I2)
dI2
= βc0 − h1 + (p∗1 + h1 − βc0)
(
1− F21(I2 − d1(p∗1)) (134)
d2V21(I2)
dI22
=
dp∗1(I2)
dI2
(1− F21(I2 − d1(p∗1))
− (p∗1 + h1 − βc0)f21(I2 − d1(p∗1))
(
1− d′1(p∗1)
dp∗1(I2)
dI2
)
≤ 0.
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Hence, V21(I2) is concave in I2. From equation (134) we have dV21(I2)/dI2|I2=0 = p∗1(0) = pu1 .
Evaluating the limit of equation (134) as I2 goes to infinity, we obtain
lim
I2→∞
dV21(I2)
dI2
= βc0 − h1.
Then, property (d) follows directly from concavity of V21(·). Thus properties (a)-(d) are true
for stage 2 for period t = 1.
Next, we consider the stage 1 problem for t = 1 and present the following first and second
order derivatives, which will be used to prove properties (e)-(g):
∂Jt(y, z)
∂z
=
[
dV2t(z)
dz
− (r1 + b)
]
(1− F1t(y − z)), (135)
∂Jt(y, z)
∂y
= (r1 + b)(1− F1t(y − z))− ct + E
[
dV2t(y −D1t)
dy
1(D1t ≤ y − z)
]
, (136)
∂2Jt(y, z)
∂y2
= −
[
r1 + b− dV2t(I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=z
]
f1t(y − z) + E
[
d2V2t(y −D1)
dy2
1(D1t ≤ y − z)
]
.
(137)
Suppose that pu1 ≤ r1 + b, then from property (d), we have dV21(z)/dz ≤ pu1 ≤ r1 + b for
z > 0. Using this inequality and equation (135) for t = 1, we observe that J1(y, z) is a
decreasing function of z for y ≤ I. Therefore, z∗1 = 0. On the other hand, if pu1 > r1 + b,
then using the fact that c < r1 + b, property (d) for period t = 1 and the intermediate value
theorem there exists a R1 ∈ <+ such that
dV21(I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=R1
= r1 + b. (138)
Evaluating expression (135) for t = 1 and using equation (138), we observe that J1(y, z) is
increasing in z for z < R1 and decreasing in z for z > R1. Therefore, J1(y, z) attains its
maximum at z∗1 = R1 for y ≥ I. From the above discussion, we see that
dV21(I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=z∗1
≤ r1 + b. (139)
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Evaluating expression (137) at t = 1 and z = z∗1 , and using the inequality in (139) and the
concavity of V21(·), we have ∂2J1(y, z∗1)/∂y2 ≤ 0. Hence, J1(y, z∗1) is concave in y. Defining
S1 such that ∂J1(y, z
∗
1)/∂y|y=S1 = 0, we have y∗1(I) = max{S1, I}. From equation (120) it
follows that V1(I) = cI + J1(y
∗
1(I), z
∗
1), and
dV1(I)
dI
= c1 +
∂J1(y, z
∗
1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=I
1(I > S1). (140)
Then, taking the derivative of equation (140) with respect to I and using the concavity of
J1(y, z
∗
1) in y, it follows that d
2V1(I)/dI
2 ≤ 0. Hence, V1(I) is concave in I. Evaluating
equation (140) at I = 0 we see that dV1(I)/dI|I=0 = c1, and using the concavity of V1(I) it
is easy to see that property (g) is true for t = 1. As a result, properties (a)-(g) are true for
t = 1.
Suppose that properties (a)-(g) are true for periods t − 1, t − 2, . . . , 2. We will show
that they are true for period t. Using assumption A1 and the properties (f) and (g) of the
induction hypothesis on the right-hand side of (125), it is easy to see that J2t(p, I2) is concave
in p for plt ≤ p ≤ put . Let p∗t (I2) be the maximizer of J2t(p, I2) for a fixed I2. Then, from
the first order condition we have (124) Ht(p
∗
t (I2), I2) = 0, where Ht(p, I2) = ∂J2t(p, I2)/∂p.
Furthermore, evaluating Ht(p, I2) at p = p
u
1 and using the inequality (122) and part (f) of
the induction hypothesis, it follows that Ht(p
u
t , I2) < 0, and hence, p
∗
t (I2) < p
u
t for all I2 > 0.
Again, using implicit differentiation, we have
dp∗t (I2)
dI2
=
−∂Ht(p∗t , I2)/∂I2
∂Ht(p∗t , I2)/∂p∗t
. (141)
We can express each term in (141) as follows:
∂Ht(p
∗
t , I2)
∂p∗t
=
∂J22t(p, I2)
∂p2
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗t
≤ 0, (142)
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∂Ht(p
∗
t , I2)
∂I2
= 1− F2t(I2 − dt(p∗t )) + d′t(p∗t )(p∗t + ht − βct−1)f2t(I2 − dt(p∗t ))
− d′t(p∗t )βE
[
d2Vt−1(I)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p∗t )−ξt
1(ξt ≤ I2 − dt(p∗t ))
]
. (143)
Thus, both the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand side of (141) exist, and
hence, p∗t (I2) is continuous in I∗2 . Taking the first order derivative of wt(I2) = I2−dt(p∗t (I2))
with respect to I2, we have
dwt(I2)
dI2
= 1− d′t(p∗t )
dp∗t (I2)
dI2
=
∂Ht(p
∗
t , I2)/∂p
∗
t + d
′
t(p
∗
t )∂Ht(p
∗
t , I2)/∂I2
∂Ht(p∗t , I2)/∂p∗t
=
1
∂Ht/∂p∗t
(
d′t(p
∗
t ) + [d
′
t(p
∗
t ) + d
′′
t (p
∗
t )(p
∗
t + ht)]F2t(wt(I2))
− d′′t (p∗t )βE
[
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=wt(I2)−ξt
1(ξt ≤ wt(I2))
])
.
Using part (g) of the induction hypothesis that dVt−1(I)/dI ≤ ct−1 in the above equation,
we have
dwt(I2)
dI2
= 1− d′t(p∗t )
dp∗t (I2)
dI2
>
d′t(p∗t ) + [d′t(p∗t ) + d′′t (p∗t )(p∗t + ht − βct−1)]F2t(wt(I2))
∂Ht/∂p∗t
> 0. (144)
Thus, wt(I2) is a increasing function of I2.
From equation (141) and inequality (142), we note that to show that p∗t (I2) is a decreasing
function of I2, we need to show that ∂Ht(p
∗
t , I2)/∂I2 ≤ 0. To this end, we rewrite Ht(pt, I2).
Using the induction hypothesis, we have Vt−1(I) = ct−1I + Jt−1(y∗t−1(I), z∗t−1), and hence,
dVt−1(I)
dI
= ct−1 +
∂Jt−1(y, z∗t−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=I
1(I > St−1). (145)
Furthermore, from the definition of St−1 and concavity of Vt−1(·), it follows that
∂Jt−1(y, z∗t−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y>St−1
≤ 0. (146)
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Then, using equation (124) and (145), Ht(p, I2) = ∂J2t(p, I2)/∂p and dHt(p, I2)/dI2 can be
rewritten as
Ht(p, I2) = H
0
t (p, I2)−Kt(p, I2), (147)
dHt(p, I2)
dI2
= 1− F2t(I2 − dt(p)) + d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(I2 − dt(p))
− d′t(p)βE
[
d2Jt−1(I, z∗t−1)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)−ξt
1(ξt ≤ (I2 − dt(p)− St−1)+)
]
dHt(p, I2)
dI2
= Qt(p, I2)− d′t(p)βE
[
d2Jt−1(I, z∗t−1)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)−ξt
1(ξt ≤ (I2 − dt(p)− St−1)+)
]
,
(148)
where H0t (p, I2) is as defined in equation (126) and Kt(p, I2) is defined as follows:
Kt(p, I2) = d
′
t(p)βE
[
dJt−1(I, z∗t−1)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)−ξt
1
(
ξt ≤ (I2 − dt(p)− St−1)+
)]
> 0. (149)
The non-negativity in (149) follows from the inequality in (146) and the assumption that
d′t(p) < 0.
Define p0t (I2) such that H
0
t (p
0
t (I2), I2) = 0. Then, following the exact same analysis
as that for t = 1, it can be shown that p0t (I2) is a decreasing function of I2. Next, since
p∗t (I2) is continuous, wt(I2) is also continuous in I2, and there exists a Is2t such that wt(Is2t) =
Is2t−dt(pst ) = St−1, where pst = p∗t (Is2t). Since, wt(I2) is increasing in I2, we have w(I2) = I2−
dt(p
∗
t (I2)) ≤ St−1 for 0 ≤ I2 ≤ Is2t. Then, for 0 ≤ I2 ≤ Is2t the last terms in equations (147)
and (148) are equal to zero. Therefore, Ht(p, I2) = H
0
t (p, I2), and hence, p
∗
t (I2) = p
0
t (I2) is
a decreasing function of I2. Consequently, for 0 ≤ I2 ≤ Is2t, we have pst ≤ p∗t (I2) ≤ put .
Similarly, for I2 > I
s
2t we have w(I2) = I2−dt(p∗t (I2)) ≥ St−1. Then, usingHt(p∗t (I2), I2) =
0, equations (147) and the inequality in (149), we have, H0t (p
∗
t (I2), I2) > 0. We know that
H0t (p, I2) is a decreasing function of p and H
0
t (p
0
t (I2), I2) = 0. Therefore, p
∗
t (I2) < p
0
t (I2) <
p0t (I2 ≤ Is2t) = p∗t (I2 ≤ Is2t). Next, we make the following observations:
O1 Recall that for a fixed p, Qt(p, I2) is decreasing in I2. For a fixed p define I
Q
2t(p) such
that Qt(p, I
Q
2t(p)) = 0. Then, from equation (130), we see that H
0
t (p, I2) is increasing
97
Figure 9: H0t (p, I2) and Kt(p, I2) w.r.t to I2 for different values of p
for I2 ≤ IQ2t(p), and H0t (p, I2) is decreasing for I2 > IQ2t(p). Therefore, IQ2t(pst ) < I22t.
O2 For a fixed I2, H
0
t (p, I2) is decreasing in p.
O3 For a fixed p, Kt(p, I2) is increasing in I2, and for a fixed I2, Kt(p, I2) is increasing in
p.
Using the above three observations, we can plot H0t (p, I2) and Kt(p, I2) for different values
of I2 and p as in Figure 9, where p
− < p < p+. In Figure 9, I12 , I22 and I32 are such that
I12 < I
2
2 < I
3
2 . We observe that p
∗
t (I
1
2 ) > p
∗
t (I
2
2 ) > p
∗
t (I
3
2 ), and hence, p
∗
t (I2) is a decreasing
function of I2
Next, using equation (118), we have V2t(I2) = −htI2 + J2t(p∗t (I2), I2), and
dV2t(I2)
dI2
= −ht + (p∗t + ht)
(
1− F2t(I2 − dt(p∗t ))
+ βE
[
dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p∗t )−ξt
1(ξt ≤ I2 − dt(p∗t ))
]
(150)
d2V2t(I2)
dI22
=
dp∗t (I2)
dI2
(1− F2t(I2 − dt(p∗t ))
− (p∗t + ht − βct−1)f2t(I2 − dt(p∗t ))
(
1− d′t(p∗t )
dp∗t (I2)
dI2
)
+ βE
[
d2Vt−1(I)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p∗t )−ξt
1(ξt ≤ I2 − dt(p∗t ))
]
≤ 0.
Hence, V2t(I2) is concave in I2. From equation (150) we have dV2t(I2)/dI2|I2=0 = p∗t (0) = put ,
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and property (d) follows directly from concavity of V2t(·). Thus properties (a)-(d) are true
for stage 2 for period t = 1.
Properties (e)-(g) for the stage 1 problem in period t follow by using the properties
(a)-(d) for the stage 2 problem in period t and using the exact same analysis as for period
t = 1.
Theorem 3 shows that the optimal policy is a combination of produce-up-to policy with
potential discretionary sales to Class 1 and dynamic pricing to Class 2. For a given value of
I2, i.e., the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand, part (a) of Theorem 3 shows
how to compute the optimal price to be charged to Class 2. Part (b) shows that p∗t (I2) is an
decreasing function of I2 and
(
I2−dt(p∗t (I2))
)
is an increasing function of I2. Part (c) shows
that the maximum expected stage 2 profit-to-go is a concave function of I2. Part (d) shows
that for every unit of left-over inventory after sales to Class 1, the increase in the optimal
expected profit at stage 2 is bounded by the maximum price that can be charged to Class 2.
We show that if pu ≤ r1+b, then Jt(y, z) is a decreasing function of z for y ≥ 0. Note that
throughout the text, we use decreasing (increasing) to mean non-increasing (non-decreasing)
for brevity. From equation (120) if pu ≤ r1 + b, it follows that z∗t = 0, and hence, it is not
optimal to practice discretionary sales to Class 1. On the other hand, if pu > r1 + b then
Jt(y, z) is a unimodal function of z for y ≥ 0, and z∗t = Rt > 0. That is, if pu > r1 +b, then it
is optimal to practice discretionary sales by protecting z∗t = Rt > 0 units from sales to Class
1. For period t, Rt denotes the inventory level at which the discounted marginal value of
protecting one more unit of inventory from Class 1 is equal to sum of price charged to Class
1 and the unit lost sales penalty. Part (e) also shows that a produce-up-to policy is optimal
in period t. Part (f) of Theorem 3 shows that the maximum expected profit-to-go in period
t is a concave function of the initial inventory. Part (g) shows that for every unit of on-hand
inventory available at the beginning of a period, the increase in the optimal expected profit
is bounded by the unit production cost in period t.
Using the results presented in Theorem 3, the supplier’s problem can be solved via
a backward induction algorithm follows: First, compute and record p∗t (I2), V2t(I2) and
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dV2t(I2)/dI2 for each possible I2 for period t = 1. Using these equations, compute and
record Rt, St, Vt(I) and dVt(I)/dI for each possible I for period t = 1. Then, repeat the
above steps for each period t = 2, . . . , T . Clearly, this requires the use of numerical methods,
which may take considerable time to solve (e.g., see [54, 68]). This, in turn, may make the
optimal policy less attractive from an implementation perspective. Considering the practical
relevance of this problem, our goal is to determine conditions under which computations for
the optimal policy parameters are simplified.
To this end, we first examine a special case of our problem and discuss relevant insights.
In particular, we examine a special case such that the Class 2 demand is a deterministic
function of its price, i.e., ξt = 0 and D2t = dt(p) for t = 1, . . . , T . Corollary 1 shows how
p∗t (I2) and z∗t simplify for this special case.
Corollary 1. When Class 2 demand is a deterministic function of its price, p∗t (I2) and z∗t
simplify as follows for t = 1, ..., T :
(a) p∗t (I2) = max{d−1t (I2), p0t }, where p0t > βct−1 − ht and satisfies
dt(p
0
t ) + (p
0
t + ht − βct−1)d′t(p0t ) = 0. (151)
(b) z∗t is given by equation (123), and Rt satisfies the following equality:
r1 + b = d
−1
t (Rt) +
Rt
d′t(Rt)
. (152)
Proof. Suppose that ξt = 0 and D2t = dt(p) for t = 1, . . . , T . Let J
d
2t(p, I2), V
d
2t(I2), J
d
t (y, z)
and V dt (I) be reduced forms of J2t(p, I2), V2t(I2), Jt(y, z) and Vt(I) when D2t = dt(p),
respectively. Using this in (119), we obtain
Jd2t(p, I2) =

(p+ ht)I2 + βV
d
t−1(0) if I2 ≤ dt(p), i.e., 0 ≤ p ≤ d−1t (I2),
(p+ ht)dt(p) + βV
d
t−1(I2 − dt(p)) if I2 > dt(p), i.e., d−1t (I2) ≤ p ≤ put .
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Taking the first order derivative of Jd2t(p, I2) with respect to p, we have
dJd2t(p, I2)
dp
=

I2 if 0 ≤ p < d−1t (I2),
dt(p) +
(
p+ ht − β dV
d
t−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)
)
d′t(p) if d
−1
t (I2) < p ≤ put .
(153)
From the first part of equation (153), it is easy to see that for 0 ≤ p < d−1t (I2), Jd2t(p, I2) is
increasing in p for I2 ≥ 0. Therefore, p∗t (I2) ≥ d−1t (I2). Furthermore, from the second part
of equation (153) and assumption (A1) for d−1t (I2) < p ≤ put , we have
d2Jd2t(p, I2)
dp2
= 2d′t(p) +
(
p+ ht − β
dV dt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)
)
d′′t (p)
+ (d′t(p))
2β
d2V dt−1(I)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p)
≤ 0.
That is, Jd2t(p, I2) is concave in p for d
−1
t (I2) < p ≤ put . Evaluating the right-hand limit
of dJd2t(p, I2)/dp as p goes to d
−1
t (I2) and using part (g) of Proposition 3 in the resulting
expression, we have
lim
p↓d−1t (I2)
dJd2t(p, I2)
dp
= dt(p) + (p+ ht − βct−1)d′t(p)
= I2 + (d
−1
t (I2) + ht − βct−1)d′t(d−1t (I2)).
Define I02t and p
0
t such that dt(p
0
t ) = I
0
2t and
dt(p
0
t ) + (p
0
t + ht − βct−1)d′t(p0t ) = 0.
If I2 ≤ I02t, i.e., d−1t (I2) ≥ p0t , then for p ≥ d−1t (I2) ≥ p0t , dJd2t(p, I2)/dp ≤ 0 and Jd2t(p, I2) is
decreasing in p. Hence, p∗t (I2) = d
−1
t (I2). On the other hand, if I2 ≥ I02t, i.e., d−1t (I2) ≤ p0t ,
then for d−1t (I2) ≤ p ≤ p0t , dJd2t(p, I2)/dp ≥ 0 and for p ≥ p0t , dJd2t(p, I2)/dp ≤ 0. Hence,
p∗t (I2) = p0t . Therefore, p∗t (I2) = max{d−1t (I2), p0t }.
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Next, from equation (118), we have V d2t(I2) = −htI2 + Jd2t(p∗t (I2), I2), where
Jd2t(p
∗
t (I2), I2) =

(d−1t (I2) + ht)I2 + βV dt−1(0) if I2 ≤ dt(p0t ),
(p0t + ht)dt(p
0
t )) + βV
d
t−1(I2 − dt(p0t ))) if I2 > dt(p0t ).
Then, taking the first order derivative of V d2t(I2), we have
dV d2t(I2)
dI2
=

d−1t (I2) + I2(d
−1
t )
′(I2) if I2 ≤ dt(p0t ),
β
dV dt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(p0t ))
− ht if I2 > dt(p0t ).
(154)
Using part (g) of Theorem 3 for period t − 1 in the second part of the equation (154), we
observe that for all I2 > dt(p
0
t ), dV
d
2t(I2)/dI2 ≤ βct−1−ht ≤ r1 +b. Then, from the definition
of Rt and the concavity of V
d
2t(I2), we have Rt ≤ dt(p0t ). Then, using the first part of (154),
Rt is such that
r1 + b = d
−1
t (Rt) +Rt(d
−1
t )
′(Rt) = d−1t (Rt) +
Rt
d′t(Rt)
.
Part (a) of Corollary 1 shows that when Class 2 demand is a deterministic function of its
price, p∗t (I2) is bounded below by p0t . Furthermore, p0t is strictly greater than βct−1−ht, and
is independent of I2. We observe that p
0
t , and hence, p
∗
t (I2) depends only on I2, dt(·), ht, ct−1
and β, and is independent of any other demand and cost parameters in the future periods.
Similarly, part (b) of Corollary 1 shows that Rt, and hence, z
∗
t depends only on dt(·), r1 and
b. In other words, Corollary 1 implies that when Class 2 demand is a deterministic function
of its price, p∗t (I2) and z∗t can be determined myopically.
A myopic policy ignores future consequences of the current decisions. As a result, a
T -period problem can be solved by solving T single period problems. Computing myopic
policies are much simpler than computing the optimal policy, which makes the myopic poli-
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cies more attractive in practice. Therefore, in the next section, we investigate myopic poli-
cies for this problem and present a methodology to determine the myopic policy parameters
when the Class 2 demand is stochastic. Furthermore, in Section III.5, we establish sufficient
conditions under which a myopic policy is optimal for a T -period problem.
III.4 Myopic Inventory and Pricing Policies
A myopic policy makes decisions in each period t by isolating it from the future periods.
As a result, a myopic solution to a T -period problem can be obtained by solving T single
period problems. Hence, myopic policies are among the simplest policies. As rightly noted by
Lovejoy [53], simple policies are less costly to evaluate and implement, and hence, are readily
accepted by practitioners. In this section, we investigate myopic policies for our problem.
More specifically, we present a methodology to determine the myopic policy parameters,
denoted by Smt , R
m
t and p
m
t (I2) for I2 > 0 and periods t = 1, . . . , T .
Let It be the on-hand inventory available at the beginning of period t and I2t be the
left-over inventory after sales to Class 1 customers in period t. Given the values of yt, zt and
pt, the discounted profit for T periods can be expressed as
Π =
T∑
t=1
βT−t
[
r1 min{D1t, yt − zt} − ct(yt − It)− b(D1t − yt + zt)+
+ pt min{D2t(pt, ξt), I2t} − ht(I2t −D2t(pt, ξt))+
]
+ βT c0I0.
The expected discounted profit for T periods is given by E[Π], and the T -period problem,
denoted by PT , can be expressed as
PT : maximize E[Π]
subject to It ≤ yt, t = 1, . . . , T,
zt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T,
0 ≤ pt ≤ put , t = 1, . . . , T.
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Since excess demand from both the classes is lost, the inventory balance equations are
I2t = max{yt −D1t, zt} = yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+, (155)
It−1 =
(
I2t −D2t(pt, ξt)
)+
=
(
yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+ −D2t(pt, ξt)
)+
. (156)
We note that max{u, v} = u+(v−u)+ and min{u, v} = v− (v−u)+ for any u, v ∈ <. Using
the inventory balance equations (155) and (156) to substitute for It and I2t, we can simplify
Π as follows:
Π =
T∑
t=1
βT−tr1
(
yt − zt − (yt − zt −D1t)+
)− cT (yT − IT )
−
T−1∑
t=1
βT−tct
(
yt − (yt+1 −D1,t+1 + (zt+1 − yt+1 +D1,t+1)+ −D2,t+1)+
)
+
T∑
t=1
βT−t
[
− b(D1t − yt + zt)+ + pt
(
I2t −
(
I2t −D2t
)+)− ht(I2t −D2t)+]
+ βT c0(y1 −D11 + (z1 − y1 +D11)+ −D21)+
=
T∑
t=1
βT−t
[
r1
(
yt − zt − (yt − zt −D1t)+
)− ctyt − b(D1t − yt + zt)+ + ptI2t
− (pt + ht)
(
I2t −D2t
)+]
+
T∑
t=1
βT−t+1ct−1
(
yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+ −D2t
)+
+ cT IT
=
T∑
t=1
βT−t
[
r1
(
yt − zt − (yt − zt −D1t)+
)− ctyt − b(D1t − yt + zt)+
+ pt(yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+)− (pt + ht)
(
yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+ −D2t
)+]
+
T∑
t=1
βT−t+1ct−1
(
yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+ −D2t
)+
+ cT IT .
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After some algebraic manipulations, we can rewrite Π as
Π = cT IT +
T∑
t=1
βT−tΓt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t), where (157)
Γt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t) = r1
(
yt − zt − (yt − zt −D1t)+
)− ctyt − b(D1t − yt + zt)+
+ pt
(
yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+
)
− (pt + ht − βct−1)
(
yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+ −D2t
)+
. (158)
We note that IT is the on-hand inventory at the beginning of the planning horizon and its
value is known. Then, using expression (157), E[Π] can be written as
E[Π] = cT IT +
T∑
t=1
βT−tE[Γt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t)]. (159)
We note that the expected value of Γt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t) depends on the distributions of D1t,
D2t as well as the distributions of yt, zt and pt (see equation (16) and the last paragraph
on pg. 25 in [14] and pg. 65 in [42]). Proposition 8 shows that the expected value of
Γt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t) depends only on the distributions of yt, zt and pt for t = 1, . . . , T .
Proposition 8. For t = 1, . . . , T , E[Γt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t)] = E[Φt(yt, zt, pt)], where
Φt(yt, zt, pt) = r1E[D1t]− (r1 + b)G1t(yt − zt)− ctyt +
∫ yt−zt
0
Ωt(pt, yt − x)dF1t(x)
+ (1− F1t(yt − zt))Ωt(pt, zt), (160)
Ωt(p, I2) = (βct−1 − ht)I2 + (p+ ht − βct−1)
(
dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p))
)
. (161)
Proof. We observe that yt and zt depend only on the information available at the start of
period t (i.e., IT , yT , zT , D1T , pT , D2T , . . . , It+1, yt+1, zt+1, D1,t+1, pt+1, D2,t+1) and are inde-
pendent of D1t and D2t. Similarly, pt depends only on the information available in period t
before the Class 2 demand is realized (i.e., IT , yT , zT , D1T , pT , D2T , . . . , It, yt, zt, D1t) and is
independent of Class 2 demand D2t. Furthermore, D11, D21, . . . , D1T , D2T are independent.
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We can write
E[Γt(yt, pt, zt, D1t, D2t)] = E
[
E[Γt(yt, pt, zt, D1t, D2t)|yt, zt, pt]
]
, (162)
and define Φt(yt, pt, zt) = E[Γt(yt, zt, pt, D1t, D2t)|yt, zt, pt]. From equation (158), we have
Φt(yt, pt, zt) = r1
(
yt − zt −
∫ yt−zt
0
(yt − zt − x)dF1t(x)
)
− b
∫ ∞
yt−zt
(x− yt + zt)dF1t(x)
− ctyt + E
[
E
[
ptI2t − (pt + ht − βct−1)(I2t −D2t)+
]∣∣I2t = yt −D1t
+ (zt − yt +D1t)+
]
.
We define Ωt(p, I2) as follows:
Ωt(p, I2) = E
[
pI2 − (p+ ht − βct−1)(I2 −D2t)+
]
. (163)
Using the above definition of Ωt(p, I2) and the fact that D2t(p) = dt(p)+ ξt, Φt(yt, pt, zt) can
be rewritten as follows:
Φt(yt, pt, zt) = r1
(∫ ∞
0
xdF1t(x) +
∫ ∞
yt−zt
(yt − zt − x)dF1t(x)
)
− b
∫ ∞
yt−zt
(x− yt + zt)dF1t(x)
− ctyt + E
[
Ωt(pt, I2t)
∣∣I2t = yt −D1t + (zt − yt +D1t)+]
= r1E[D1t]− (r1 + b)G1t(yt − zt)− ctyt +
∫ yt−zt
0
Ωt(pt, yt − x)dF1t(x)
+ (1− F1t(yt − zt))Ωt(pt, zt),
where we used the fact that when D1t > yt − zt, I2t = yt − D1t + (zt − yt + D1t)+ = zt.
Furthermore, using equation (163) and D2t(p) = dt(p) + ξt, Ωt(pt, I2) can be simplified as
Ωt(p, I2) = pI2 − (p+ ht − βct−1)
∫ I2−dt(p)
0
(I2 − dt(p)− x)dF2t(x)
= pI2 − (p+ ht − βct−1)
(
I2 − dt(p)− µt +
∫ ∞
I2−dt(p)
(x− I2 + dt(p))dF2t(x)
)
,
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Ωt(p, I2) = (βct−1 − ht)I2 + (p+ ht − βct−1)
(
dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p))
)
.
Then, the result follows directly by using the definition of Φt(yt, pt, zt) on the right-hand
side of (162).
The result in Proposition 8 simplifies further analysis. Using equation (159) and Propo-
sition 8, E[Π] can now be rewritten as
E[Π] = cT IT +
T∑
t=1
βT−tE[Φt(yt, zt, pt)]. (164)
Therefore, the problem PT can be considered as a maximization problem with separable
terms for each period t subject to the constraints It ≤ yt, zt ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ pt ≤ put . Each
separable term βT−tE[Φt(yt, zt, pt)], t = 1, . . . , T , of this problem is equal to the present value
of expected profit for period t. Let Smt , z
m
t and p
m
t denote the values of the decisions variables
that maximize βT−tE[Φt(yt, zt, pt)] for each period t = 1, . . . , T . Proposition 9 presents how
to determine Smt , z
m
t and p
m
t for a given I2 ≥ 0 by studying the functions Ωt(p, I2), and
Φt(y, z, p
m
t ) for t = 1, . . . , T . Similar to Section III.3.1, we assume that condition (122) is
true.
Proposition 9. Ωt(p, I2) and Φt(y, z, p
m
t (I2)) satisfy the following properties for t, t =
1, . . . , T :
(a) For a given I2 ≥ 0, Ωt(p, I2) has a finite maximizer pmt (I2) such that βct−1 − ht <
pmt (I2) ≤ put and
0 = dt(p
m
t (I2)) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(pmt (I2)))
+ d′t(p
m
t (I2))
(
pmt (I2) + ht − βct−1
)
F2t(I2 − dt(pmt (I2))). (165)
(b) pmt (I2) is decreasing in I2, and δt(I2) = I2 − dt(pmt (I2)) ≥ 0 is increasing in I2.
(c) Ωt(p
m
t (I2), I2) is concave in I2.
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(d) Φt(y, z, p
m
t (I2)) has a finite maximizer denoted by (S
m
t , z
m
t ) such that
zmt =

0 if pu ≤ r1 + b,
Rmt if p
u > r1 + b,
(166)
where Rmt satisfies
dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=Rmt
= r1 + b, and
Smt satisfies
dΦt(y, z
m
t , p
m
t (I2))
dI2
∣∣∣∣
y=Smt
= 0.
Proof. Ωt(p, I2) and Φt(y, z, p
m
t ) are the one-period counterparts of J2t(p, I2) and Jt(y, z)
with cost and demand parameters corresponding to period t, respectively. The proof follows
by working out the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 3 for t = 1. In particular, taking
the first and second order derivatives with respect to p of Ωt(p, I2) defined in equation (161),
we have
∂Ωt(p, I2)
∂p
= dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p))
+ (p+ ht − βct−1)
(
d′t(p)− d′t(p)
[
1− F2t(I2 − dt(p))
])
= dt(p) + µt −G2t(I2 − dt(p)) + d′t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1)F2t(I2 − dt(p)), (167)
∂2Ωt(p, I2)
∂p2
= d′t(p)− d′t(p)[1− F2t(I2 − dt(p))] + d′′t (p)(p+ ht − βct−1)F2t(I2 − dt(p))
+ d′t(p)F2t(I2 − dt(p))− (d′t(p))2(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(I2 − dt(p))
=
(
2d′t(p) + (p+ ht − βct−1)d′′t (p)
)
F2t(I2 − dt(p))
− (d′t(p))2(p+ ht − βct−1)f2t(I2 − dt(p)). (168)
(a) From equation (167), we observe that ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂p > 0 for p ≤ βct−1 − ht. Therefore,
pmt (I2) ≥ βct−1−ht. Furthermore, using assumption A1, we observe that ∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p2 < 0
for p > βct−1 − ht. Hence, Ωt(p, I2) is a concave function of p for fixed I2 ≥ 0 when
p > βct−1 − ht. Furthermore, using the assumption that condition (122) is true, it can be
shown that ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂p|p=put < 0. Therefore, there is a unique maximum of Ωt(p, I2) in
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interval [βct−1 − ht, put ] with respect to p. Define pmt (I2) such that
∂Ωt(p, I2)
∂p
|p=pmt (I2) = 0. (169)
Then, pmt (I2) is the unique maximizer of Ωt(p, I2). Furthermore, evaluating equation (167)
at p = d−1t (I2), i.e., d(p) = I2, and simplifying the resulting expression we have
∂Ωt(p, I2)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=d−1t (I2)
= dt(p) = I2 ≥ 0.
Then, from equation (169) and the concavity of Ωt(p, I2) in p, it follows that p
m
t (I2) ≥
d−1t (I2). Let us define δt(I2) = I2 − dt(pmt (I2)), then using assumption A1 that dt(p) is a
decreasing function of p it follows that δt(I2) ≥ 0 for I2 ≥ 0.
(b) From equations (126), (130) and (167), we observe that ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂p = H
0
t (p, I2) =∫ I2
0 Qt(p, x)dx, where Qt(p, I2) is given by equation (129). Using this on the left-hand side
of (169), we have ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂p|p=pmt (I2) =
∫ I2
0 Qt(p
m
t (I2), x)dx = 0. Using implicit differen-
tiation, we have
dpmt (I2)
dI2
=
−∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p∂I2|p=pmt (I2)
∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p2|p=pmt (I2)
. (170)
From the concavity of Ωt(p, I2) in p, we have
∂2Ωt(p, I2)
∂p2
∣∣∣∣
p=pmt (I2)
≤ 0. (171)
Furthermore, using equation (167), taking the first order derivative of ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂p with
respect to I2 and evaluating it at p = p
m
t (I2), we have
∂2Ωt(p, I2)
∂p∂I2
∣∣∣∣
p=pmt (I2)
= 1− F2t
[
I2 − dt(pmt (I2))
]
+ d′t(p
m
t (I2))
[
pmt (I2) + ht − βct−1
]
f2t(I2 − dt(pmt (I2)))
= Qt(p
m
t (I2), I2).
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From assumptions A1 and A2, it follows that et(p, I2) is increasing in I2 for t = 1, . . . , T .
Then, for a fixed p, Qt(p, I2) is decreasing in I2 for t = 1, . . . , T . If Qt(p
m
t (I2), I2) > 0, then
for all x ≤ I2, Qt(pmt (I2), x) > 0, and hence,
∫ I2
0 Qt(p
m
t (I2), x)dx > 0. This contradicts the
definition of pmt (I2), i.e.,
∫ I2
0 Qt(p
m
t (I2), x)dx = 0. Therefore, we have Qt(p
m
t (I2), I2) ≤ 0,
and hence,
∂2Ωt(p, I2)
∂p∂I2
∣∣∣∣
p=pmt (I2)
= Qt(p
m
t (I2), I2) ≤ 0. (172)
Using the inequalities in (171) and (172) on the right-hand side of (170), we have dpmt (I2)/dI2 ≤
0, and hence, pmt (I2) is a decreasing function of I2. From part (a) above, we recall that
δt(I2) = I2 − dt(pmt (I2)) ≥ 0, then
dδt(I2)
dI2
= 1− d′t(pmt (I2))
dpmt (I2)
dI2
=
∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p
2|p=pmt (I2) + d′t(pmt (I2))∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p∂I2|p=pmt (I2)
∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p2|p=pmt (I2)
=
d′t(pmt (I2)) +
[
d′t(pmt (I2)) + d′′t (pmt (I2))(pmt (I2) + ht − βct−1)
]
F2t
(
I2 − dt(pmt (I2))
)
∂2Ωt(p, I2)/∂p2|p=pmt (I2)
> 0.
Thus, δt(I2) = I2 − dt(pmt (I2)) is increasing in I2.
(c) Next, evaluating equation (161) at p = pmt (I2) and taking the first and the second order
derivatives of the resulting expression with respect to I2, we have
∂Ωt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
∂I2
= βct−1 − ht + (pmt (I2) + ht − βct−1)
[
1− F2t
(
I2 − dt(pmt (I2))
)]
,
∂2Ωt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
∂I22
=
dpmt (I2)
dI2
[
1− F2t
(
I2 − dt(pmt (I2))
)]
− (pmt (I2) + ht − βct−1)f2t
(
I2 − dt(pmt (I2))
)dδt(I2)
dI2
≤ 0.
Thus, Ωt(p
m
t (I2), I2) is a concave function of I2. Furthermore, dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)/dI2|I2=0 =
pmt (0) = p
u
t . Then, from the concavity of Ωt(p
m
t (I2), I2), we have dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)/dI2 ≤ put .
110
(d) Evaluating equation (160) at p = pmt (I2) and taking the first order derivative of the
resulting expression with respect to z, we have
dΦt(y, z, p
m
t (I2))
dz
= −
(
r1 + b− dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=zt
)
(1− F1t(y − z)).
Then, using the fact that dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)/dI2 ≤ put and following the exact same analysis as in
the proof of part (e) of Theorem 3, we have zmt as expressed in equation (166). Furthermore,
we can show that dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)/dI2|I2=zmt ≤ r1 + b.
Evaluating equation (160) at p = pmt (I2), z = z
m
t and taking the first order derivative of
the resulting expression with respect to y, we have
dΦt(y, z
m
t , p
m
t (I2))
dy
= −ct + (r1 + b)(1− F1t(y − zmt ))
+
∫ y−zmt
0
dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=y−x
dF1t(x)
d2Φt(y, z
m
t , p
m
t (I2))
dy2
= −
(
r1 + b− dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=zmt
)
f1t(y)
+
∫ y−zmt
0
d2Ωt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
dI22
∣∣∣∣
I2=y−x
dF1t(x) ≤ 0.
Then, using dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)/dI2|I2=zmt ≤ r1 + b we see that Φt(y, zmt , pmt (I2)) is concave in y.
Define Smt such that Φt(y, z
m
t , p
m
t (I2))|y=Smt = 0, then Smt maximizes Φt(y, zmt , pmt (I2)).
We note that
(
yt = S
m
t , zt = z
m
t , pt = p
m
t (I2)
)
is the supplier’s policy in period t obtained
by isolating it from the future periods, and hence, is myopic. Part (a) of Proposition 9 shows
that the myopic price charged to Class 2 in period t is a function of the left-over inventory
after satisfying Class 1 demand in period t. It also shows that the myopic price is bounded
from below by βct−1 − ht.
We note that any left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand can either be sold
to Class 2 at price p, or carried to period t − 1 at a unit holding cost of ht. In the latter
case, a unit production cost of ct−1 is saved in period t − 1, and hence, the present value
of the carry option is equal to βct−1 − ht. It is now intuitive that the first option of selling
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inventory to Class 2 is profitable only when p > βct−1 − ht. This generalizes the results
observed in Chapter II for stationary demand and cost parameters.
Part (d) of Proposition 9 shows that when put ≤ r1 + b, zmt = z∗t = 0. That is, when
put ≤ r1 + b, the myopic solution for the inventory to be protected from Class 1 is optimal.
Part (d) also shows that the stage 1 myopic policy is characterized by two critical quantities:
Smt is the myopic critical produce-up-to level and R
m
t is the myopic critical amount of
inventory to be protected from Class 1 in period t.
We recall that Corollary 1 shows that for the special case where Class 2 demand is a
deterministic function of its price, p∗t (I2) and z∗t can be determined myopically. In fact, using
Proposition 9, we can show that for this special case pmt (I2) = p
∗
t (I2) = max{d−1t (I2), p0t } and
zmt = z
∗
t for t = 1, ..., T . Next, we provide a simple example to illustrate the computations
of the myopic policy.
Example: Suppose that Class 2 demand is a deterministic function of its price, dt(p) =
a1t−a2tp and D1t ∼ Unif[0, A1t]. Then, d−1t (I2) = (a1t− I2)+/a1t, and from equation (151),
we have
p0t =
a1t + a2t(βct−1 − ht)
2a2t
> 0 and dt(p
0
t ) =
a1t − a2t(βct−1 − ht)
2
.
The myopic price pmt (I2) is optimal and can be computed easily using Corollary 1 as
pmt (I2) = p
∗
t (I2) = max
{
a1t − I2
a2t
,
a1t + a2t(βct−1 − ht)
2a2t
}
.
If a1t/a2t ≤ r1 +b, then zmt = z∗t = 0, else zmt = z∗t = Rmt , where Rmt satisfies equation (152).
It is easy to show that Rmt = 0.5(a1t − a2t(r1 + b)). From Proposition 9, Smt is such that
0 = −ct + (r1 + b)(1− F1t(Smt − zmt )) +
∫ Smt −zmt
0
dΩt(p
m
t (I2), I2)
dI2
∣∣∣∣
I2=Smt −x
dF1t(x),
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where
dΩt(I2)
dI2
=

(a1t − 2I2)/a2t if I2 ≤ dt(p0t ),
βct−1 − ht if I2 > dt(p0t ).
When a1t/a2t ≤ r1 + b, zmt = z∗t = 0 and some algebraic manipulations, we obtain:
Smt =
2a2tA1t(r1 + b− ct) + (a1t − a2t(βct−1 − ht)2
2a2t(r1 + b− βct−1 + ht) .
The above example illustrates that closed form solutions can be derived for the myopic
policy parameters when the Class 2 demand is a deterministic function of its price, and Class
1 demand is a uniform random variable. Next, Proposition 10 establishes a lower bound on
the myopic price, that is tighter than βct−1 − ht. Furthermore, it compares the myopic and
the optimal prices.
Proposition 10. (a) The myopic price is bounded as βct−1 − ht < pm0t ≤ pmt (I2) ≤ put ,
where pm0t is such that
d(pm0t ) + µt + d
′
t(p
m0
t )(p
m0
t + ht − βct−1) = 0.
(b) p∗t (I2) ≤ pmt (I2), and the inequality is tight when I2 − dt(pmt (I2)) ≤ St.
Proof. (a) Using equation (167) and taking the limit of ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂I2 as I2 goes to infinity
we have
lim
I2→∞
∂Ωt(p, I2)
∂p
= dt(p) + µt + d
′
t(p)(p+ ht − βct−1).
Define pm0t = limI2→∞ pmt (I2), then by definition pm0t is such that
lim
I2→∞
∂Ωt(p, I2)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=pm0t
= dt(p
m0
t ) + µt + d
′
t(p
m0
t )(p
m0
t + ht − βct−1) = 0.
Since, pmt (I2) is a decreasing function of I2, we have p
m
t (I2) ≥ pm0t . Furthermore, it is easy
to see that limI2→∞ ∂Ωt(p, I2)/∂p|p=βct−1−ht > 0. Then, from the concavity of Ωt(p, I2) and
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the definition of pm0t , it follows that βct−1 − ht < pm0t ≤ pmt (I2).
(b) Evaluating equation (124) at p = pmt (I2) and using equation (169) in the resulting
expression, we have
∂J2t(p, I2)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=pmt (I2)
= d′t(p
m
t (I2))βE
[
ct−1 − dVt−1(I)
dI
∣∣∣∣
I=I2−dt(pmt (I2))−ξt
1
(
ξt ≤ I2 − dt(pmt (I2))
)]
(173)
≤ 0.
The above inequality follows directly from assumption A1 and part (g) of Proposition 3.
Then, from the definition of p∗t (I2) and concavity of Vt−1(I), we have pmt (I2) ≤ p∗t (I2).
Furthermore, if I2 − dt(pmt (I2)) ≤ St, then using equation (145) on the right-hand side of
(173), we have ∂J2t(p, I2)/∂p|p=pmt (I2) = 0. From the definition uniqueness of p∗t (I2), it
follows that pmt (I2) = p
∗
t (I2).
Part (a) of Proposition 10 shows that the myopic price pmt (I2) is bounded below by p
m0
t ,
where pm0t is the optimal myopic price when I2 goes to infinity. Furthermore, p
0
t is strictly
greater than βct−1−ht and independent of I2. Part (b) of Proposition 10 shows the myopic
price is an upper bound on the optimal price. This can be explained as follows. For the
optimal policy, any inventory remaining at the end of period t, denoted by It−1 has a value
equal to Vt−1(It−1), which is a concave function of It−1. As a result, St, Rt and p∗t (I2)
depend on the future periods. Furthermore, a careful observation reveals that the myopic
policy considers that any inventory remaining at the end of a period has a salvage value
equal to ct−1 ≥ dVt−1(It−1)/dIt−1. Hence, we have p∗t (I2) ≤ pmt (I2). Part (b) of Proposition
10 also provides a condition under which the upper bound is tight, and hence, the myopic
policy is optimal. In general, finding whether I2 − dt(pmt (I2)) ≤ St requires computing the
myopic policy parameters. Nevertheless, it is easy to verify that this condition is satisfied
when I2 < St, which is true when demand and cost parameters are stationary and the
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on-hand inventory available at the beginning of the horizon is zero.
III.5 Optimality of the Myopic Policy
As discussed before, myopic policies are easy to compute, and hence, attractive from the
implementation perspective (also see [68]). In this section, we establish sufficient conditions
under which the joint myopic inventory and pricing policy of Proposition 9 is optimal for a
finite horizon problem with T periods. Furthermore, we discuss the restrictions that these
conditions impose on the demand and cost parameters.
Theorem 4. The myopic policy with yt = max{It, Smt }, zt = zmt and pt = pmt (I2) is optimal
for a T -period planning horizon if IT ≤ SmT , and
Smt − dt(pmt (Smt )) ≤ Smt−1 for t = 1, . . . , T . (174)
Proof. From part (d) of Proposition 9, we know that Φt(S
m
t , z
m
t , p
m
t (I2)) ≥ Φt(yt, zt, pt)
for all yt, zt, pt and t = 1, . . . , T . Therefore, Φt(S
m
t , z
m
t , p
m
t (I2)) ≥ E[Φt(yt, zt, pt)] for
t = 1, . . . , T , and hence,
T∑
t=1
βt−1Φt(Smt , z
m
t , p
m
t (I2)) ≥
T∑
t=1
βt−1E[Φt(yt, zt, pt)]. (175)
Before we proceed with the proof, we prove the following result, which will be useful later:
If (a) It ≤ Smt , (b) the myopic policy is used in period t, and (c) the condition (174) is
true then It−1 ≤ Smt−1. Suppose that the above conditions (a)-(c) are true for period t.
Then, yt = S
m
t . Using the fact that D1t ≥ 0 and the inventory balance equations, we have
I2t = max{Smt − D1t, zmt } ≤ Smt . Using this inequality and the inventory balance equatio
(156) for period t− 1, we have
It−1 ≤
(
Smt − dt(pmt (Smt )− ξt
)+
.
From part (b) or Proposition 9, we have δt(I2 = S
m
t ) = S
m
t − dt(pmt (Smt ) > 0. Then, using
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the fact that ξt ≥ 0 and the inequality in (174), we have
It−1 ≤
(
Smt − dt(pmt (Smt )− ξt
)+ ≤ Smt − dt(pmt (Smt ) ≤ Smt−1.
Suppose that IT ≤ SmT , then yT = SmT , zT = zmT and pT = pmT (I2) are feasible with
respect to all three constraints of the problem PT , namely, (i) It ≤ yt, (ii) zt ≥ 0, and (iii)
0 ≤ pt ≤ put . Furthermore, if the condition (174) is true for period T , then from the result
above it follows that IT−1 ≤ SmT−1. Using the same argument as for period T , it follows that
yT−1 = SmT−1, zT−1 = z
m
T−1 and pT−1 = p
m
T−1(I2) are feasible for period T − 1. Repeating
this argument for periods t = T − 2, . . . , 1, we see that if the condition (174) is true then
yt = S
m
t , zt = z
m
t and pt = p
m
t (I2) is feasible for each period t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Then, using
equation (175), it follows that yt = S
m
t , zt = z
m
t and pt = p
m
t (I2) is optimal for each period
t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The proof for Theorem 4 consists of two parts: feasibility and the optimality of the myopic
policy. The conditions presented in Theorem 4 are sufficient to show that the myopic policy
is feasible in each period. The first sufficiency condition is IT ≤ SmT , i.e., the on-hand
inventory at the beginning of the planning horizon is less than the myopic produce-up-to
level. It ensures that yT = S
m
T is feasible with respect to the constraint yT ≥ IT . The second
sufficiency condition given by the inequality (174) ensures that It ≤ Smt , and hence, yt = Smt
is feasible in periods t = 1, . . . , T − 1. As shown in Proposition 9, zt = zmt and pt = pmt (I2)
are always feasible in each period. The optimality of the myopic policy then follows from
Proposition 9.
The second sufficiency condition given by the inequality (174) generalizes the condition
for the optimality of a myopic inventory policy provided in [43, 79] for the case with non-
stationary costs and demand distributions. Verification of this condition, in general, requires
computing Smt , z
m
t and p
m
t (I2) for each period t = 1, . . . , T . Nevertheless, Corollary 2
provides easy to verify conditions on the demand and cost parameters such that the second
sufficiency condition is satisfied.
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Corollary 2. The myopic policy with yt = max{It, Smt }, zt = zmt and pt = pmt (I2) is optimal
for a T -period planning horizon if (1) IT ≤ SmT , and
(2a) all the demand and cost parameters are stationary,
(2b) any units at the end of the planning horizon can be salvaged at a value equal to the
unit production cost.
Proof. Suppose that demand and cost parameters are stationary and any units at the end
of the planning horizon can be salvaged at a value equal to the unit production cost, i.e.,
ct = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Then, from Proposition 9, it follows that p
m
t (I2) = p
m(I2), z
m
t = z
m
and Smt = S
m for t = 1, . . . , T . Since dt(·) = d(·) ≥ 0, condition (174) is satisfied. Then,
using Theorem 4 and the inequality IT < S
m
T = S
m, it follows that the myopic policy is
optimal.
When all demand and cost parameters are stationary, and any units remaining at the
end of the planning horizon can be salvaged at a value equal to the unit production cost,
we show that a stationary myopic policy is optimal. Since dt(·) ≥ 0, it is easy to see that
condition (174) is satisfied, and hence, the myopic policy is optimal. For example, the pure
inventory model in [43, 53, 77], and the joint inventory and pricing model in [70] assume
that conditions (2a) and (2b) are true. Furthermore, by letting T go to infinity, we see that
the myopic policy is optimal for the infinite horizon problem with stationary demand and
cost parameters.
Next, we briefly discuss the reason why the myopic policy is not optimal when It > S
m
t ,
t = 1, . . . , T . When It > S
m
t , yt = max{It, Smt } = It and it is possible that I2t = It −D1t >
St−1 + dt(pmt (I2t)). In this case, from part (b) of Proposition 10, we have p∗t (I2) < pmt (I2),
and hence, the myopic pricing policy is not optimal.
III.6 Computational Study
In this section, we present the results of our computational study, which has two goals.
Our first goal is to investigate the sensitivity of the optimal policy parameters to key model
parameters and develop managerial insights. We note that the optimal policy is a combi-
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nation of two strategies: discretionary sales for Class 1 and dynamic pricing for Class 2.
Our second goal is to quantify the benefits of these strategies, and examine the effect of key
model parameters on these benefits. The key model parameters that we consider include the
variances of Class 1 and Class 2 demands, and the slope of the Class 2 demand curve.
III.6.1 Experimental setup
The computational results reported in this section assume that (i) all demand and cost
parameters are stationary, (ii) any units remaining at the end of the planning horizon are
salvaged at the unit production cost, and (iii) there is no on-hand inventory available at the
beginning of the planning horizon. As a result, a stationary myopic policy is optimal, and
it is used to address the goals of our computational study.
We set β = 1, and use the gamma distribution for the Class 1 demand, which is commonly
encountered in practice, especially, for electronics products with short life-cycles (e.g., see
[11, 25, 48]). We investigate two different settings: E[D1] ∼ Unif(1000, 2000) for Setting
1 and E[D1] ∼ Unif(2000, 3000) for Setting 2. We consider three different values for the
standard deviation of Class 1 demand such that σ1 = αE[D1], α =0.25, 0.5 or 1.0, and
examine the cases with low, medium and high Class 1 demand variability. For Class 2, we
consider a linear demand model such that d(p) = a1 − a2p, and pu = a1/a2. Furthermore,
we consider the case where ξ ∼ Unif(0, A). To investigate the effect of the slope of demand
curve and Class 2 demand variance, we consider three different values of a2 and A. Based
on the parameter values listed in Table 11, we develop a factorial design corresponding to
486 parameter settings. For each parameter setting, we generate five different sets of values
for demand parameter E[D1], and hence, study a total of 2430 problem instances.
Setting α c h r1 b a1 a2 A
1 0.25 400 10 500 1.1(r1-c) 3000 1 250
2 0.5 400 20 1000 2 500
1.0 400 40 1500 4 1000
Table 11: Experimental setup
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As observed in Sections III.3.1 and III.4, relative values of pu and r1 + b are important
when considering the need for discretionary sales for Class 1. Hence, in our computational
study, we consider both cases: pu ≤ r1 + b and pu > r1 + b. Since we consider α ≤ 1, shape
parameter of the gamma distribution is greater than 1 as required to satisfy assumption
A2 presented in Section III.3. We note that for each of the 486 parameter settings A <
a1 − a2(c− h), and hence, condition (122) is satisfied.
III.6.2 Sensitivity of optimal policy parameters
Our first goal is to investigate the sensitivity of the optimal policy parameters to key
model parameters and develop managerial insights. Based on our computational results, we
make the following observations:
O1 An increase in E[D1] or α (i.e., variance of Class 1 demand) increases S
m, and it has no
effect on zm or pm(zm) and, in general, on pm(I2) for I2 ≥ 0.
O2 An increase in A leads to an increase in both mean and the variance of Class 2 demand,
and we observe that Sm, zm and pm(zm) increase as can be seen from Table 12 for a
representative set of parameters. Figure 10 shows how the optimal price pm(I2) changes
with respect to the left-over inventory I2 for different values of A. It shows that as A
increases, pm(I2) becomes flatter in I2. This results in an increase in both p
m(I2) and
pm0, which is the optimal myopic price when I2 goes to infinity and a lower bound on
pm(I2) (see Proposition 10 for more details).
O3 As a2 increases, any increase in price leads to a larger decrease in Class 2 demand, and
accordingly, we observe that both zm and pm(zm) decrease. This in turn leads to a
A Sm zm pm(zm)
250 5038.6 998.5 1082.5
500 5188.0 1112.3 1110.6
1000 5496.2 1354.5 1168.0
Table 12: Effect of A on the optimal pol-
icy parameters: Setting 1, E[D1] = 2626,
r1 = 500, α = 0.5, h = 40, a2 = 2
a2 S
m zm pm(zm)
1 5469.7 1493.4 1926.8
2 5188.0 1112.3 1110.6
4 4618.3 350.6 693.7
Table 13: Effect of a2 on the optimal pol-
icy parameters: Setting 1, E[D1] = 2626,
r1 = 500, α = 0.5, h = 40, A = 500
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Figure 10: Optimal price with respect to
I2 and A: Setting 2, E[D1] = 2626, r1 =
500, α = 0.5, h = 40, a2 = 2
Figure 11: Optimal price with respect to
I2 and a2: Setting 2, E[D1] = 2626, r1 =
500, α = 0.5, h = 40, A = 250
decrease in Sm as can be seen from Table 13 for a representative set of parameters.
Figure 11 shows how the optimal price pm(I2) changes with respect to the left-over
inventory I2 for different values of a2. We observe that as a2 increases, p
m(I2) becomes
flatter in I2. This provides additional insights about the results in Proposition 10, which
shows that βc− h ≤ pm0 ≤ pm(I2) ≤ pu. In particular, it shows that although both pm0
and pu = a1/a2 decrease with respect to a2, rate of decrease in p
u is higher than that
in pm0. This decreases the difference between the lower and the upper bounds on the
optimal price that is charged to Class 2.
O4 As r1 increases, S
m increases and zm decreases, simultaneously. This is intuitive because
if Class 1 price increases, profits can be increased by selling more to Class 1, which can
be achieved by producing more and protecting less units from Class 1.
III.6.3 Benefits of discretionary sales and dynamic pricing
A prevalent practice in real life and the corresponding assumption in the inventory man-
agement literature are to fully satisfy demand if sufficient stock is available. This is primarily
motivated by the goal to provide better service levels and prevent loss of good will. That is,
in such models z = 0 and there are no discretionary sales. However, as we show in this chap-
ter, discretionary sales is optimal when the seller anticipates a higher-revenue demand from
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a different customer Class. Similarly, while several recent models examine joint inventory
and pricing decisions, a significant amount of literature assumes that the supplier (seller) is a
price-taker and focus only on the inventory decisions (e.g. see [31, 49]). As demonstrated by
our results and similar joint inventory and pricing models in the literature, dynamic pricing
results in higher profits. However, implementing discretionary sales and dynamic pricing
requires customer segmentation, is costly and may result in loss of good will. Hence, one of
the goals of this numerical study is to quantify the benefits of these strategies.
To isolate the benefits of these two strategies, we consider two benchmark policies. Policy
P1 considers there are no discretionary sales to Class 1, i.e., z = 0, and dynamic pricing
is used for Class 2, i.e., p(I2) = p
m(I2). Policy P2 considers discretionary sales to Class 1,
i.e., z = zm, but Class 2 is charged a pre-specified price. We note that at least zm units are
protected from Class 1 for sales to Class 2, and hence, I2 ≥ zm. Furthermore, since pm(I2)
is a decreasing function of I2, we have p
m(I2) ≤ pm(zm). Hence, pm(zm) is the highest price
that can be charged to Class 2 demand. In order to provide a conservative estimate of the
benefits of dynamic pricing for Class 2, we consider that the pre-specified price for policy
P2 is pm(zm). For each problem instance, we compute the per period expected profit loss
under the benchmark policy as follows:
ei = 100
(
V1(0)− Expected profit per period for policy Pi with zero starting inventory
V1(0)
)
%,
where V1(0) = E[φ(y
m
t , z
m
t , p
m
t (0))] is the maximum expected profit for a one-period problem
with zero starting inventory. We note that the service level offered to Class 1 under the
Policy Avg. Max
(%) (%)
P1 0.9 9.1
P2 11.7 44.2
Table 14: Average and maximum percentage expected profit loss for the benchmark policies
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Figure 12: Distribution of percentage expected profit loss for the benchmark policies
optimal policy is equal to SL1 = F
−1
1 (S
m−zm). We compute SL1 for each problem instance
and use it to explain our results below.
The computational results that are summarized in Table 14 suggest that while both
discretionary sales for Class 1 and dynamic pricing for Class 2 are valuable, the benefits of
dynamic pricing for Class 2 are significantly higher. However, further examination of these
results is essential. In particular, Figure 12 shows that there is no profit loss under policy
P1 for 47.4% of the experiments. This percentage accounts for 1152 problem instances out
of which (i) for 1080 instances pu ≤ r1 + b, and hence, zm = 0 and policy P1 is optimal,
(ii) for 72 problem instances pu > r1 + b and SL1 > 0.999. For the remaining 1278 problem
instances pu > r1 + b and the average value of SL1 is equal to 0.95, with a minimum of 0.84.
The profit loss under policy P2 is greater than zero for all problem instances. Conse-
quently, ignoring discretionary sales under P1 results in a average expected profit loss of
0.9%, but ignoring dynamic pricing under policy P2 results in a significant average expected
profit loss of 11.7%. However, these results should be used with caution, since the maximum
expected profit loss under policy P1 is 9.1%, which is significantly high. A careful investiga-
tion of our numerical results suggests that the expected profit loss under policy P1 can be
more than 5% for cases with higher Class 1 market size, low values of r1 + b compared to
pu, and high values of α and h.
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α Policy P1† Policy P2
Avg. Max. Avg. Max. SL1
(%) (%) (%) (%)
0.25 0.2 1.7 11.3 40.8 0.982
0.5 0.8 5.2 11.6 41.4 0.971
1.0 1.7 9.1 12.3 44.2 0.964
† indicates results when pu > r1 + b
Table 15: Percentage expected profit loss for the benchmark policies with respect to α
Next, we examine the impact of key model parameters on the profit loss under policies P1
and P2. For policy P1, we only present the results for the problem instances with pu > r1+b.
Otherwise, policy P1 is optimal (i.e., zm = 0). We list our observations below:
1. Table 15 shows that the average and the maximum expected profit loss under both
policies P1 and P2 increase with respect to α. To explain this, we note that as α
increases, SL1 decreases. This leads to a higher profit loss under policy P1. Further-
more, an increase in α leads to an increase in the variance of Class 1 demand, which in
turn increases the variance of the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand.
Using an extended computational study, we find that pm(I2) is a relatively flat function
of I2 for smaller values of α compared to higher values of α. As a result, the profit loss
under policy P2 with fixed price increases with α.
2. Table 16 shows that the average expected profit loss under policies P1 and P2 decreases
A Policy P1† Policy P2
Avg. Max. Avg. Max. SL1
(%) (%) (%) (%)
250 1.0 9.1 14.4 44.2 0.970
500 0.9 8.7 12.2 37.0 0.972
1000 0.8 7.9 8.6 25.4 0.975
† indicates results when pu > r1 + b
Table 16: Percentage expected profit loss for the benchmark policies with respect to A
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a2 Policy P1† Policy P2
Avg. Max. Avg. Max.
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1 0.8 9.1 12.5 40.5
2 1.7 6.8 15.1 44.2
4 0.4 1.3 7.6 25.4
† indicates results where pu > r1 + b
Table 17: Percentage profit loss for the benchmark policies with respect to a2
as A, and hence, the mean and variance of Class 2 demand increase. Again, this
seemingly non-intuitive result, especially, with respect to policy P1 can be explained
by studying SL1. From Table 12, we note that although z
m increases as A increases,
so does Sm and SL1. Hence, the profit loss under policy P1 decreases. We note that
an increase in A results in two changes with opposing effects on the expected profit:
(i) It increases the mean of the stochastic and price-independent component of Class
2, and hence, the total expected Class 2 demand. This in turn increases the expected
profit for both the optimal and P2 policies. (ii) It decreases the difference between
the lower and the upper bounds on the optimal price that is charged to Class 2 (see
item O2 in section III.6.2). This decreases the percentage expected profit loss due to
the fixed price strategy under policy P2. Results in Table 16 show that the combined
effect of these factors due to an increase in A leads to a decrease in expected profit loss
under policy P2. This indicates that the effect due to increase in demand is dominated
by the effect due to a comparatively flatter optimal price curve.
3. Table 17 shows that the average expected profit loss under policies P1 and P2 increase
when a2 increases from 1 to 2, but decreases as a2 further increases to 4. We further
examine this result by conducting an extended study with several values of a2. Figure
13 shows the behavior of expected profit loss with respect to a2. It shows that as a2
increases, the profit loss under policy P1 decreases. As a2 increases, z
m decreases (see
item O3 in section III.6.2). Figure 13 also shows that the profit loss under policy P2
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Figure 13: Effect of a2 on the expected profit loss under the benchmark policies: Setting 2,
E[D1] = 2626, r1 = 500, α = 1.0, h = 40, A = 250
increases (decreases) with respect to a2 when a2 is such that p
u = a1/a2 > r1 + b
(pu = a1/a2 ≤ r1 + b). To explain this, we note that an increase in a2 results in two
opposing effects on the expected profit: (i) It reduces the deterministic component
of demand, and hence, the total Class 2 demand. This in turn reduces the expected
profit for both the optimal and P2 policies. Furthermore, when pu = a1/a2 ≤ r1 + b,
pm(zm) = pm(0) = pu ≥ pm(I2). As a result, there is higher decrease in Class 2
demand and the expected profit under policy P1, compared to that under the optimal
policy. (ii) It decreases the difference between the lower and the upper bounds on the
optimal price that is charged to Class 2 (see item O3 in section III.6.2). As a result, the
percentage profit loss due to the fixed price strategy under policy P2 decreases. Figure
13 indicates that when pu = a1/a2 > r1 + b, the effect due to decrease in demand is
lower than the effect due to flattening of the price curve, and hence, the profit loss
under policy P2 decreases, and vice-a-versa.
III.7 Summary of Contributions and Key Insights
In this chapter, we consider a multi-period, joint replenishment, allocation and pricing
problem for a supplier facing stochastic demand from two customer classes. This problem
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is particularly relevant for electronics manufacturers who sell their products to retailers at
a fixed price, and to individual buyers via web-based channels where prices can be changed
easily. We model the price-sensitive demand in Class 2 using an additive demand function.
We show that the optimal policy is a combination of produce-up-to policy with potential dis-
cretionary sales to Class 1 and dynamic pricing to Class 2. To facilitate the implementation
of the optimal policy, we establish two sufficiency conditions under which a myopic policy is
optimal. The first sufficiency condition requires the on-hand inventory at the beginning of
the planning horizon to be less than the myopic produce-up-to level. The second sufficiency
condition is satisfied if the critical myopic produce-up-to level is increasing. For example,
this is true when all cost and demand parameters are stationary and any units remaining at
the end of the planning horizon are salvaged at a value equal to the unit production cost.
Our results show that the dynamic pricing for Class 2 leads to significant benefits with an
average of 11.7%. On the other hand, benefits of discretionary sales for Class 1 can be more
than 5% in the following cases: (i) Class 1 market size is higher, (ii) sum of unit price charged
to Class 1 and the lost sales penalty is less than the maximum price charged to Class 2, and
(iii) variance of Class 2 demand is high.
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CHAPTER IV
DEMAND ALLOCATION DECISIONS UNDER MULTI-SOURCING AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE BULLWHIP EFFECT
IV.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a real life problem faced by a major electronics manufacturer
(buyer), who faces stochastic demand for its end-product, which is an assembly of several
parts. We consider a specific part that is multi-sourced via a vendor managed inventory
(VMI) program with percentage supply allocations (PSAs) as illustrated in Figure 14. We
define PSA as a pre-negotiated percentage of the multi-sourced part’s total demand that the
buyer should allocate to a supplier in order to get discounts (commonly called as market
share discounts [8, 57]) or avoid penalties, depending on the specific agreement. We address
the buyer’s demand allocation decision for the multi-sourced part with the objective to meet
the PSAs for each supplier.
Multi-sourcing with PSAs is common across many industries including electronics, health
care, supermarkets and retail supply chains [9, 76]. For example, in the health care and retail
industries, a contract with PSAs is implemented in the form of a market share discount, which
Figure 14: Supply chain setting
127
is a price-break given by a supplier based on the percentage of the buyer’s total demand that
is allocated to that particular supplier [8]. In the electronics industry, a contract with PSAs
is usually implemented along with VMI programs in the form of commitments, which are
binding on the buyer and the suppliers. As part of the VMI program, the buyer regularly
shares forecasts with its suppliers, who manage replenishments to VMI hubs located close
to the buyer’s facility. Furthermore, the buyer (e.g., a computer manufacturer) may commit
to allocate a certain percentage (e.g., 50%) of its total demand to a supplier. In return,
the supplier provides the buyer a price guarantee and timely delivery of items, even when
overall market demand for that item temporarily exceeds the overall market supply [73]. For
example, the supplier provides a constant service level by continuously holding a minimum
level of inventory at its VMI hub. At the end of the contract term, if the actual percentage
of total demand allocated to a supplier is less than the committed PSA, then the buyer
is directly liable for this deficit. In particular, the buyer either pays a penalty or simply
purchases the amount equivalent to the percentage deficit, even if there is no immediate
demand for it. Similarly, the supplier pays penalty for any shortages that occur when the
actual inventory level falls below the specified minimum.
An important decision that the buyer makes under multi-sourcing is how to allocate de-
mand (or orders) among various suppliers. A contract with PSAs poses unique challenges to
the demand allocation decisions due to operational constraints, especially, in the electronics
industry. In the absence of any operational constraints, the demand allocation decisions are
straightforward. For example, if a hospital uses a contract with PSAs for surgical instru-
ments, then a practical and effective policy is to split every among suppliers proportional to
the PSAs. In contrast, consider a computer manufacturer who multi-sources motherboards
from suppliers M1 and M2, and hard-drives from suppliers H1 and H2. Suppose that moth-
erboards from M1 (M2) are compatible only with hard drives from H1 (H2), and either of
the compatible pair can be used in the end-product. At any given time, inventory from only
one supplier can be used and when the buyer moves from one supplier to another, we say
that the buyer switches suppliers. Suppose that motherboards from M1 are currently being
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used to assemble the end-product and the manufacturer wants to switch to motherboards
from M2. This implies switching to hard drives from H2, and entails operational changes on
the factory floor, e.g., replacing inventories of M1 and H1 from the assembly line with those
of M2 and H2. During a recent industry collaboration with a major computer manufacturer,
we observed that when all components of a computer are considered, the operational changes
necessary to (temporarily) switch suppliers for even a single part are significant, affect pro-
ductivity and are expensive [48]. As a result, developing a practical demand allocation policy
that meets the PSAs with minimum number of supplier switches is extremely important.
In addition, during our industry collaboration, we observed that the demand allocation
policy used in current practice creates two main challenges: (i) it is not effective in meeting
PSAs, (ii) it can significantly increase the variability of the demand observed by the suppliers,
leading to the bullwhip effect. Bullwhip effect is the amplification of demand variability as
customer orders travel upstream of the supply chain and leads to supply chain inefficiencies
[10, 12, 52]. Furthermore, we note that a contract with PSAs in the form of market share
discounts has attracted antitrust scrutiny because they may have exclusionary effects when
offered by a major supplier with significant market power. For example, Intel’s use of such
discounts for a central processing unit led to antitrust proceedings by AMD and Federal
Trade Commission, resulting in monetary fines and prohibition of future use of such discounts
by Intel [1, 44]. This has motivated several economic models, which conclude that like most
pricing practices, market share discounts can be used for both pro-competitive as well as
anti-competitive purposes [56, 57, 71, 76].
As noted before, the objective of this chapter is to address the operational challenges
under multi-sourcing with PSAs by developing effective demand allocation policies that are
practical in the context of electronics industry. To this end, we first benchmark the demand
allocation policy observed in the electronics industry using random allocation policy (RAP).
In addition, we propose two alternate policies: time-based cyclic consumption (CCP-T)
and quantity-based cyclic consumption policies (CCP-Q). These policies prescribe guidelines
to systematically make the supplier switching decisions. We evaluate and compare the
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performances of these policies based on (i) long-run fraction of total demand allocated to
each supplier, (ii) buyer’s expected long-run average number of supplier switches, and (iii)
supplier’s bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing.
Demand allocation policies that can meet PSAs have not been studied in the literature
before. In contrast, the bullwhip effect is investigated by a vast and growing body of aca-
demic and practice oriented literature. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the bullwhip
effect is widespread across all industries and leads to supply chain inefficiencies [10, 12, 52].
Existing models in the literature study the bullwhip effect in single-sourcing supply chains
with one supplier and one or more buyers [18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 27, 29, 37, 52]. However,
there is no literature on bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing. We contribute to the current
literature by demonstrating the existence of bullwhip effect caused due to demand allocation
policies in multi-sourcing systems. We term it as the bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing
and emphasize its absence in single-sourcing systems. We quantify the bullwhip effect under
multi-sourcing and study its impact on the supplier’s replenishment and inventory holding
costs. While we do not focus on the pro-competitive or anti-competitive effects of a contract
with PSAs, our results offer new insights showing that these effects may be strengthened or
weakened depending on the demand allocation policy used by the buyer.
In particular, we provide analytical expressions that quantify the performances of RAP,
CCP-T and CCP-Q, and show that they can meet PSAs in the long run. We demonstrate
that RAP always leads to the bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing and offer new insights
that substantiate the exclusionary, and hence, anti-competitive effects of a contract with
PSAs. We also show that while CCP-T also leads to the bullwhip effect, it is less than that
under RAP. On one hand, we show that CCP-Q may not always lead to the bullwhip effect.
However, when the coefficient of variation of the buyer’s demand is high, the bullwhip effect
under CCP-Q can be higher than that under RAP. When the total number of suppliers
increase while keeping the PSA for a particular supplier fixed, the bullwhip effect observed
by that supplier: (i) remains the same under RAP and CCP-T, (ii) decreases under CCP-
Q. In contrast, when PSAs are distributed equally among all suppliers, the bullwhip effect
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under each policy increases as the total number of suppliers increases. Considering the
importance of the buyer’s expected long-run number of supplier switches, we provide a
method to compute policy parameters for CCP-T and CCP-Q to achieve a target value of
the number of supplier switches. Furthermore, when negotiating a contract with the buyer,
suppliers will find our results valuable to carefully select the service levels that they commit
to provide based on the agreed upon PSA.
We address two key research questions in this chapter. The first is which policy is
preferred by the buyer and each supplier? Clearly, the buyer prefers the policy with the
lowest expected long-run average number of supplier switches, and each supplier prefers the
policy that results in the lowest bullwhip effect for that supplier. To address this, we rank
the three policies based on each performance measure. We demonstrate, analytically where
possible and numerically if not, that both CCP-T and CCP-Q can reduce the supplier’s
bullwhip effect without increasing the buyer’s expected long-run average number of supplier
switches compared to that under RAP. Furthermore, we establish a threshold value of PSA
such that suppliers with higher (lower) PSA than this threshold observe the lowest bullwhip
effect under CCP-Q (CCP-T), and hence, prefer it over other policies.
The second question that we investigate is: which policy is the best considering the total
system consisting of the buyer and all the suppliers? To address this, we choose parameters
of CCP-T and CCP-Q so that the resulting expected long-run average number of supplier
switches under each policy is the same, and hence, all policies are equivalent for the buyer.
We consider that each supplier replenishes its VMI hub using an produce-up-to policy and
compare the demand allocation policies based on the system cost, i.e., the total replenishment
and inventory holding costs across all suppliers. Our numerical results show that, compared
to RAP, both CCP-T and CCP-Q result in significant savings in the total system cost with
an average of more than 15%. These savings are higher for smaller values of coefficient of
variation of the buyer’s demand. Furthermore, CCP-Q performs mildly better than CCP-T
with an average benefit of 0.44% and a maximum of 2.62%. We note that CCP-T is easier
to implement than CCP-Q, and hence, depending on the magnitude of the actual savings
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CCP-T or CCP-Q may be used.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section IV.2, we present the
problem definition and introduce the performance measures used to evaluate the demand
allocation policies. In Sections IV.3, IV.4 and IV.5, we present the models and analyses for
RAP, CCP-T and CCP-Q demand allocation policies, respectively. We define RAP, CCP-T
and CCP-Q demand allocation policies. We also derive the expressions of the performance
measures and evluate the effects of model parameters on the performance measures for each
policy. In Section IV.6, we compare and rank the three demand allocation policies based
on the three performance measures listed above. Section IV.7 compares the three policies
based on the total system cost. Section IV.8 summarizes our findings and the key insights.
IV.2 Problem Setting and Definition
In this section, we discuss the problem setting, introduce our notation and the perfor-
mance measures used to evaluate the demand allocation policies.
We consider a buyer (e.g., electronics manufacturer) who faces stochastic demand for its
end-product, which is an assembly of several parts. The demand for the buyer’s end-product
arrives periodically. We consider a specific part that is multi-sourced from K suppliers via
a VMI program with PSAs. Let pij be the PSA for supplier j such that 0 < pij < 1 for
j = 1, . . . ,K and
∑K
j=1 pij = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that pi1 ≤ pi2 ≤ . . . ≤
piK . Under a VMI program, suppliers maintain inventory at a VMI hub close to the buyer’s
facility as illustrated in Figure 14. As a result, the buyer does not carry any inventory and
pulls it from suppliers’ VMI hubs after observing the demand in each period. We address the
buyer’s demand allocation decisions subject to an operational constraint. More specifically,
the operational constraint dictates that the buyer can switch from one supplier to other at
most once per period (e.g., a day). This is a common practice observed in the electronics
industry and the aim is to lower the number of supplier switches. Accordingly, our model
allows switching suppliers only at the beginning of a period.
At the beginning of each period t, the buyer observes the random demand, denoted by
Dt. Then, based on the demand allocation policy, the buyer selects one supplier among its
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K suppliers and allocates the entire demand for that period to the selected supplier. In
other words, the demand allocation policy guides the buyer in selecting a supplier for each
period. The buyer’s objective is to meet the PSAs in the long-term for each supplier with
the minimum number of supplier switches. We benchmark the demand allocation policy
observed in the electronics industry using RAP, and demonstrate that it always leads to
bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing. To mitigate this, we propose two alternate policies,
CCP-T and CCP-Q, which are based on a novel concept of a consumption cycle [48]. We
define the consumption cycle as below:
Definition 1. A consumption cycle allocates demand to different suppliers in a sequential
manner such that during every cycle, either the total time or the minimum quantity of
demand allocated to each supplier is fixed. Any sequence of suppliers may be chosen based
on operational ease.
Depending on whether the supplier switching decisions are made by time or quantity, we
define time-based (CCP-T) and quantity-based cyclic consumption (CCP-Q) policies. For
modeling purposes we choose the 1 − 2 − . . .K sequence, and emphasize that our results
regarding performance of CCP-T and CCP-Q are independent of the chosen sequence.
IV.2.1 Underlying stochastic process
Next, we discuss the underlying demand process and introduce our notation. We consider
that {Dt : t = 1, 2, . . .} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) non-
negative random variables with cumulative distribution function F (·). Let us denote the
mean and standard deviation of Dt by µ and σ, respectively. Let CV [Dt] = σ/µ be the
coefficient of variation of Dt. Define Yn as the total demand observed by the buyer up to
period n, i.e.,
Yn =
n∑
t=1
Dt. (176)
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Let i be the index for the demand allocation policy used by the buyer, i = 1 for RAP, i = 2
for CCP-T, and i = 3 for CCP-Q. For i = 1, 2, 3, and t, n = 1, 2, . . ., define
Kit = supplier to which demand is allocated in period t under policy i
Xijt = demand allocated to supplier j in period t under policy i
Yijn = the total demand allocated to supplier j up to period n under policy i
Then, for each policy i, Kit ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and
Xijt = 1(Kit = j)Dt (177)
Yijn =
n∑
t=1
Xijt. (178)
Next, we introduce the performance measures used to evaluate the demand allocation poli-
cies.
IV.2.2 Performance measures
During a recent industry collaboration, we observed that under the demand allocation
policy used in current practice, inventory consumption from some suppliers may exceed their
PSAs, while not meeting the same for other suppliers. This satisfies the buyer’s percentage
commitment for some suppliers, but violates it for other suppliers. Furthermore, since
supplier switching affects productivity the buyer prefers a policy with less number of supplier
switches. In addition, we observed that the demand allocation policy used in current practice
leads to the bullwhip effect. Table 18 presents empirical evidence based on actual industry
data. It highlights that the coefficient of variation (CV) of orders placed to supplier S3
was almost twice the CV of the buyer’s demand. This increases costs and leads to supply
chain inefficiencies. For example, due to increased demand variability, suppliers have to
hold more inventory at the VMI hubs to achieve the committed service level. Furthermore,
the bullwhip effect increases the supplier’s replenishment and inventory holding costs [21].
Consequently, we investigate and compare the three demand allocation policies, based on
the following three long-run performance measures:
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S1 orders S2 orders S3 orders Sales
Average daily demand 1568 951 481 3000
Standard deviation of daily demand 5431 1513 1938 6153
Coefficient of Variation (CV) 3.46 1.59 4.03 2.05
Table 18: Variability of orders placed with suppliers v/s variability of sales.
1. Since the buyer’s primary objective is to meet PSAs, the first performance measure
that we consider is the expected long-run fraction of total demand allocated to supplier
j under policy i, denoted by αij . Mathematically, we can write αij = limn→∞ αij(n),
where
αij(n) = E
[
Yijn
Yn
]
. (179)
2. The second performance measure that we consider is the buyer’s expected long-run
average number of supplier switches under policy i, denoted by γi. As discussed before,
the buyer tends to choose the policy which results in less number of supplier switches.
Consequently, we discuss how to compute the parameters of a demand allocation policy
given a specific target value of γ, denoted by γ0.
3. Our third performance measure is the bullwhip effect observed by supplier j due to
demand allocation policy i, denoted by βij . We term this as the bullwhip effect under
multi-sourcing. Traditionally, for single-supplier single-buyer systems, the bullwhip
effect is defined as the ratio of the variance of supplier’s demand (i.e., buyer’s orders)
and the variance of buyer’s demand. In such systems, the supplier’s and the buyer’s
long-run average demands are equal. In contrast, in multi-supplier systems, the average
demand observed by each supplier is less than the average demand observed by the
buyer. Since CV measures variation of a random variable relative to its mean, for
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multi-supplier systems, we define the bullwhip ratio as
βij =
CV [supplier j’s demand under policy i]
CV [buyer’s demand]
. (180)
If βij ≥ 1 (βij < 1), then orders placed with supplier j are more (less) variable than the
demand observed by the buyer, and we say that supplier j observes (does not observe)
bullwhip effect under policy i.
It is worthwhile to note that there is no bullwhip effect in the single-sourcing
version of our supply chain setting, where the traditional measures to reduce the bull-
whip effect are already in place, e.g., VMI, zero lead time (between the VMI hub
and buyer’s facility) [18, 19, 20, 28, 27, 29]. Furthermore, other causes of bullwhip
effect like updating of forecasts based on observed demand, supply shortages leading
to inventory rationing, batching of orders, and price fluctuations are also absent in our
setting [21, 52].
IV.3 Random Allocation Policy
The random allocation policy (RAP) benchmarks the demand allocation policy observed
in the electronics industry. In practice, demand can be allocated to a random supplier in each
period providing full flexibility to the buyer [45]. Accordingly, we model RAP by considering
K1t as a random variable such that P(K1t = j) = rj , where 0 < rj < 1 and
∑K
j=1 rj = 1 for
j = 1, . . . ,K and t = 1, 2, . . .. As a result, RAP is characterized by (r1, . . . , rK) and works
as follows: In each period t, the buyer observes the realized value of K1t and assigns the
entire demand of the period to that supplier.
We illustrate RAP using an example. Suppose there are two suppliers, i.e., K = 2 and
the buyer uses a RAP with parameters r1 = r2 = 0.5. Suppose that for t = 1 and k11 = 1,
the buyer allocates D1 to supplier 1 and no demand is allocated to supplier 2. Next, suppose
that for t = 2, we also have k12 = 1. Then, the buyer allocates D2 to supplier 1, and so on.
Figure 15 illustrates a realization of the buyer’s cumulative demand process Yn, and supplier
j’s cumulative demand process Y1jn under RAP when k1t = j for t = 1, 2, 8, 10.
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Figure 15: Cumulative demand process for the buyer and an arbitrary supplier j under RAP
We note that K1t and Dt are independent random variables and K1t are i.i.d. Using equa-
tion (177) for i = 1, we see that X1jt = 1(K1t = j)Dt, t = 1, 2, . . . are also i.i.d. Proposition
11 provides expressions for the performance of RAP with parameters (r1, . . . , rK).
Proposition 11. For j = 1, . . . ,K, the following are true for RAP with parameters (r1, . . . , rK):
(a) α1j = rj,
(b) β1j =
√
1
rj
+
1− rj
rjCV 2[D]
≥ 1√
rj
> 1,
(c) γ1 = 1−
∑K
j=1 r
2
j .
Proof. Before we proceed with the proof, we derive some useful identities. First, using
linearity of expectation, we have
1 = E
[∑n
t=1Dt
Yn
]
=
n∑
t=1
E
[
Dt
Yn
]
.
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Since Dt, t = 1, 2, . . . are i.i.d., E[Dt/Yn] = E[Dt′/Yn] for t 6= t′, then using the above
equality we have
E[Dt/Yn] = 1/n for t = 1, 2, . . . , n. (181)
Next, using the fact that K1t and Dt are independent and P (K1t = j) = rj , we have
E[X1jt] = E
[
1(K1t = j)Dt
]
= rjµ (182)
V ar[X1jt] = V ar
[
1(K1t = j)Dt
]
= rjE[D
2]− r2jµ2
= rjσ
2 + rj(1− rj)µ2
= r2jµ
2
(
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
rj
)
. (183)
(a) Using equations (177), (178), (179) for i = 1, the fact thatK1t andDt/Yn are independent
and the identity (181), we have
α1j(n) = E
[∑n
t=1 1(K1t = j)Dt
Yn
]
=
n∑
t=1
E[1(K1t = j)]E
[
Dt
Yn
]
=
n∑
t=1
rj
1
n
= rj .
(b) Using the equations (182) and (183), we compute CV [X1jt] as
CV [X1jt] =
√
V ar[X1jt]
E[X1jt]
= rjµ
√
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
rj
1
rjµ
=
√
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
rj
. (184)
X1jt are i.i.d. random variables, and hence, the bullwhip effect under RAP can be defined
as follows
β1j =
CV [X1jt]
CV [Dt]
=
1
CV [D]
√
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
rj
=
√
1
rj
+
1− rj
rjCV 2[D]
≥ 1√
rj
> 1.
(c) If supplier j is chosen in period t, then the probability that the buyer switches to another
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supplier at the end of period t is equal to Pr(K1,t+1 6= j) = 1 − rj . Since K1t, t = 1, 2, . . .
are i.i.d., γ1 can be computed by conditioning on K1t as follows
γ1 = E
[
E[Number of supplier switches in a period|K1t = j]
]
=
K∑
j=1
(1− rj)rj = 1−
K∑
j=1
r2j ,
where we use the fact that
∑K
j=1 rj = 1.
From part (a) of Proposition 11, it follows that RAP will meet PSA for supplier j,
j = 1, . . . ,K, in the long-run if rj = pij . Part (b) of Proposition 11 shows that each supplier
observes bullwhip effect when the buyer uses RAP. This is intuitive because under RAP,
in addition to the uncertainty in the order size, the supplier also faces the uncertainty due
to the buyer’s random selection process. In addition, part (b) of Proposition 11 provides
a lower bound on β1j . Part (c) of Proposition 11 presents an expression for the buyer’s
long-run average number of supplier switches under RAP, γ1. We observe that γ1 depends
on PSAs. Next, Corollary 3 examines the effect of model parameters on β1j .
Corollary 3. The following are true for RAP with parameters (r1, . . . , rK):
(a) β1j is a convex decreasing function of rj,
(b) β1j is a convex decreasing function of CV [D],
(c) β1j is a super-modular function of rj and CV [D].
Proof. (a) Taking the first and second order derivatives of β1j with respect to rj , we have
∂β1j
∂rj
=
−1
2CV [D]
(
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
rj
)−1/2(CV 2[D] + 1
r2j
)
=
−(CV 2[D] + 1)
2CV 2[D]r2jβ1j
≤ 0,
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∂2β1j
∂r2j
=
−(CV 2[D] + 1)
2CV 2[D]
( −2
r3jβ1j
− 1
r2jβ
2
1j
∂β1j
∂rj
)
=
−(CV 2[D] + 1)
2CV 2[D]r3jβ1j
(
− 2 + CV
2[D] + 1
CV 2[D]rjβ21j
)
=
(CV 2[D] + 1)
2CV 2[D]r3jβ1j
(
CV 2[D] + 1 + 2rj
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
)
≥ 0.
Thus, β1j is a convex decreasing function of rj .
(b) Taking the first and second order derivatives of β1j with respect to CV [D], we have
∂β1j
∂CV [D]
=
−(1− rj)
β1jrjCV 3[D]
≤ 0
∂2β1j
∂(CV [D])2
=
−(1− rj)
rj
( −1
β21jCV
3[D]
∂β1j
∂CV [D]
− 3
β1jCV 4[D]
)
=
−(1− rj)
β1jrjβ1jCV 4[D]
(
(1− rj)CV 2[D]
CV 2[D] + 1− rj − 3
)
=
(1− rj)
[
CV 2[D](2 + rj) + 3(1− rj)
]
rjβ1jCV 4[D]
(
CV 2[D] + 1− rj
) ≥ 0.
Thus, β1j is a convex decreasing function of CV [D].
(c) Taking the first order derivative of ∂β1j/∂rj with respect to CV [D], we have
∂β1j
∂rj∂CV [D]
=
−1
2rj
(
1
β21j
(
1 +
1
CV 2[D]
)
∂β1j
∂CV [D]
− 2
β1jCV 3[D]
)
=
−1
2rjβ1jCV 2[D]
(
(1− rj)(CV 2[D] + 1)
β21jrjCV
3[D]
− 2
CV [D]
)
=
−1
2rjβ1jCV 3[D]
(
(1− rj)(CV 2[D] + 1)
CV 2[D] + 1− rj − 2
)
=
−1
2rjβ1jCV 3[D]
(
1− rj + CV 2[D](1 + rj)
CV 2[D] + 1− rj ≥ 0.
Thus, β1j is a super-modular function of rj and CV [D] [42].
Part (a) of Corollary 3 presents an important result that β1j is a convex decreasing
function of rj . That is, as the probability of choosing supplier j (rj), and hence, the per-
centage of demand allocated to supplier j increases supplier j’s bullwhip effect decreases.
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Figure 16: β1j with respect to rj for different values of CV [D]
Therefore, when rj = pij for j = 1, . . . PSAs are met and a major supplier with high PSA
observes lower bullwhip effect compared to a minor supplier with low PSA. An important
and counter-intuitive result is that β1j is a convex decreasing function of CV [D]. One may
expect that as CV [D] increases, the supplier’s demand variance increases, and hence, β1j
also increases. However, we note that as CV [D] increases both the buyer’s and the supplier’s
demand variances increase. Furthermore, the result in part (b) of Corollary 3 shows that the
magnitudes of the increases in the buyer’s and the supplier’s demand variances are such that
β1j decreases. Part (c) of Corollary 3 shows that β1j is a super-modular function of rj and
CV [D], i.e., the decrease in β1j due to an increase in rj is larger for smaller values of CV [D].
Figure 16 complements the analytical results of Corollary 3 and further expounds the effect
of rj and CV on β1j . It illustrates the result that β1j is a convex decreasing function of rj
and CV [D], and β1j can be significantly high for small values of rj and/or CV [D].
Corollary 4 examines the trade-off between the bullwhip effect observed by different
suppliers and the buyer’s long-run average number of supplier switches under dual-sourcing,
i.e., K = 2. We consider that rj = pij for j = 1, 2, and hence, PSAs are met. We recall that
pi1 ≤ pi2.
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Corollary 4. The following is true under dual-sourcing, i.e., K = 2, and RAP with param-
eters rj = pij for j = 1, 2:
(a) As pi1 increases, β11 decreases while β12 increases such that the rate of decrease in
β11 is greater than the rate of increase in β12. When pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, β11 = β12 =√
2 + 1/CV 2[D].
(b) γ1 is a concave increasing function of pi1.
Proof. Suppose that rj = pij for j = 1, 2. Using this in part (a) of Corollary 3 it follows
that as pi1 increases, β11 decreases while β12 increases and when pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, β11 = β12 =√
2 + 1/CV 2[D]. Next, using the chain rule of differentiation, we have
∂β12
∂pi1
=
∂β12
∂pi2
∂pi2
∂pi1
= −∂β12
∂pi2
> 0. (185)
Using part (a) of Corollary 3, the fact that when pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, β11 = β12 and equation
(185), we have
∂β11
∂pi1
∣∣∣∣
pi1<0.5
<
∂β11
∂pi1
∣∣∣∣
pi1=0.5
=
∂β12
∂pi2
∣∣∣∣
pi2=0.5
<
∂β12
∂pi2
∣∣∣∣
pi2>0.5
= −∂β12
∂pi1
∣∣∣∣
pi1<0.5
< 0.
Therefore, the rate of decrease in β11 with respect to pi1, i.e., −∂β11/∂pi1, is greater than
the rate of increase in β12 with respect to pi1, i.e., ∂β12/∂pi1. Similarly, using part (c) of
Proposition 11 we have
γ1 = 1− pi21 − (1− pi1)2 = 2pi1 − 2pi21.
Taking the first and second order derivatives of γ1 with respect to pi1 and using the fact that
pi1 ≤ 0.5 ≤ pi2, we have
dγ1
dpi1
= 2− 4pi1 ≥ 2− 4× 0.5 = 0,
d2γ1
dpi21
= −4 ≤ 0. (186)
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Figure 17: β11 , β12 and γ1 with respect to r1 for K = 2
Thus, γ1 is a concave increasing function of pi1.
Figure 17 illustrates the effect of pi1 on β11, β12 and γ1 when K = 2. It shows that as
pi1 increases, β11 decreases and β12 increases such that the rate of decrease in β11 is higher
than the rate of increase in β12. From Corollary 4 and Figure 17, we gain the following key
insights regarding RAP, and hence, the demand allocation policy used in practice:
O1 In a dual-sourcing system, the buyer prefers a skewed, rather than a comparable distri-
bution of PSA among its two suppliers due to lower expected long-run average number of
supplier switches. As a result, if the major supplier offers a lucrative discount for 100%
of buyer’s market share, the buyer may prefer single-sourcing from the major supplier
rather than dual-sourcing.
O2 In a dual-sourcing system, the minor supplier with low PSA is at a significant disadvan-
tage: not only is its market share (of buyer’s demand) small, but it also observes high
bullwhip effect, which increases his replenishment and inventory holding costs at the
VMI hub [21]. As a result, it may not be profitable for the minor supplier with lower
market/negotiating power to trade with a buyer who insists on low PSA.
Thus, for the demand allocation policy used in practice, our results offer new insights that
substantiate the exclusionary effects of a contract with PSAs when offered by a major supplier
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with significant market power. Furthermore, when negotiating a contract with the buyer,
suppliers will find our results valuable to carefully select the service levels that they commit
to provide based on the agreed upon PSA.
In Sections IV.4 and IV.5, we propose alternate demand allocation policies which can
reduce the supplier’s bullwhip effect without increasing the buyer’s expected long-run average
number of supplier switches.
IV.4 Time-based Cyclic Consumption Policy
When implementing a consumption cycle to make demand allocations, the buyer may
make supplier switching decisions based on time. More specifically, in every cycle, the buyer
may allocate demand to each supplier for a specific number of periods before switching to the
next supplier. We term this approach as the time-based cyclic consumption policy (CCP-T).
CCP-T prescribes guidelines to construct a fixed schedule for switching suppliers, and each
supplier knows the time periods during which demand will be allocated to its VMI hub.
The CCP-T is characterized by K parameters (L1, . . . , LK), where Lj is the fixed number
of periods during which demand is allocated to supplier j in each consumption cycle.
For modeling purposes, we choose the 1 − 2 − . . .K sequence for cycling through the
supplies. Nevertheless, our results regarding performance of CCP-T and CCP-Q in Section
IV.5 are independent of the chosen sequence. We model CCP-T as follows: Let L denote
the fixed length of each consumption cycle, then we have
L =
K∑
j=1
Lj . (187)
Furthermore, K2t is known for each t and can be written as follows:
K2t =

j if (t mod L) = 1 +
∑j−1
k=1 Lk, . . . ,
∑j
k=1 Lk and 1 ≤ j < K
K if (t mod L) = 0, 1 +
∑K−1
k=1 Lk, . . . ,
∑K
k=1 Lk − 1.
(188)
Next, we illustrate CCP-T with an example. Suppose K = 2 and the buyer uses a CCP-
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Figure 18: Cumulative demand process for an arbitrary supplier under CCP-T.
T with parameters (L1 = 1, L2 = 2). Then, L = 3 and demand in periods t = 1, 4, 7, 10, . . .
is allocated to supplier 1, and demand in periods t = 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, . . . is allocated to supplier
2. Figure 18 illustrates a realization of supplier 1’s demand process for this example.
Using equation (177) for i = 2, we know that demand allocated to supplier j in period t
is given by X2jt = 1(K2t = j)Dt. Since K2t depends on t, X2jt are not i.i.d. We emphasize
that K2t is deterministic and we know the periods when X2jt = 0. However, all time-based
consumption cycles are i.i.d., and hence, we can define the bullwhip ratio under CCP-T as
β2j =
CV [demand observed by supplier j in a consumption cycle]
CV [demand observed by the buyer in a consumption cycle]
. (189)
Proposition 12 provides expressions for the performance measures of CCP-T with parameters
(L1, . . . , LK).
Proposition 12. For j = 1, . . . ,K, the following are true for a CCP-T with parameters
(L1, . . . , LK):
(a) α2j = Lj/L,
(b) β2j =
√
L/Lj > 1,
(c) γ2 = K/L.
Proof. (a) We first compute α2j(n) and then take its limit as n goes to infinity to compute
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α2j . Using equations (177), (178), (179) and (181), we have
α2j(n) = E
[∑n
t=1 1(K2t = j)Dt
Yn
]
=
n∑
t=1
1(K2t = j)
1
n
. (190)
We can express n in terms of L as n = n1L + n2, where n1 = bn/Lc is the quotient and
n2 = (n mod L) is the remainder of the division of n by L. Then, from equation (188), we
have
α2j(n) =

(n1Lj)/n if (n mod L) ≤
∑j−1
m=1 Lm(
n1Lj +
(
n2 −
∑j−1
m=1 Lm
))
/n if
∑j−1
m=1 Lm < (n mod L) <
∑j
m=1 Lm
(n1 + 1)Lj/n if (n mod L) ≥
∑j
m=1 Lm,
(191)
where
∑0
m=1 Lm = 0. Since n2 = (n mod L) < L, when
∑j−1
m=1 Lm < (n mod L) <∑j
m=1 Lm, we have (n2 −
∑j−1
m=1 Lm) < Lj . As a result, the following inequality holds
n1Lj
n
≤ α2j(n) ≤ (n1 + 1)Lj
n
. (192)
Furthermore, writing n1 = (n− (n mod L))/L, we have
lim
n→∞
n1Lj
n
= lim
n→∞
(n− (n mod L))Lj
Ln
= lim
n→∞
(
1− (n mod L)
n
)
Lj
L
=
Lj
L
, (193)
lim
n→∞
(n1 + 1)Lj
n
= lim
n→∞
(
1 +
L− (n mod L)
n
)
Lj
L
=
Lj
L
. (194)
Then, using (192)-(194) and the sandwich theorem (see pg. 39 in [62]), it follows that
limn→∞ α2j(n) = Lj/L.
(b) Let Ujm be the total demand observed by supplier j in the mth consumption cycle, then
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Ujm, m = 1, 2, . . . are i.i.d., and
Ujm ∼
L∑
t=1
1(K2t = j)Dt.
Using equation (189) and the definition of Ujm, we have
β2j =
CV [Ujm]
CV [YL]
. (195)
From equation (188), in each consumption cycle the total number of periods that demand
is allocated to supplier j is equal to Lj . Hence, we have
E[Ujm] = E
[ L∑
t=1
1(K2t = j)Dt
]
=
L∑
t=1
E[1(K2t = j)Dt] = Ljµ, (196)
V ar[Ujm] = V ar
[ L∑
t=1
1(K2t = j)Dt
]
=
L∑
t=1
V ar[1(K2t = j)Dt] = Ljσ
2, (197)
CV [Ujm] =
√
Ljσ2
Ljµ
= CV [D]
√
1
Lj
. (198)
Furthermore, since Dt, t = 1, 2, . . . are i.i.d, CV [YL] = CV [D]/
√
L. Using this and equation
(198) in (195), we have β2j =
√
L/Lj . Since L > Lj , it follows that β2j > 1.
(c) During each cycle, the buyer switches suppliers K times. Therefore, γ2 can be written
as
γ2 =
Number of switching suppliers per cycle
length of each cycle
=
K
L
.
Part (a) of Proposition 12 shows that when the buyer uses CCP-T, PSAs will be met in
the long-run, i.e., α2j = pij , if
Lj = Lpij (199)
for j = 1, . . . ,K. The operational constraint limiting the number of supplier switches to a
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maximum one per period will be satisfied if Lj ≥ 1 for j = 1, . . . ,K. Furthermore, when
Lj values are integers, suppliers are switched only at the beginning of a period. Recall that
pi1 < pij , for j = 2, . . . ,K. Hence, if condition (199) is true then the operational constraint
will be satisfied if L1 ≥ 1 so that L ≥ 1/pi1 and Lj , j = 1, . . . ,K are all integers. Part
(b) of Proposition 12 shows that CCP-T also leads to bullwhip effect. Furthermore, when
Lj = Lpij , we have
β2j =
1√
pij
> 1.
One interesting and non-intuitive observation is that β2j depends only on the ratio L/Lj
and is independent of µ, σ and CV [D]. Part (c) of Proposition 12 provides an expression to
compute γ2 and shows that γ2 increases in K and decreases in L. More importantly, part (c)
of Proposition 12 demonstrate the inherent flexibility of CCP-T, which allows it to meet the
buyer’s target for the expected long-run average number of supplier switches, denoted by γ0.
In particular, given K and γo, part (c) of Proposition 12 shows that L can be determined as
L(γ0) = K/γ0. Furthermore, the result in Corollary 5 follows directly from Proposition 12.
Corollary 5. β2j is a convex decreasing function of L/Lj.
Next, in Corollary 6, we set Lj = Lpij and examine the trade-off between the bullwhip
effect observed by the suppliers and the buyer’s expected long-run average number of supplier
switches for different combination of pi1 and pi2 under dual sourcing, i.e., K = 2.
Corollary 6. The following are true under dual-sourcing, i.e., K = 2, and CCP-T with
parameters Lj = Lpij for j = 1, 2:
(a) β21 ≥ β22,
(b) As pi1 increases, β21 decreases while β22 increases such that the rate of decrease in β21
is greater than the rate of increase in β22. When pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, β21 = β22 =
√
K.
(c) γ2 is a linear increasing function of pi1, and a linear decreasing function of L.
Proof. Suppose that Lj = Lpij for j = 1, 2. Parts (a) and (b) follow directly using Corollary
5 and following the same steps as in the proof of Corollary 4. Using part (c) of Proposition
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Figure 19: β21, β22 and γ2 with respect to pi1 for K = 2
11, we have γ2 = K/L = Kpij/Lj . Thus, γ2 is a linear increasing function of pi1, and a linear
decreasing function of L.
Figure 19 illustrates the effect of pi1 on β21, β22 and γ2 when K = 2. It shows that as pi1
increases, β21 decreases while β22 increases such that the rate of decrease in β21 is greater
than the rate of increase in β22. Furthermore, it shows that as L increases γ2 decreases.
Therefore, a wise choice of L and Lj will allow the buyer to meet PSAs and its target for the
expected long-run average number of supplier switches, while reducing the bullwhip effect
observed by the suppliers.
IV.5 Quantity-based Cyclic Consumption Policy
When implementing a consumption cycle, the buyer may make supplier switching deci-
sions based on quantity. More specifically, the buyer may decide to allocate a pre-defined
number of units to supplier j in each cycle, j = 1, . . . ,K, before switching to the next
supplier. We propose the following quantity-based cyclic consumption policy (CCP-Q): (1)
CCP-Q is characterized by K parameters, which are (Q1 . . . , QK). Similar to CCP-T, we
assume that the buyer cycles through all suppliers in the 1 − 2 − . . . −K sequence. (2) In
each cycle, the buyer allocates at least Qj units to supplier j in consecutive periods and
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Figure 20: Cumulative demand process for an arbitrary supplier under CCP-Q
switches to supplier j + 1 after the period in which the total number of units allocated to
supplier j in that cycle reaches or exceeds Qj units for the first time, j = 1, . . . ,K.
We model CCP-Q by introducing additional notation. We recall equation (176) and
define
N(d) = sup{n : Yn < d}, where N(0) = 0. (200)
That is, N(d) is a renewal process that counts the maximum number of periods such that
the buyer’s total demand is up to d units. We denote the associated renewal function as
M(d) = E[N(d)]. Hence, the total number of periods during which demand is allocated to
supplier j in each cycle is equal to N(Qj) + 1. Since N(d) ≥ 0, it follows that any Qj ≥ 0
will satisfy the operational requirement and limit switching suppliers to a maximum of one
per period.
We illustrate CCP-Q using an example. Suppose K = 2 and the buyer uses a CCP-Q
with parameters Q1 = Q2 = 50. Consider the first consumption cycle, which starts in period
t = 1. The buyer observes d1, the realized value of D1, allocates it to supplier 1. Suppose
that d1 = 40 < Q1, then the buyer does not switch suppliers and D2 is also allocated to
supplier 1. Suppose that d2 = 30, i.e., d1 + d2 > Q1. The buyer has now exceeded Q1 units
quota for supplier 1 for the first time. Hence, the buyer switches to supplier 2, and allocates
D3 to supplier 2. Suppose D3 = 55 > Q2, i.e., the buyer has now allocated more than
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Q2 units to supplier 2. Therefore, the first consumption cycle ends. The same process is
repeated during each consumption cycle. In this example, for the first cycle N(Q1) = 1 and
N(Q2) = 0. As a result, demand was allocated to supplier 1 for 2 periods and to supplier 2
for 1 period. Figure 20 illustrates supplier 1’s demand process for this example.
We note that that all quantity-based consumption cycles are i.i.d. Let Lq be the length
of a quantity-based consumption cycle, then
Lq =
K∑
j=1
(N(Qj) + 1). (201)
In addition, the demand allocated to each supplier in a consumption cycle is also random.
Let Q = [Q1, Q2, . . . , QK ] be a vector of size K. Proposition 13 provides performance
measures of CCP-Q with parameters Q.
Proposition 13. For j = 1, . . . ,K, the following are true for CCP-Q with parameters Q:
(a) α3j(Q) =
M(Qj) + 1∑K
i=1(M(Qi) + 1)
,
(b) β3j(Q) =
∑K
i=1(M(Qi) + 1)
(M(Qj) + 1)
√
(M(Qj) + 1)(CV 2[D]−M(Qj)) +H(Qj)∑K
i=1
(
(M(Qi) + 1)(CV 2[D]−M(Qi)) +H(Qj)
, where
H(Qj) = 2µ
−1
(
QjM(Qj)−
∫ Qj
0
M(q)dq
)
, (202)
(c) γ3(Q) =
K∑K
j=1(M(Qj) + 1)
.
Proof. We first derive some useful results which will be used to prove parts (a) -(c). Let Vjm,
j = 1, . . . ,K, be the total demand allocated to supplier j in the mth consumption cycle.
Then, Vm =
∑K
j=1 Vjm is the buyer’s total demand in the mth consumption cycle. Let K
′
3(d)
be the supplier to whom the buyer allocates demand when the buyer’s cumulative demand
is d. During the mth consumption cycle, K ′3(d) is equal to j for a random demand-quantity
equal to Vjm. Then, {K ′3(d), d ≥ 0} is a regenerative process with state space {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
The regenerative points are the epochs at which a new consumption cycle starts. That is,
K ′3(d) consists of i.i.d consumption cycles. The tuples (V1m, . . . , VKm, Vm), m ≥ 1, are i.i.d.
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Since Dt has a finite mean µ < ∞, F (0) < 1, we have E[Vjm] < ∞ and E[Vm] < ∞.
Furthermore,
Vjm ∼
N(Qj)+1∑
t=1
Dt,
i.e., Vjm follows the same distribution as that of
∑N(Qj)+1
t=1 Dt. Since N(Qj)+1 is a stopping
time for {Dt, t = 1, 2, . . .} [64], we have
E[Vjm] = µ(M(Qj) + 1). (203)
Furthermore, using the results from [16], we have
E[V 2jm] = E[D
2](M(Qj) + 1) + 2µ
(
QjM(Qj)−
∫ Qj
0
M(q)dq
)
.
Using the fact that V ar[Vjm] = E[V
2
jm] − E2[Vjm], after some algebraic simplifications we
obtain
V ar[Vjm] = (M(Qj) + 1)(σ
2 − µ2M(Qj)) + 2µ
(
QjM(Qj)−
∫ Qj
0
M(q)dq
)
= µ2
(
(M(Qj) + 1)(CV
2[D]−M(Qj)) +H(Qj)
)
, (204)
where H(Qj) is as defined in (202). Furthermore, using the fact that Vm =
∑K
j=1 Vjm and
Vjm, j = 1, . . . ,K, are independent, we have
E[Vm] =
K∑
j=1
E[Vjm], (205)
V ar[Vm] =
K∑
j=1
V ar[Vjm]. (206)
152
(a) Using the renewal reward theorem [64],α3j can be written as
α3j(Q) =
E[Vjm]
E[Vm]
=
M(Qj) + 1∑K
j=1(M(Qj) + 1)
.
(b) Similar to CCP-T, we define the bullwhip effect under CCP-Q as follows
β3j(Q) =
CV [Vjm]
CV [Vm]
=
E[Vm]
E[Vjm]
√
V ar[Vjm]
V ar[Vm]
=
∑K
j=1E[Vjm]
E[Vjm]
√
V ar[Vjm]∑K
j=1 V ar[Vjm]
, (207)
where we substituted for E[Vm] and V ar[Vm] using equations (205) and (206). The result
follows by using equations (203) and (204) on the right-hand side of (207).
(c) During each cycle, the buyer switches suppliers K times. Then, using equation (201), γ3
can be written as
γ3(Q) =
number of supplier switches per cycle
E[length of consumption cycle]
=
K
E[
∑K
j=1(N(Qj) + 1)]
=
K∑K
j=1(M(Qj) + 1)
.
From part (a) of Proposition 13, we observe that the buyer can meet PSAs in the long-
run (i.e., α3j = pij) if Qj , j = 1, . . . ,K, satisfy certain conditions. Corollary 7 derives
these conditions. From part (b) of Proposition 13, we observe that β3j depends on: (i)
the parameters of the buyer’s demand distribution: µ, σ and M(·), which depend on F (·),
and (ii) the parameters of CCP-Q, (Q1, . . . , QK), j = 1, . . . ,K. Part (c) of Proposition 13
provides an expression to compute γ3.
Corollary 7. If Qj, j = 1, . . . ,K, are such that
pi1(M(Qj) + 1) = pij(M(Q1) + 1), (208)
then the following are true for CCP-Q:
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(a) α3j(p,Q1) = pij,
(b) β3j(p,Q)) =
1
pij
√
(M(Qj) + 1)(CV 2[D]−M(Qj)) +H(Qj)∑K
i=1
(
(M(Qi) + 1)(CV 2[D]−M(Qi)) +H(Qj)
,
(c) γ3(p,Q1) =
Kpi1
M(Q1) + 1
.
Proof. Suppose that Qj , j = 1, . . . ,K, satisfy equation (208). Using part (a) of Proposition
13, equation (208) and the fact that
∑K
j=1 pij = 1, we obtain
α3j(p,Q1) =
pij(M(Q1) + 1)
pi1(M(Q1) + 1)
∑K
j=1 pij/pi1
= pij .
Similarly, part (b) follows by using part (b) of Proposition 13 and equation (208). Using
part (c) of Proposition 13, equation (208) and the fact that
∑K
j=1 pij = 1, we obtain
γ3(p,Q1) =
K
(M(Q1) + 1)
∑K
j=1 pij/pi1
=
Kpi1
M(Q1) + 1
.
Part (a) of Corollary 7 shows that if condition (208) is satisfied, then the expected long-
run fraction of total demand allocated to supplier j is equal to pij , j = 1, . . . ,K. Thus, in
order to meet PSAs, the buyer needs to choose Qj for any one of the suppliers, say supplier
1, and compute Qj for other suppliers by solving equation (208). Corollary 7 also provides
expressions for β3j and γ3 when condition (208) is satisfied.
Corollary 8. When condition (208) is satisfied, the following are true for CCP-Q with
parameters (Q1, . . . , QK):
(a)
dβ3j
dµ
=
∑K
i=1
(
V ar[Vim]dV ar[Vjm]/dµ− V ar[Vjm]dV ar[Vim]/dµ
)
2pi2jβ3j
(
V ar[Vjm]
)2 ,
(b)
dβ3j
dQ1
=
∑K
i=1
(
V ar[Vim]dV ar[Vjm]/dQ1 − V ar[Vjm]dV ar[Vim]/dQ1
)
2pi2jβ3j
(
V ar[Vjm]
)2 ,
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(c)
dβ3j
dCV [D]
=
2µ2CV [D](M(Q1) + 1)
(∑K
i=1 V ar[Vim]pij − V ar[Vjm]
)
pi2jβ3j
(
V ar[Vjm]
)2 , where
dV ar[Vjm]
dµ
= −2µM(Qj)
(
M(Qj) + 1
)
+ 2µH(Qj), (209)
dV ar[Vjm]
dQ1
=
µ2pij
pi1
dM(Q1)
dQ1
(
CV 2[D] +
2Qj
µ
− 2pij
pi1
(M(Q1) + 1)− 1
)
. (210)
Proof. When condition (208) is satisfied, using Corollary 7 and equation (207), we have
β3j(Q) =
1
pij
√
V ar[Vjm]∑K
j=1 V ar[Vjm]
.
Then, parts (a), (b) and equation (209) follow directly by taking the first order derivative of
β3j and V ar[Vjm] with respect to µ and Q1, respectively. Differentiating both sides of (208)
with respect to Q1 and reorganizing the resulting expression, we have
dM(Qj)
dQ1
=
pij
pij
dM(Q1)
dQ1
. (211)
Taking the derivative of V ar[Vjm] with respect to Q1, and using equations (211) and (208)
in the resulting expression, we have
dV ar[Vjm]
dQ1
= µ2
dM(Qj)
dQ1
(
CV 2[D]−M(Qj)−M(Qj)− 1 + 2Qj
µ
)
=
µ2pij
pi1
dM(Q1)
dQ1
(
CV 2[D] +
2Qj
µ
− 2pij
pi1
(M(Q1) + 1)− 1
)
.
Furthermore, taking the derivative of V ar[Vjm] with respect to CV [D], we have
dV ar[Vjm]
dCV [D]
=
2µ2pij(M(Q1) + 1)CV [D]
pi1
. (212)
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Taking the derivative of β3j using equation (212) in the resulting expression, we have
dβ3j
dCV [D]
=
2µ2CV [D](M(Q1) + 1)
(∑K
i=1 V ar[Vim]pij − V ar[Vjm]pi
)
pi2jβ3j
(
V ar[Vjm]
)2 ,
=
2µ2CV [D](M(Q1) + 1)
(∑K
i=1 V ar[Vim]pij − V ar[Vjm]
)
pi2jβ3j
(
V ar[Vjm]
)2 .
Based on the results presented so far, we observe that in contrast to RAP and CCP-
T, the expressions for the performance measures of CCP-Q are less amenable to intuition.
Hence, to gain additional insights, we investigate performance of CCP-Q for two special
cases. Corollary 9 investigates the case where Qj = q ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and Corollary
10 investigates the case where the buyer’s demand is exponentially distributed. Further-
more, in Section IV.5.1 we study the effect of model parameters on β3j using an extensive
computational study.
Corollary 9. If Qj = q ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K, then (a) α3j = 1/K, (b) β3j =
√
K, and
(c) γ3(q) = 1/(M(q) + 1).
Proof. Suppose that Qj = q for j = 1, . . . ,K. Then, the results follow directly by substitut-
ing Qj = q for j = 1, . . . ,K in parts (a)-(c) of Proposition 13, and simplifying the resulting
expressions.
Corollary 9 verifies the intuitive notion that if Qj = q for all suppliers, then the expected
fraction of demand allocated to each supplier is equal to 1/K. That is, in the long-run,
buyer’s total demand is equally allocated among all K suppliers. An interesting and less
obvious result is that if Qj = q for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K, then β3j =
√
K for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K
independent of the parameters of the buyer’s demand distribution as well as the choice of
q. As a result, the buyer can choose q to its benefit, without amplifying the bullwhip effect
observed by its suppliers. For example, the buyer can choose a target value for the expected
long-run average number of supplier switches and use part (c) of Corollary (9) to solve for
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q.
Corollary 10. If the buyer’s demand is exponentially distributed, i.e., F (d) = 1 − e−d/µ
and Qj, j = 1, . . . ,K, are such that
Qj =
(pij − pi1)µ+ pijQ1
pi1
, (213)
then (a) α3j(p,Q1) = pij, (b) β3j(p,Q) = (pij
√
K)−1, and (c) γ3(p,Q1) = Kpi1µ/(Q1 + µ).
Proof. Suppose that F (d) = 1 − e−d/µ, for d ≥ 0, then we know that N(d) is a Poisson
process with mean d/µ. Therefore, M(d) = V ar[N(d)] = d/µ for d ≥ 0 and condition (208)
simplifies as follows:
pi1
(
Qj
µ
+ 1
)
= pij
(
Q1
µ
+ 1
)
⇒ Qj = (pij − pi1)µ+ pijQ1
pi1
=
pij(µ+Q1)− pi1µ
pi1
. (214)
Then, part (a) follows directly from Corollary 7. To prove part (b), we note that when
demand is exponentially distributed, µ = σ. Substituting this and the fact that M(Qj) =
V ar[N(Qj)] = Qj/µ in expression (204), we have
V ar[Vjm] =
(
Qj
µ
+ 1
)(
µ2 − µ2Qj
µ
)
+ 2µ
(
Q2j
µ
−
∫ Qj
0
q
µ
dq
)
=
Qj + µ
µ
(µ2 − µQj) +Q2j = µ2. (215)
Using equations (208) and (215) on the right hand side of (207), we have
β3j(p,Q) =
(M(Q1) + 1)
∑K
j=1 pij/pi1
(M(Q1) + 1)pij/pi1
√
µ2∑K
j=1 µ
2
=
1
pij
√
K
.
Part (c) follows by using M(Qj) = Qj/µ and part (c) of Corollary 7.
For the special case where buyer’s demand is exponentially distributed, Corollary 10
provides a simple expression (213) to compute Qj for j = 2, . . . ,K for a given value of Q1
so that PSAs are met in the long-run. Interestingly, part (b) of Corollary 10 shows that
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the bullwhip ratio under CCP-Q can be less than 1, i.e., CCP-Q does not always lead to
bullwhip effect. In fact, we have
β3j

≤ 1 if pij ≥ 1/
√
K
> 1 if pij < 1/
√
K.
(216)
Thus, when pij ≥ 1/
√
K, supplier j will prefer CCP-Q to RAP and CCP-T, which lead
to bullwhip effect. We refer the reader to Cachon et al. [12] for practical examples of cases
where the bullwhip ratio is less than 1. Part (b) of Corollary 10 also shows that β3j depends
only on pij and K, and is independent of Q1. Part (c) of Corollary 10 provides an expression
for γ3. It also shows that γ3 is an increasing function of K, µ, pi1 and a decreasing function
of Q1. More importantly, part (c) of Corollary 10 demonstrates the inherent flexibility of
CCP-Q, which allows it to meet the buyer’s target for the expected long-run average number
of supplier switches, denoted by γ0. In particular, given γ0, part (c) of Proposition 12 shows
that Q1 can be determined as
Q1 =
Kcpi1µ
γ0
− µ.
Figure 21: β31, β32 and γ3 with respect to pi1 = 1− pi2 for K = 2
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Figure 21 graphically illustrates the results in Corollary 10. It shows that for K = 2 as
pi1 increases, β31 decreases while β32 increases such that the rate of decrease in β31 is greater
than the rate of decrease in β32. Furthermore, it shows that as Q1 increases γ3 decreases.
Therefore, the buyer can manage its expected long-run average number of supplier switches
by an appropriate choice of Q1. That is, a wise choice of Q1 will allow the buyer to meet
PSAs and its target for the expected long-run average number of supplier switches, while
reducing the bullwhip effect observed by the suppliers.
IV.5.1 Sensitivity of bullwhip ratio under CCP-Q to model parameters
In this section, we numerically investigate the sensitivity of the performance of CCP-Q
to model parameters. For this purpose, we assume that condition (208) is satisfied, and
hence, α3j = pij and β3j as given by Corollary 7.
We assume that the buyer’s demand follows gamma distribution, which is defined only for
non-negative values and commonly encountered in practice (e.g., see [48]). For our numerical
study, we design an experimental setup by considering the parameter values summarized in
Table 19. We consider eight different values of µ and seven different values of CV [D], which
in turn imply a wide range of distribution shapes. As the number of suppliers increases, the
buyer’s administrative and contract management costs increase linearly. Hence, in practice
buyers contract with up to five preferred suppliers (e.g., see [3]), allocating at least 10% of
their demand to each supplier. As a result, we consider a maximum of five suppliers and
only investigate those cases where pij ≥ 0.1 for j = 1, . . . ,K. In addition, we ignore the
problem instances where pij = 1/K for j = 1, . . . ,K since analytical results for this case are
provided in Corollary 9. There are 48 combinations of PSAs where pij ≥ 0.1 and pij 6= 1/K for
µ CV [D] K pij/pi1 w = Q1/µ
50, 100, . . ., 6400 0.5, 0.75, . . ., 2 2, 3,4, 5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0.25, 0.5, . . ., 2
Table 19: Experimental setup to investigate the sensitivity of performance of CCP-Q to
model parameters
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Figure 22: β3j with respect to CV [D]: µ = 400, K = 3, pi1 = 1/6, pi2 = 1/3, pi3 = 1/2,
w = 1
j = 1, . . . ,K. We consider eight different values of Q1, such that w = Q1/µ = 0.25, 0.5,. . . , 2.
Thus, we study a total of 8× 7× 48× 8 = 21, 504 problem instances.
We list our observations as follows:
1. β3j is independent of µ.
2. When K = 2 the behavior of β3j , j = 1, 2 with respect to pi1 is similar to the one
observed in Figure 21.
3. As can be seen from Figure 22 for a representative set of parameter values, if pij < 1/K,
then β3j is a concave function of CV [D]. Otherwise, β3j is a convex function of CV [D].
4. The behavior of β3j with respect to w, and hence, Q1 depends on pij and CV [D] as can
be seen from Figure 23 for a representative setting. We note when CV [D] = 1.0, the
gamma distribution with mean µ reduces to the exponential distribution with mean
µ. Furthermore, from Corollary 10, we recall that when the buyer’s demand follows
exponential distribution β3j = (pij
√
K)−1 is independent of Q1. When the buyer’s
demand follows the gamma distribution, we find that pij < 1/K and CV [D] < 1.0
(CV [D] > 1.0), then β3j decreases convexly (increases concavely) and converges to
(pij
√
K)−1. In contrast, if pij ≥ 1/K and CV [V ] < 1.0 (CV [D] > 1.0), then β3j
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Figure 23: β3j with respect to w: µ = 400, K = 3, pi1 = 1/6, pi2 = 1/3, pi3 = 1/2
increases concavely (decreases convexly) and converges to (pij
√
K)−1. In addition, we
note that the magnitude of variation in β3j with respect to w, and hence, Q1 is so
small that it may seem to be independent of Q1, especially when pij ≥ 1/K.
5. In general, when pij is fixed, β3j decreases with respect to K, and the specific values
depend on PSAs of other suppliers. Table 20 illustrates how β3j changes when pi1 = 0.2
and K varies from 2 to 5. For example, as K increases from 2 to 3, β31 may decrease
from 3.64 to 3.00 or 2.94, depending on PSAs of other suppliers when K = 3. This
shows that as long as pij stays the same, supplier j benefits if the buyer diversifies its
supply base. That is, CCP-Q corroborates the pro-competitive effects of a contract
K pi1 pi2 pi3 pi3 pi5 β31
2 0.20 0.80 3.64
3 0.20 0.40 0.40 3.00
3 0.20 0.20 0.60 2.94
4 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40 2.54
5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 2.20
Table 20: β31 with respect to K: µ = 400, CV = 0.75 and w = 1.
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with PSAs. In contrast, Sections IV.3 and IV.4 show that the bullwhip effects under
RAP and CCP-T are independent of K and PSAs of other suppliers.
IV.6 Comparison of Demand Allocation Policies
In this section, we compare the three demand allocation policies from the perspective of
the buyer and the suppliers based on the three performance measures we defined in section
IV.2.2. Clearly, the buyer prefers the policy with the lowest expected long-run average
number of supplier switches, and each supplier prefers the policy that results in the lowest
bullwhip effect for that supplier. To facilitate the comparison of the policies, we consider
the following:
A1 Parameters for each demand allocation policy satisfy the respective conditions to meet
the PSAs, i.e., rj = pij , Lj = Lpij and Qj satisfy condition (208) for j = 1, . . . ,K.
A2 Each policy limits the maximum number of supplier switches to one per period, i.e.,
L ≥ 1/pi1. Alternatively, if v = Lpi1, then v ≥ 1.
A3 Lengths of the time-based and quantity-based consumption cycles are equal. From A1
and A2 and equation (201), we have
L = E[Lq] = E
[ K∑
j=1
(N(Qj) + 1)
]
=
(M(Q1) + 1)
∑K
j=1 pij
pi1
=
M(Q1) + 1
pi1
.
That is, M(Q1) = v − 1 ≥ 0.
From A1 it follows that αij = pij for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, . . . ,K. Hence, we compare the
policies based on the bullwhip ratios and the expected long-run average number of supplier
switches. Proposition 14 compares the performance of RAP and CCP-T. Propositions 15
and 16 compare the three demand allocation policies for special cases.
Proposition 14. When conditions A1-A3 are met, RAP and CCP-T compare as follows
for j = 1, . . . ,K: (a) β1j > β2j, and (b) if L ≥ Lmin, where Lmin is such that
Lmin =
K
1−∑Kj=1 pi2j , (217)
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Figure 24: The bullwhip effect under RAP and CCP-T with respect to pi1 for K = 2
then γ1 ≥ γ2, else γ1 < γ2.
Proof. (a) Using rj = pij in part (b) of Proposition 11, we obtain β1j ≥ 1/√pij . Similarly,
substituting Lj = Lpij in part (b) of Proposition 12, we obtain β2j = 1/
√
pij , and the result
follows directly from this.
(b) Using rj = pij in part (c) of Proposition 11, we have γ1 = 1−
∑K
j=1 pi
2
j . From part (c) of
Proposition 12, we have γ2 = K/L. Hence, if L > Lmin, where Lmin = K(1 −
∑K
j=1 pi
2
j )
−1,
then γ1 ≥ γ2, else γ1 < γ2.
Part (a) of Proposition 14 shows that the bullwhip effect under CCP-T is always lower
than that under RAP. Figure 24 illustrates this graphically, and provides a detailed compari-
son of RAP and CCP-T with respect to pi1 for K = 2. It shows that the bullwhip effect under
CCP-T is significantly lower than the bullwhip effect under RAP for the minor supplier with
pi1 ≤ 0.5. Part (b) of Proposition 14 shows that when L ≥ Lmin, we have γ1 ≥ γ2. Figure
25 shows that for K = 2, Lmin is a convex decreasing function of pi1. Thus, Proposition 14
shows that for L ≥ Lmin, both the expected long-run average number of supplier switches
and the bullwhip effect under CCP-T will be lower than those under RAP.
Proposition 15 extends this analysis for comparison of all three policies when PSAs are
equally distributed among the suppliers.
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Figure 25: Lmin with respect to pi1 for K = 2
Proposition 15. When conditions A1-A3 are met and pij = 1/K for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K, then
(a) β1j =
√
K +
K − 1
CV 2[D]
> β2j = β3j =
√
K > 1.
(b) If L = E[Lq] ≥ L¯min and Q1 ≥ Q¯1,min then γ1 ≥ γ2 = γ3, where L¯min = K
2
K − 1 and
Q¯1,min =
1
K − 1 . Else γ1 < γ2 = γ3.
Proof. (a) Using Corollary 9, we have β3j =
√
K = 1/
√
pij for j = 1, . . . ,K. From the
proof for part (a) of Proposition 14, we know that β1j ≥ β2j = 1/√pij . It follows that
β1j ≥ β2j = β3j .
(b) Evaluating γi as given by parts (c) of Proposition 11, Proposition 12, and Corollary 7
at rj = pij = 1/K, and L = E[Lq] = (M(Q1) + 1)/pi1 for j = 1, . . . ,K, and simplifying
the resulting expression we have: (i) γ1 = (K − 1)/K, (ii) γ2 = γ3 = K/L. Define L¯min =
K2/(K − 1) and Q¯1,min such that L¯min = (M(Q¯1,min) + 1)/pi1, then Q¯1,min = 1/(K − 1).
Furthermore, from (i) and (ii) above, we see that if L ≥ L¯min and Q1 ≥ Q¯1,min then
γ1 ≥ γ2 = γ3, else γ1 < γ2 = γ3.
Proposition 15 shows that when PSAs are equally distributed among all the suppliers,
CCP-T and CCP-Q result in the same performance. Part (b) of Proposition 14 shows that
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Figure 26: βij with respect to K when pij = 1/K for j = 1, . . . ,K
for L ≥ L¯min and Q1 ≥ Q¯1,min, both the expected long-run average number of supplier
switches and the bullwhip effect under CCP-T as well as CCP-Q will be lower than those
under RAP. Figure 26 graphically illustrates the increase in β1j and β2j = β3j with respect
to K when PSAs are equally distributed among all the suppliers. As a result, the less is the
number of suppliers that the buyer has, the higher is the PSA for each suppliers, and hence,
the smaller is the bullwhip effect observed by each supplier. Next, we compare the three
policies for the special case where the buyer’s demand is exponentially distributed.
Proposition 16. When conditions A1-A3 are met and the buyer’s demand is exponentially
distributed, then for j = 1, . . . ,K we have
(a) If pij < 1/K, and (i) if pijK(2 − pij) ≤ 1 then β3j ≥ β1j > β2j, (ii) if pijK(2 − pij) > 1
then β1j > β3j > β2j. On the other hand, if pij ≥ 1/K, then β1j > β2j > β3j.
(b) If L = E[Lq] ≥ Lmin where Lmin is as defined in equation (217) then γ1 > γ2 = γ3, else
γ1 < γ2 = γ3. Furthermore, E[Lq] ≥ Lmin is true when Q1 ≥ Q1,min and
Q1,min =
Kpi1µ
1−∑Kj=1 pi2j − µ. (218)
165
Proof. Suppose that conditions A1-A3 are met and the buyer’s demand is exponentially
distributed. Then CV = 1 and from Proposition 11, for rj = pij we have β1j =
√
(2− pij)/pij .
From Corollary 10, we have β3j = 1/(pij
√
K). If pij < 1/K, then we have
β3j =
1
pij
√
K
≥
√
pij
pij
= β2j . (219)
In addition, if pijK(2− pij) ≤ 1, then
β21j =
2− pij
pij
≤ 1
pi2jK
= β23j ,
and hence, β1j ≤ β3j . From part (a) of Proposition 14, we know that β1j ≥ β2j for j =
1, . . . ,K. Thus, it follows that if pij < 1/K and pijK(2 − pij) ≤ 1 then β3j ≥ β1j > β2j .
Similarly, if pijK(2 − pij) ≤ 1 then β1j > β3j . Combining this with equation (219), we see
that if pij < 1/K and pijK(2−pij) > 1 then β1j > β3j > β2j . On the other hand, if pij ≥ 1/K,
then following the same steps as above we can show that β1j > β2j > β3j . Part (b) follows
from part (b) of Proposition 14 and using L = E[Lq] = (M(Q1) + 1)/pi1 from A3.
Part (a) of Proposition 16 ranks RAP, CCP-T and CCP-Q based on the bullwhip ratio
and specific conditions on pij and K when the buyer’s demand is exponentially distributed.
The key insights of part (a) are: (i) If pij < 1/K, then CCP-T results in the lowest bullwhip
ratio, which is greater than 1 based on the results in Proposition 12. (ii) If pij ≥ 1/K, then
CCP-Q results in the lowest bullwhip ratio, which may be greater or less than 1 as shown by
Corollary 10. (iii) CCP-T never results in the highest bullwhip ratio, and (iv) RAP never
results in the lowest bullwhip ratio. Hence, if pij < 1/K, then supplier j prefers CCP-T.
Otherwise, supplier j prefers CCP-Q among all the three demand allocation policies. Part
(b) of Proposition 16 shows that for L ≥ Lmin and Q1 ≥ Q1,min, both the expected long-run
average number of supplier switches and the bullwhip effect under CCP-T as well as CCP-Q
will be lower than those under RAP.
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IV.6.1 Numerical study
In this section, we compare the demand allocation policies by considering more realistic
assumptions about the buyer’s demand process. We consider that conditions A1-A3 are met,
and hence, αij = pij for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, . . . ,K. Furthermore, we set parameters of CCP-
T and CCP-Q so that γ1 = γ2 = γ3. As a result, based on the expected long-run average
number of supplier switches, all policies are equivalent to the buyer. Hence, we compare the
three policies based on their bullwhip effect, i.e., from the supplier’s perspective.
We consider the same experimental setup that is used in Section IV.5.1 and is summarized
in Table 19 with the following changes: Since βij , i = 1, 2, 3 is independent of µ, we set
µ = 400. Furthermore, we consider that Q1 = Q1,min and L = Lmin so that γ1 = γ2 = γ3.
Thus, we consider a total of 48 × 7 = 336 problem instances. We list our observations as
follows:
O1 When K = 2, we have pi1 ≤ 0.5 and pi2 ≥ 0.5. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 27,
when K = 2 and pi1 < 0.5, supplier 1 always prefers CCP-T, while supplier 2 always
prefers CCP-Q. Furthermore, we observe that the bullwhip effect observed by supplier 1
is significantly lower under CCP-T than under CCP-Q. In contrast, the bullwhip effect
Figure 27: Comparison of the bullwhip effect for CCP-T and CCP-Q with respect to pi1 for
K = 2, CV [D] = 1, Q = µ
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Figure 28: Comparison of βi1 with respect to CV [D] when pi1 < 1/K and pi1K(2− pi1) ≤ 1:
K = 3, pi1 = 0.125, pi2 = 0.25, pi3 = 0.625
observed by supplier 2 is, relatively, only mildly higher under CCP-T than under CCP-
Q. From Proposition 14, we already know that β1j > β2j for j = 1, . . . ,K. Hence,
for K = 2 and pi1 < 0.5, from a system perspective, CCP-T may perform better than
CCP-Q. Similarly, when K = 2 and pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, perfromances of CCP-T and CCP-Q
are exactly the same and better than RAP as shown in Proposition 15.
O2 For all problem instances, we observe that when pij < 1/K and pijK(2 − pij) ≤ 1,
there exists a critical value u1 such that if CV [D] ≤ u1 then β1j ≥ β3j > β2j , else if
CV [D] > u1 then β3j ≥ β1j > β2j . This is illustrated by Figure 28 for a representative
setting where K = 3, pi1 = 0.125, pi2 = 0.25, pi3 = 0.625, and hence, pij < 1/K and
pijK(2 − pij) ≤ 1 for j = 1. We observe that u1 ≈ 0.70. Furthermore, recalling the
results from Section IV.5.1, it follows that β3j , and hence, u1 depends on K, and the
PSAs of other suppliers.
O3 For all problem instances, we observe that when pij < 1/K and pijK(2− pij) > 1, there
exists a critical value u2 such that if CV [D] ≤ u2 then β1j ≥ β3j > β2j . Otherwise
β3j ≥ β1j > β2j . This is illustrated by Figure 29 for a representative setting where
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Figure 29: Comparison of βi2 with respect to CV [D] when pi2 < 1/K and pi2K(2− pi2) ≤ 1:
K = 3, pi1 = 0.125, pi2 = 0.25, pi3 = 0.625
K = 3, pi1 = 0.125, pi2 = 0.25, pi3 = 0.625, and hence, pij < 1/K and pijK(2 − pij) > 1
for j = 2. We observe that u2 ≈ 1.350. Again, u2 depends on K, and the PSAs of other
suppliers. This generalizes the results in item (ii) of part (a) of Proposition 16.
In fact, we can combine observations O2 and O3 as follows: If pij < 1/K, there exists a
critical value u such that if CV [D] ≤ u, then β1j ≥ β3j > β2j . Otherwise β3j ≥ β1j > β2j .
O4 When pij ≥ 1/K, for each of the 384 problem instances, we observe that β1j ≥ β2j > β3j
as can be seen from Figure 30 for a representative set of parameters. This observation
is consistent with part (a) of Proposition 16.
O5 Figures 28, 29 and 30 also show that the differences in the bullwhip ratios under different
policies are relatively high for small values of CV [D], compared to the large values of
CV [D]. This is because (i) β1j decreases with respect to CV [D] as shown in Proposition
11, (ii) β2j is independent of CV [D] as shown in Proposition 11, and (iii) β3j is either a
concave or a convex function of CV [D] as shown in Section IV.5.1.
In general, some suppliers will have PSAs less than 1/K and some others will have PSAs
greater than 1/K. As a result, there is no policy which is unanimously preferred by the buyer
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Figure 30: Comparison of βi3 with respect to CV [D] when pi3 > 1/K: K = 3, pi1 = 0.125,
pi2 = 0.25, pi3 = 0.625
and all the suppliers. The natural question then is: which policy is the best considering the
total system consisting of the buyer and K suppliers? We address this question in the next
section.
IV.7 System Cost and the Supplier’s Perspective
So far, we have compared the demand allocation policies based on individual performance
measures. In this section, we compare the demand allocation policies by considering the total
system consisting of the buyer and K suppliers. Similar to Section IV.6.1, we consider that
A1 is satisfied, and set the parameters of CCP-T and CCP-Q so that γ1 = γ2 = γ3. That
is, all policies meet the PSAs in the long-run and result in the same expected long-run
average number of supplier switches. Consequently, all three demand allocation policies are
equivalent to the buyer and we compare them by considering the system cost, i.e., the total
replenishment and inventory holding costs incurred by K suppliers.
For this purpose, we consider that each supplier replenishes its VMI hub using an order-
up-to policy. Furthermore, when the buyer uses RAP or CCP-T suppliers replenish the
VMI hub inventory once every L periods. Similarly, when the buyer uses CCP-Q, suppliers
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replenish the VMI hub once every consumption cycle, for example, at the start of each
consumption cycle. Let pi = [pi1, pi2, . . . , piK ] be the vector of PSAs. Let Cj(pij) be supplier
j’s replenishment and inventory holding cost when its PSA is pij and the bullwhip ratio is
equal to 1, i.e., βij = 1. For example, Cj(pij) can be supplier j’s replenishment and inventory
holding cost when the buyer allocates demand to each supplier by splitting demand in each
period proportional to the PSAs. Let Vi(βij , pi) be the total VMI hub replenishment and
inventory holding cost incurred by all suppliers under policy i, i = 1, 2, 3, when PSAs are
given by pi. Then, using the results by Chen and Lee [21], we have
Vi(βij , pi) =
K∑
j=1
Cj(pij)
√
βij .
We assume that Cj(pij) is a linear function of pij such that Cj(pij) = Ajpij for j = 1, . . . ,K.
Let eii′ be the percentage savings in replenishment and inventory holding costs across all
suppliers due to policy i compared to policy i′. From the above discussion, Definition 2
follows immediately.
Definition 2. If Cj(pij) is a linear function of pij such that Cj(pij) = Ajpij for j = 1, . . . ,K,
then for i, i′ = 1, 2, 3 we have
eii′ =
(
1−
∑K
j=1Ajpij
√
βij∑K
j=1Ajpij
√
βi′j
)
× 100%.
Clearly, if eii′ > 0 then policy i results in lower costs compared to policy i
′. To gain
additional insights from Definition 2, we compute eii′ for each of the 384 problem instances
of Section IV.6.1 by assuming that Aj = A for j = 1, . . . ,K. We list our observations as
follows:
O1 Our results show that both CCP-T and CCP-Q result in significant cost savings com-
pared to RAP such that: (i) average value of e21 is 15.62% with a minimum of 1.87%
and a maximum of 47.99%, and (ii) average value of e31 is 15.99% with a minimum of
1.85% and a maximum of 47.96%. Figure 31 shows the distribution of e21 and e31 over
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Figure 31: Distribution of cost savings under CCP-T and CCP-Q compared to RAP
384 problem instances.
O2 In addition, we find that on an average CCP-Q performs better than CCP-T, such that
average value of e32 is 0.44% with a minimum of −0.37% and a maximum of 2.62%.
Recall that CCP-T prescribes guidelines to construct a fixed schedule for switching
suppliers, and is easier to implement than CCP-Q. Hence, depending on the magnitude
of the actual savings CCP-T or CCP-Q may be used.
O3 Compared to RAP, the average cost savings under both CCP-T and CCP-Q decrease
Figure 32: Average cost savings under CCP-T and CCP-Q compared to RAP with respect
to CV [D]
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convexly with respect to CV [D]. This is illustrated by Figure 32 for CCP-T, and follows
from our observations in item O5 of Section IV.6.1.
In summary, compared to RAP, both CCP-T and CCP-Q result in significant savings
in the total system cost with an average of more than 15% without increasing the buyer’s
expected long-run average number of supplier switches. These savings are higher for smaller
values of CV [D].
IV.8 Summary of Contributions and Key Insights
In this chapter, we propose and investigate three demand allocation policies for a buyer
to fulfill percentage supply allocations in multi-sourcing systems. We benchmark the de-
mand allocation policy observed in the electronics industry using RAP, and propose CCP-T
and CCP-Q as alternate policies to improve performance. We evaluate and compare the
performances of these policies based on (i) long-run fraction of total demand allocated to
each supplier, (ii) buyers expected long-run average number of supplier switches, and (iii)
suppliers bullwhip effect under multi-sourcing. We show that all three polices can meet
PSAs in the long run. Our main contribution is that we introduce the concept of bullwhip
effect under multi-sourcing, demonstrate its existence and quantify it. We show that while
RAP and CCP-T always lead to bullwhip effect, the bullwhip ratio under CCP-Q can be less
than 1. Counter to the intuition, the bullwhip effect for a supplier decreases (is independent
of) with respect to the coefficient of variation of the buyer’s demand under RAP (CCP-T).
In contrast, under CCP-Q the bullwhip effect for a supplier is a concave (convex) function
of the coefficient of variation of the buyer’s demand if the product of PSA for that particular
supplier and the total number of suppliers is less (greater) than unity.
We show that under dual sourcing systems and RAP, the buyer prefers a skewed, rather
than a comparable distribution of PSAs among its two suppliers due to lower expected
long-run average number of supplier switches. As a result, if the major supplier offers
lucrative discount for 100% of buyer’s market share, the buyer may prefer single-sourcing
rather than dual-sourcing. In contrast, CCP-T and CCP-Q are flexible such that with a
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wise choice of parameters, the buyer can meet its target for the expected long-run average
number of supplier switches, while reducing the bullwhip effect observed by the suppliers.
Thus, the demand allocation policy used by the buyer influences the pro-competitive and
anti-competitive effects of a contract with PSAs.
We rank the demand allocation policies based on each performance measure. We establish
a threshold value of PSA such that suppliers with higher (lower) PSA than this threshold
observe the lowest bullwhip effect under CCP-Q (CCP- T), and hence, prefer it over other
policies. Furthermore, our numerical results show that, compared to RAP, both CCP-T and
CCP-Q result in significant savings in the total system cost with an average of more than
15%. These savings are higher for smaller values of coefficient of variation of the buyer’s
demand. Furthermore, CCP-Q performs mildly better than CCP-T with an average benefit
of 0.44% and a maximum of 2.62%. We note that CCP-T is easier to implement than CCP-
Q, and hence, depending on the magnitude of the actual savings CCP-T or CCP-Q may be
used. When negotiating a contract with the buyer, suppliers will find our results valuable
to carefully select the service levels that they commit to provide based on the agreed upon
PSAs.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation is motivated by practices in the electronics industry. In particular, on
the out-bound side, manufacturers satisfy stochastic demand from multiple markets. On
the in-bound side, manufacturers multi-source parts from several suppliers. Recognizing
the potential benefits and increased relevance of such practices, this dissertation focuses
on three distinct yet related problems. The first problem investigates joint replenishment
and liquidation decisions for a supplier who satisfies demand from a contractual and a spot
market. The second problem extends this to investigate a supplier’s joint replenishment,
allocation and pricing decisions under two markets. The third problem investigates a buyer’s
demand allocation decisions under multi-sourcing with percentage supply allocations and
their impact on the bullwhip effect. The contributions of this dissertation can be summarized
as follows:
1. We provide a stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) formulation for joint replen-
ishment and allocation decisions of a supplier facing stochastic demand from both
contractual and spot markets under production capacity limitations. In such settings,
if one reserves the optimal amount of inventory for future high-priority or high-revenue
demand, higher profits can be earned. If the unit revenue and the lost sales penalty for
the primary market are stationary, we show that for both the lost sales and the backlog
cases, the optimal policy is characterized by two quantities: the critical produce-up-to
and the critical retain-up-to levels. We establish bounds for the two critical quantities,
discuss their economic interpretation, and use them to construct a new and effective
heuristic policy.
2. Our practical contribution is that we identify alternate benchmark policies and show
that there are (lower and upper) thresholds on the unit revenue earned from the spot
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market such that one of the alternate benchmark policies is optimal. Based on our
computational study, we quantify the benefits of using the optimal policy over the
benchmark policies and show that the potential savings are significant.
3. In addition, we study a generalization where all cost and revenue parameters are non-
stationary, i.e., the unit revenue and lost sales penalty from the primary market are
also non-stationary. We show that the optimal policy is characterized by three critical
quantities rather than just two: the critical produce-up-to level, the critical level of
inventory to be saved from sales in either market and the critical level of inventory to
be saved from sales in the spot market.
4. We provide a stochastic dynamic programming formulation for joint replenishment, al-
location and pricing decisions of a supplier facing stochastic demand from two customer
classes. This problem is relevant for manufacturers who sell their products to high vol-
ume customers (e.g., retailers) as well as directly to individual customers through their
web-based channel. We show that the optimal price charged to Class 2 customers is
a function of the left-over inventory after satisfying Class 1 demand, i.e., a dynamic
pricing policy is optimal. Furthermore, the stage 1 optimal policy is characterized by
two quantities: the critical produce-up-to level and the critical amount of inventory to
be protected from Class 1. That is, a discretionary sales policy is optimal for Class 1.
We conduct a computational study and quantify the benefits of discretionary sales for
Class 1 and dynamic pricing for Class 2.
5. We contribute to the existing literature by investigating the optimality of joint myopic
replenishment, allocation and pricing policies for a supplier facing stochastic demand
from two demand classes.
6. Although common across all industries, multi-sourcing under percentage supply al-
locations (PSAs) leads to unique challenges due to the operational changes needed
for (temporarily) switching suppliers in the electronics industries. In such settings,
buyer’s demand allocation policies that can meet PSAs have not been studied in the
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literature before. To fill this gap, we propose and investigate three demand alloca-
tion policies: (i) random allocation policy (RAP) benchmarks the current practice, (ii)
time-based cyclic consumption (CCP-T) and (iii) quantity-based cyclic consumption
policies (CCP-Q).
7. Furthermore, although a vast and growing body of academic and practice oriented
literature investigates bullwhip effect in single-sourcing supply chains, there is no liter-
ature on bullwhip effect in multi-sourcing supply chains. We contribute to the current
literature by demonstrating the existence of bullwhip effect caused due to demand
allocation policies in multi-sourcing systems. We term it as the bullwhip effect under
multi-sourcing and emphasize its absence in single-sourcing systems. We show that
while RAP and CCP-T always lead to bullwhip effect, the bullwhip ratio under CCP-
Q can be less than 1. We show that compared to RAP, both CCP-T and CCP-Q
result in significant savings in total replenishment and inventory holding costs across
all suppliers with an average of more than 15% without increasing the buyer’s expected
long-run average number of supplier switches.
8. Our results offer new insights showing that the pro-competitive and anti-competitive
effects of a contract with PSAs may be strengthened or weakened depending on the
demand allocation policy used by the buyer.
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